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Abstract
Both suffrage rights and elections are fundamental parts of democracy. I study the fac-
tors that drive the effects of and the support for suffrage extensions. In the context
of elections, I develop an empirical strategy to identify the potential disadvantage from
which incumbent parties suffer. My dissertation is therefore split into three papers,
which answer the following research questions:
1. Does the political impact of enfranchisement vary with its political and institu-
tional context?
2. What are the factors driving the support for enfranchisement?
3. How can we identify whether incumbent parties suffer from a disadvantage in elec-
tions?
In the first paper, I exploit quasi-random local franchise extensions to Swiss women
in the late 20th century to empirically identify the political impact of female suffrage
in different contexts. First, I analyse municipalities with a male majority in favor of
women’s vote and ones with a majority against it. I further study municipalities with a
parliament versus direct-democratic assemblies. My findings show that female suffrage
caused a right-wing effect in municipal party vote shares and expenditure. However,
municipalities that favoured female suffrage moved more center-right than right, and
experienced a lower drop in electoral turnout. Municipalities with a parliament instead
of an assembly making budget decisions, experienced an increase instead of a drop in
expenditure. I complement my findings with a national election survey from 1972 to
show that the effects might be driven by differences in women’s political interest.
Democratisation literature mostly focuses on the elite’s decision to extend the fran-
chise. But in many cases, current voters have to decide whether to grant the vote to
a broader population. Little evidence exists on what factors drive the support among
those who are already enfranchised. In this paper, I exploit the change in municipal
Yes-vote shares among male voters for two Swiss national referenda on female suffrage
between 1959 and 1971. I show that municipalities, which quasi-randomly introduced
local female suffrage in between the two referenda, increased their support much more.
This increase is driven by municipalities in which a majority of men was initially op-
posed to national suffrage. Conditioning on similar initial support, I further show that
this difference cannot be explained by a “ceiling effect”. My findings can also not cor-
roborate that the rise in support is driven by post-suffrage change in municipal party
vote shares, expenditure, or cultural proxies, such as female labour market participation.
The third paper discusses the partisan incumbency disadvantage. Partisan incumbency
disadvantage is the extent to which a candidate is impeded by her party’s incumbency
status in an open-seat race. The current literature suggests its prevalence in young
democracies and explains it through weak parties or corruption. However, we show
that canonical regression discontinuity designs (RD) to estimate this quantity can be
downward biased. Cause is an imbalance in voters’ uncertainty about the candidate’s
quality at the RD cut-off. We propose a revised empirical strategy to circumvent bias.
With data from Brazilian mayoral elections in 1996-2012, we apply both the canonical
and the revised strategy to identify the electoral disadvantage incumbent parties face.
We find that using the new approach cuts the effect by three quarters (from -13.2% to
-3.1%).
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1. Making Suffrage Work
The impact of female suffrage in different environments
“We warned that the Swiss political landscape would shift to the left if
women were given the right to vote in elections and referenda.”
Rosmarie Koeppel, Swiss Anti-suffragist1
Abstract: I exploit quasi-random local franchise extensions to Swiss women in the late
20th century to empirically identify the political impact of female suffrage in different
contexts. First, I analyse municipalities with a male majority in favor of women’s vote
and ones with a majority against it. I further study municipalities with a parliament
versus direct-democratic assemblies. My findings show that female suffrage caused a
right-wing effect in municipal party vote shares and expenditure. However, municipali-
ties that favoured female suffrage moved more center-right than right, and experienced a
lower drop in electoral turnout. Municipalities with a parliament instead of an assembly
making budget decisions, experienced an increase instead of a drop in expenditure. I
complement my findings with a national election survey from 1972 to show that the
effects might be driven by differences in women’s political interest.
1New Zurich Newspaper (NZZ), “Gegnerinnen der Gleichberechtigung” (Enemies of (Gender) Equal-
ity), 6 February 2011.
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1.1. Introduction
Women’s political inclusion started with female suffrage. For most countries today,
decades have passed since this turning point in history. But involving women in politics,
both as voters and policy makers, is still a priority for governments around the world.
On the one hand, the objective is to improve representation. On the other hand, evi-
dence suggests direct welfare benefits from women’s presence in politics.
An example for these welfare benefits is the powerful impact female suffrage had in the
US. It reduced child death (Miller, 2008) and inequality in children’s education (Kose
et al., 2018). From several countries, we know that female policymakers increase the
emphasis on public health (Clayton and Zetterberg, 2018; Chattopadhyay and Duflo,
2004). All of these effects are channelled through more liberal policy platforms and
higher government expenditure.
While we know about these aggregate effects, the impact of women’s inclusion may
still vary with its political and institutional context. For example, the US gave women
the vote during the Progressive Era, which was a particularly fruitful period for liberal
policy. We therefore have to ask if suffrage would have had a different effect if it were
introduced within other times, or under different political institutions. Understanding
heterogeneous effects is important when we implement inclusive policy (e.g. gender
quota), and want to learn the historical impact women’s vote had around the world.
In this paper, I therefore study female suffrage in a setting, which has two main ad-
vantages. One, it allows for an improved causal identification. Moreover, I can identify
heterogeneous effects across different political environments and their underlying insti-
tutions. In the following, I explain both advantages in detail.
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Female suffrage was usually introduced as a national voting reform. This makes it
hard to identify the political impact it had on a country. A cross-country comparison is
problematic, because where and when women were enfranchised was not random (Teele,
2018; Przeworski, 2009). Even when we estimate the effect of suffrage at the subnational
level (e.g. in US states), differential political trends may still be a confounding factor,
which we cannot perfectly control for.
To address this issue, I exploit the case of quasi-random subnational franchise exten-
sions to Swiss women. Like the US, Switzerland is a federalised country with a long
democratic history. Its 26 cantons could change their suffrage laws autonomously by
holding a referendum. Between 1966-1971, eight Swiss cantons held cantonal referenda
on local female suffrage that were either narrowly rejected or approved, with a vote
margin of 3% or less. This narrow margin made the referendum outcome unpredictable,
and which of these eight cantons introduced women’s vote was credibly quasi-random.
We can therefore be less concerned that enfranchised cantons in this sample followed
systematically different political trends, which could confound the estimated effect of
suffrage. I conduct my analysis at the municipality level with a new panel dataset of
1,242 Swiss municipalities for the years 1940-1990.
In a second step, I test two potential sources of heterogeneity in the political impact
suffrage had. One is an environment of men in favour or against women’s vote. This
political context could influence the effect of suffrage in several ways. Gender norms
could be correlated with municipalities being favourable towards suffrage. And women’s
political interest or preferences could be affected by these norms. Moreover, male vot-
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ers against women’s vote may respond differently to suffrage than those who favoured it.
The second source of heterogeneity I test is institutional. I analyse if the franchise ex-
tension had a different impact on municipalities with a municipal parliament instead of
direct-democratic assemblies. Evidence shows that Swedish women turned out at higher
rates where municipalities had local assemblies instead of parliaments (Kim, 2019). Dif-
ferences in turnout could affect the impact suffrage had on municipal expenditure. The
lack of anonymity in assemblies might alter both women’s and men’s voting behaviour.
Finally, parliaments could respond less or slower to the new voters’ political preferences.
To estimate the causal impact of women’s suffrage, and test for heterogeneous ef-
fects, I estimate the difference in differences in municipal party vote shares, turnout and
municipal expenditure. My findings show that, in aggregate, female suffrage caused a
right-wing effect in municipal party vote shares and a drop in expenditure. However, I
find meaningful heterogeneous effects for almost all outcomes.
Favourable municipalities show a larger drop in the vote share for left parties, but
to the benefit of conservative and independent instead of right-wing populist parties.
They also experienced a smaller decline in liberal party vote shares. And even though
their voter base grew more as a result of suffrage, their election turnout dropped less.2
Finally, municipalities with a parliament instead of direct-democratic assemblies show
an increase instead of a drop in total expenditure. I find no significant effect on social
welfare.
Since Swiss voting ballots are not split by gender, we cannot see if these effects are
driven by the new female voters, or result from a response in male voting behaviour. In
2The share of new voters is estimated by the effect of female suffrage on the number of entitled voters.
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a final analysis, I therefore use two data sources to conduct ecological inference. The
first is municipalities’ proxied share of women.3
I find that the shift to the center-right was driven by a higher female proportion.
Specifically, left parties’ vote share and turnout dropped more with a higher share of
women, and independent parties’ vote share gained more.4 A higher share of women was
further associated with a smaller drop in liberal party vote shares and total expenditure.
The second source for ecological inference is a national election survey from 1972.
The distribution of male and female responses to survey questions on ideology, party
and policy preferences reveals: When they showed interest in politics, then men and
women voted about equally center-right at the time.5
However, women’s interest in politics ranked much lower than men’s. In addition to
claiming low interest, they responded more often than men to not know an answer to a
question. The survey therefore points to a possible mechanism for the findings in this
paper: Less informed women could have been more impressionable. Theory shows that
uninformed voters are easier to influence with campaign spending (Baron, 1994). In a
similar manner, low-informed women could have been more susceptible to party rhethoric
at a time when right-wing parties generally gained in Swiss politics.6 Therefore, when
uninterested women turned out at all, they may have voted for more right-wing pol-
3The municipal share of women is proxied by the change in the number of entitled voters in the last
election before and the first election after female suffrage.
4Within the sample, the average share of women is 52.6% in municipalities, with a standard deviation
of 4.5%.
5This applies to both, respondents from the overall Swiss population and from the population of the
eight cantons in my sample.
6In Figure A.12.1 in Appendix section A.12, we can see that Swiss right-wing parties increased their
national vote share significantly in the 1970s. This was generally associated with the political debate
around a 1970 national referendum on very restrictive immigration policy, called the “Schwarzenbach
referendum”.
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icy platforms. My finding that favourable municipalities experienced a lower drop in
turnout suggests that their women were possibly more intersted in politics. And hence,
these municipalities shifted less to the right and more to the center-right.
This paper makes several contributions to the current literature. Using quasi-random
franchise extensions to women, it identifies the causal impact of female suffrage on politi-
cal outcomes, which includes party vote shares, turnout and government expenditure. It
further reveals meaningful heterogeneity in these effects. This heterogeneity shows that
the impact of women’s inclusion in politics is not one-directional, and may not always
trigger liberal policy. Moreover, it improves our understanding how the political and
institutional context may matter when we introduce gender-inclusive policies today.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current
literature on female suffrage. Section 3 describes in detail the institutional context of
Swiss female suffrage at the local level. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy, the
sample selection and the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results on municipal party
vote shares, election turnout and municipal expenditure. Section 6 tests the robustness
of the presented results. Section 7 investigates the underlying mechanisms using the
municipal share of women and survey data. Section 8 concludes the paper.
1.2. Literature on Female Suffrage
From the current literature, we know that the political and the cultural environment
influenced the timing of women’s suffrage. Women were more likely to get the franchise
early where electoral competition was high and parties anticipated that they would gain
vote shares from the newly enfanchised voters (Teele, 2018; Przeworski, 2009). Effective
cooperation between the suffrage movements across the United States led to an earlier
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franchise extension than in the otherwise similar political system of Switzerland. There,
the cultural divide between the French- and German-speaking cantons slowed the pro-
cess down (Banaszak, 1996).
The political and institutional environment further mattered for women’s political
participation after suffrage was introduced. Direct-democratic assemblies at the munic-
ipality level generated higher female turn-out than municipal parliaments after Sweden
extended the franchise to women (Kim, 2019). In a study of the US, Corder and Wol-
brecht (2005) find that turnout was significantly lower among women than men. But
despite their inexperience, female voters’ turnout was not more sensitive to political
context, such as political campaigns, than men’s.
Once introduced, women’s suffrage had an important, mostly liberal impact on US
policy. Suffrage caused an immediate shift to more progressive voting in Congress, which
led to higher child healthcare expenditure and lower child mortality rates (Miller, 2008).
It further led to improved education policies and higher as well as more equal educa-
tional attainment of American children (Kose et al., 2018).
Both studies exploit differential timing of US state-level suffrage extensions to identify
these effects. Hence, effects are estimated by the difference in over-time differences in
outcomes between states with and without women’s vote. The identification relies on
the assumption that outcomes across those states would follow parallel trends with and
without suffrage.
In a similar study, Lott and Kenny (1999) find that enfranchised women caused a
positive impact on states’ total expenditure and revenues, and led to more progressive
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voting of state representatives. They further show that this effect did not differ for
states, which were forced to extend the franchise to women through the 19th Amend-
ment in 1920. However, they cannot observe whether and how opposed those states
were to suffrage by that time. Further, the impact of the 1920 enforcement cannot be
disentangled from a simple year effect.
The current literature further provides evidence that female suffrage caused a liberal
shift in election outcomes. Morgan-Collins and Teele (2018) show that women’s suffrage
was associated with an increase in liberal party vote shares across different democra-
cies in Western Europe. Morgan-Collins (2019) finds that in US counties with a strong
suffrage movement, the national franchise extension of 1920 decreased the success of
conservative politicians, and incentivised others to adopt a more progressive agenda.
A complementary literature shows that women not only had an impact on policy as
voters, but also as policymakers. Again, the identified effects are mostly liberal. Clayton
and Zetterberg (2018) find that the introduction of women’s quota across the world’s
legislatures is associated with higher healthcare expenditure. Similarly, Chattopadhyay
and Duflo (2004) identify a shift in public goods provision from infrastructure to water
supply, as a consequence of women’s quota in Indian local government.
However, another branch of the literature points towards women voting more conser-
vative than men. In France, Teele (2018) argues that the Radicals’ main reason to not
extend the franchise in early 20th century, was because they thought female voters were
too pious to support a progressive political agenda. In America, the suffrage movement
was linked to the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), a national organisa-
tion campaigning for alcohol prohibition (Teele, 2018; Keyssar, 2000; Banaszak, 1996).
8
In more recent elections in Chile, Pino (2017) shows that women were less likely to vote
for female candidates than men, and that this bias against women is stronger among
female voters from the political right.
Liberal impact through women’s political inclusion can also be prevented by “back-
lash” from conservative voters. Clayton (2015) finds that women’s quota caused a de-
crease in women’s political participation in Lesotho. Gottlieb (2016) shows that civic
education targeting women in Mali had a negative impact on female civic activity. Both
conclude that the mechanism behind these effects were a backlash against the interven-
tion into traditional gender norms. Gottlieb further finds that backlash was stronger
where gender norms were more conservative. Hence, the impact of inclusive policies can
vary with the cultural environment.
In summary, the literature on female franchise is not conclusive on the question
whether women have or had different political preferences than men and in what di-
rection. But the majority of studies suggests a more liberal tendency. Consensus exists
on the following: The political environment influenced whether women received the right
to vote earlier or later. And some evidence shows that the political, cultural and insti-
tutional environment affected women’s political participation. This paper contributes
to the literature with evidence that context matters for the political impact of female
suffrage beyond participation. It further confirms that women’s political inclusion does
not always lead to more liberal policies. Finally, it shows that the impact of suffrage
could depend on women’s political interest.
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1.3. The Institutional Context of Swiss Female Suffrage
1.3.1. Swiss Federalism
In 1970, Switzerland had 25 cantons and 3,074 municipalities. Its population consisted
of 6.3 million residents (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2020). Roughly half of it were
women and 15% foreigners, which together made up the unenfranchised share of the
adult population.
As a democratic confederation founded in 1848, the Swiss cantons and their munic-
ipalities always had strong political autonomy. Each canton has its own constitution,
which also determines who owns the right to vote within the canton. These local voting
rights are important, because most policy decisions are made at the cantonal and the
municipality level.
Table 1.1 shows the typical division of policy responsibilities across the three admin-
istrative levels in the Swiss political system. Social welfare is for example a typical
municipal responsibility. Switzerland has a national social insurance against unemploy-
ment, age and invalidity. Social welfare is therefore intended to be a “last resort” when
national insurance is not sufficient to cover an individual’s or family’s essential living
expenses.
The generosity of social welfare varies considerably between municipalities (SKOS,
2020). The Swiss Conference for Social Welfare (SKOS) is an association of all cantons
and about half of all Swiss municipalities that regularly meets to publish guidelines
on what a minimum standard of living in Switzerland should include. However, these
guidelines leave a lot of room for discretion.
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Many other policies that directly affect people’s lives such as education, healthcare,
transportation and security, are all part of local and not national politics. Political par-
ticipation therefore truly matters at the cantonal and the municipality level.
Switzerland’s three administrative units and their responsibilities
Federal Level Cantons Municipalities
- Foreign policy - School system - Refuse collection
- Defense - Hospitals - Water supply
- Railway infrastructure - Police - Sanitation
- Aviation - Culture - Social welfare
- Monetary and currency - Nature/monument care - Asylums
- Customs - Public transportation - Fire brigades
- Research/science - Taxation - Urban planning
- Agrarian policy - Location policy - Operating schools
- Communication - Church - Leisure locations
- Social insurances - Sports - Operating road network
- Environmental policy - Law enforcement
- Nuclear energy - Additional social security
- Macroeconomic policy
- Immigration policy
Table 1.1.: Division of responsibilities between federal, cantonal and municipal level.
Source: Moeckli (2008).
1.3.2. Swiss Direct Democracy
The decentralised political system in Switzerland made female suffrage just as much a
cantonal as a national matter. Every franchise extension to women required a constitu-
tional amendment. For any amendment to a constitution, both national and cantonal,
an obligatory referendum has to be called. Above 50% of the voters has to approve
the referendum in order to pass the amendment. Every referendum outcome counts.
Hence, there are no minimum requirements for voter turn-out. Voters also do not have
to register, with the exception of Swiss nationals who live abroad. There are therefore
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relatively low barriers to turn out.
Referenda on constitutional amendments like female suffrage are either automatically
called after parliament has passed the amendment. Or they can be requested through
a so-called “popular initiative”. Almost all of the cantonal referenda on female suffrage
were automatically launched after the amendment had passed parliament (Ruckstuhl,
1991). An exception was a referendum in Geneva in 1920.7
Swiss cantons started to hold local referenda on the question of cantonal and/or mu-
nicipal female suffrage in 1919.8 Until 1959, all of these referenda were unsuccessful. In
1959, the first national referendum on a constitutional amendment introducing women’s
vote was rejected by 66.9% of the purely male voters. But at the same time, the first two
local referenda were accepted in Waadt and in Neuenburg, both partly French-speaking
cantons.
The numbers of cantonal referenda that followed varied per year. Only some of them
succeeded. Figure 2.3.2 shows the number of cantonal referenda each year since the
beginning of the 20th century and the accumulative number of cantons that introduced
female suffrage of some sort (i.e. school council, municipal or cantonal voting right).
Swiss men eventually granted women the right to vote at the federal level in a second
national referendum in 1971 where 65.7% of the voting population and the majority
within 17 cantons voted Yes. Due to the cantonal autonomy, this had at first no legal
consequences for local suffrage laws. Eight cantons had not yet extended their franchise
7Yvonne Voegeli, Swiss Historical Lexicon, 17 Sept 2019:
https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/010380/2019-09-17/
8Neuenburg held a cantonal referendum on introducing the cantonal and municipal voting right for
women in June 1919, which was however rejected with a 69.2% majority in the popular vote, and
not a single municipality voting in favour.
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Figure 1.1.: History of Swiss local female suffrage: Timeline of cantonal referenda
with Yes-vote share (in %) at the cantonal level and count of cantons with
cantonal female suffrage.
to women.9 Women in these cantons could therefore vote in national elections and ref-
erenda, but not in local ones. The very last canton to enfranchise women at the local
level was Appenzell-Innerrhoden in 1990.10
The staggered enfranchisement of Swiss women brings an empirical advantage: We
can observe political outcomes like election results or policy within the same years in
cantons with and in cantons without women’s suffrage. Another advantage comes from
the fact that the franchise was always extended through referenda.
Compared to for example survey data, referenda results are much more likely to reveal
9The eight cantons were all in the German-speaking part of Switzerland: Appenzell Ausserrhoden,
Appenzell Innerrhoden, Glarus, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schwyz, St. Gallen and Uri.
10Appenzell-Innerrhoden rejected female suffrage in its last referendum on this matter in 1990, but
was then forced by the Swiss supreme court to introduce it. The court argued that the canton’s
constitution violated a basic right (i.e. the right to vote independent of gender) in the national
constitution. This intrusion by the supreme court into cantonal matters was without precedence
and hence a surprise at the time.
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sincere voter preferences. Swiss referenda are always binding. Hence, voters do not sim-
ply express their preference, but actually internalise the consequences of their decision.
This includes the decision not to turn out to vote in the first place.
Referenda questions are always binary. This meant that voters were only allowed to
give a unique response when they were asked whether they wanted to extend the fran-
chise to women: Yes or No. Empty ballots do not count in referenda. We can therefore
exclude the possibility of strategic voting.
Finally, referenda are not an unusual event for Swiss voters. Since 1848, Switzerland
has held over 600 referenda at the national level. Among these, 69 happened between
1951-1970 and 145 between 1971-1990 (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2020). For local
referenda, the frequency varies across cantons and years. But referenda are everywhere
an essential part of the Swiss political decision-making process. Swiss voters are there-
fore not only familiar with the voting procedure, but also with the fact that referenda
outcomes are truly binding and will have a potentially large impact on their lives.
In summary, the Swiss institutional context around female suffrage provides a unique
setting for my empirical strategy.
1.4. Empirical Strategy
The following section on how I identify heterogeneous effects of female suffrage first
explains my specifications. It is followed by my sample selection of eight cantons, which
quasi-randomly extended the franchise. It concludes with detailed information on the
dataset I created to estimate the political effects female suffrage had on the municipalities
within those eight cantons.
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1.4.1. Specifications
To estimate my empirical model, I use two specifications. I first identify the political
impact of female suffrage at the municipality level. In a second step, I test for hetero-
geneity in this effect.
To identify the impact of women’s suffrage, I exploit the fact that the cantons in my
sample extended the franchise to women in different years. I use panel data on munic-
ipal party vote shares, turnout and municipal expenditure to estimate the difference in
differences between municipalities in cantons with and without female suffrage. I use
the following specification in an OLS regression:
Ym,c,y = αm + γy + σct+ βEnfranchisedc,y + m,c,y (1.1)
where Ym,c,y is the outcome of interest in municipality m in canton c in year y. αm
are municipality fixed effects and γy are year effects. Since cantonal elections don’t take
place annually but every four years, I use election instead of year fixed effects when I
run the regression for electoral outcomes.11 Election effects can better capture electoral
cycle effects, which might be common across cantons, despite their elections not taking
place in the exact same year. I further control for canton-specific linear time trends
with σct. β is the difference-in-differences estimator of local female suffrage. Thus,
Enfranchisedc,y is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of 1 in year y after female
suffrage is successfully introduced by a cantonal referendum. m,c,y is the error term for
each municipality-year observation.
11Election dummies are coded for each jth election after the cantonal referendum on suffrage, and each
jth election before the cantonal referendum on suffrage. Election dummies can hence control for
common electoral cycle affects across cantons within the years in which the cantonal referenda on
female suffrage happened.
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In a second step, I estimate the following model:
Ym,c,y = αm + γy + σct+ σEnfranchisedc,y
+ρ(Enfranchisedc,y × In favourm) + m,c,y
(1.2)
where In favourm is a dummy variable, which equals 0 (1) if a municipality’s majority
voted against (in favour of) the franchise extension at the time of the cantonal referen-
dum. I further run a second version of this model, with an interaction variable being
Municipal parliamentm, which equals 0 (1) if a municipality had a direct-democratic
assembly (a municipal parliament) deciding over its budget.
The coefficient of interest in this model is ρ. It is the difference-in-difference-in-
differences estimator. In other words, it captures the between-municipality difference
in the effect of female suffrage on outcome Ym,y. Whether a municipality favoured or
voted against female suffrage, and whether it had a municipal parliament or not, both
remain fixed over time. The individual effect of In favourm and Municipal parliamentm
on outcome Ym,y is therefore absorbed in the municipality fixed effect αm. However, I can
exploit the variation in the enfranchisement status of cantons (Enfranchisedc,y) over the
time period in the panel data. This allows me to identify the interaction effect between
enfranchisement (Enfranchisedc,y = 1) and favourable municipalities (In favourm = 1).
The same applies to the interaction effect between enfranchisement and municipalities
with a municipal parliament (Municipal parliamentm = 1).
1.4.2. Sample Selection
Difference in differences rely on the parallel trends assumption (Steigerwald et al., 2020;
Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Hence, one worry is that it is not random which cantons
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introduce female suffrage earlier or later. If that is the case, these cantons may follow
different instead of parallel trends in outcomes, and the estimated effect will be biased.
A common practice to address this concern is to test for differential trends in polit-
ical outcomes before suffrage was introduced. However, trends might still differ in the
introduction years. The problem is that we never observe the same canton in the same
(election) year both with and without suffrage.
I therefore identified eight cantons in Switzerland, which had very narrow referenda
outcomes on female suffrage. All of them happened within a relatively short time frame
between 1966-1972. Table B.1.1 shows for each canton the year in which the cantonal
referendum was held, the Yes-vote share in the referendum and the suffrage bill that was
voted on. Each of the eight referenda had a margin of 3% or less. However, only three
of them were narrowly approved and therefore extended the franchise. The other five
were narrowly rejected. These cantons introduced local female suffrage in later years.
Figure 1.2 shows a map of all Swiss cantons with the eight cantons colored in orange
and purple, according to their narrow referendum outcome.
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Referendum in Yes-vote share Suffrage right voted on Canton
1968 52.1% Municipal Bern (BE)
1969 50.8% Municipal (education policy) Thurgau (TG)
1971 51.7% Cantonal and municipal Aargau (AG)
Referendum in Yes-vote share Suffrage right voted on Canton
1966 48.3% Cantonal and municipal Ticino (TI)
1968 47.3% Municipal Solothurn (SO)
1969 47.2% Cantonal and municipal Schaffhausen (SH)
1970 47.3% Municipal St. Gallen (SG)
1971 47.0% Cantonal and municipal Schwyz (SZ)
Table 1.2.: The eight cantons with a narrow cantonal referendum outcome on female
suffrage. At the top: The three cantons, which narrowly approved their
referendum with a Yes-vote share below 53%. At the bottom: The five
cantons, which narrowly rejected their referendum with a Yes-vote share at
or above 47%.
Using the municipalities in these eight cantons to estimate the difference in differences
brings a few improvements for identification. All eight cantons voted on local female
suffrage around the same time. This makes selection bias from calling a referendum
earlier or later less likely. Moreover, all expressed almost identical (dis)approval of a
local franchise extension. In other words, none of these cantons was a female suffrage
enthusiast, but instead rather hesitant to give women the vote. Finally, the very narrow
margin of all referenda suggests that it was extremely difficult to anticipate the outcome
of the referendum. Figure 1.3 shows the Yes-vote shares of all Swiss cantonal referenda
over the years. As we can see, the eight referenda of the cantons I use in this sample
were closest to the 50% threshold within a narrow time frame of five years.
In summary, the narrow referenda margins in these cantons make the introduction of
female suffrage credibly quasi-random. In expectation, these cantons should therefore
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be similar. More importantly, they should not follow differential political trends.
Another advantage of this sample selection is that although all eight cantons had
narrow referendum margins, each consists of municipalities in which a majority of men
had voted in favour of female suffrage and municipalities in which a majority of men
had voted against it. They further all contain municipalities with a municipal parlia-
ment besides municipalities with direct-democratic assemblies. With this variation, I
can identify the heterogeneity in the effect of female suffrage, which is specified as inter-
action effects in model (2).
Cantonal referendum result: Not in sample Rejected female suffrage Approved female suffrage
Figure 1.2.: The eight cantons in the sample, where the purple (orange) cantons narrowly
approved (rejected) their cantonal referendum on female suffrage between
1966-1972.
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AG  1971  51.7%
TI  1966  48.3%
SO  1968  47.3%
SH  1969  47.2%
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Figure 1.3.: Sample selection: Timeline of approved (purple) and rejected (orange)
cantonal referenda on female suffrage and Yes-vote share (in %) at the can-
tonal level. In bold: The close cantonal referenda within time frame of 6
years.
1.4.3. Data
Referenda Yes-vote shares at the municipality level. I created a data-set from
the referenda records of each cantonal referendum ever held on female suffrage, which I
retrieved from the different cantonal archives in Switzerland. According to my records,
a total of 81 cantonal referenda on female suffrage were held between 1919 and 1990.
For each referendum, I coded the Yes-vote share of each municipality. Based on this
data, I selected the eight close referenda for my sample.
For these eight referenda, I used the municipal Yes-vote shares to code a municipality
as being favourable towards female suffrage or not. Specifically, if the municipal Yes-
vote share was above 50%, a municipality was coded as being in favour with a dummy
variable value of In favourm = 1. For municipalities with a Yes-vote share below 50%, I
coded the dummy variable as In favourm = 0. In the overall sample, 44% of the munic-
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ipalities had a male majority voting in favour of female suffrage.
Municipal party vote shares. Electoral outcomes are frequently used to measure
the impact of franchise extensions (Morgan-Collins, 2019; Morgan-Collins and Teele,
2018; Berlinski and Dewan, 2011). To study the electoral impact of women’s suffrage, I
therefore created an original panel data-set on cantonal parliament elections. All elec-
tion records were retrieved from the eight cantonal archives.
For seven of the eight sample cantons, I was able to collect and code the municipal vote
shares of each party in each election between 1940-1990. I listed each party in Appendix
section A.13. For the canton of Schaffhausen (SH), these results were only recorded at
the district level. In my analyses of the electoral outcomes at the municipality level, I
therefore had to drop this canton from the sample.
Swiss cantonal elections happen every four years. All have a PR system within which
the four main parties run almost everywhere along with several fringe parties. The four
main parties are the Socialist Party (SP), the Christian-Democracts (CVP/EVP), the
Free Democratic Party (FDP, former FDP/LPS ) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP,
former BGB/DP). The order on a left-right scale of these four parties would be the same
as the order they were mentioned in.
The number and type of fringe parties who run in cantonal elections varies between
years and cantons. However, fringe parties can almost always be associated with one
of the four main parties. In a second step, I therefore aggregated them together with
the main parties into four party blocks: Socialist, conservative, liberal and right-wing
populist parties.
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I also created a fifth party block for usually smaller parties, which could not be asso-
ciated with any of the four main parties. This party block is called independent. The
largest among these independent parties was the Alliance of Independents (LdU ), which
existed from 1936-1999 and ran a policy platform that could be located at the center of
a left-right scale. Appendix section A.13 lists the party names under each of the 5 labels
for each canton.
Table 2.4.1 lists the pre-suffrage averages for the five party blocks in the sample can-
tons that narrowly rejected (approved) their cantonal referendum.12 We can see that
the right-wing populist block had the highest average vote share, followed by the con-
servatives, the liberals, the left, and independent parties. This highlights the rather
conservative political landscape, which is not atypical for many Swiss cantons at the
time. However, we can also see that there is considerable variation in vote shares across
and within the cantons.
Cantons Narrowly
Rejected Referendum Approved Referendum Overall
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Left parties’ vote share 16.3 14.9 25.1 18.4 21.9 17.7
Conservative parties’ vote share 37.0 23.9 18.9 25.2 25.2 26.2
Independent parties’ vote share 2.1 9.7 1.4 4.0 1.6 6.7
Liberal parties’ vote share 38.2 20.8 14.8 14.7 23.2 20.5
Populist parties’ vote share 4.2 8.7 39.8 28.8 26.9 29.2
Table 1.3.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal party vote shares
(in %) for the sample cantons with a narrowly rejected or approved referen-
dum on female suffrage, since 1940.
Number of entitled voters and turnout. From the archival records, I further
coded the number of entitled voters and the number of voters who turned out in each
12For a municipal party vote share averages listed by canton, see Table B.2.1 in Appendix section B.2
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municipality in each election year. Table 1.4 lists the pre-suffrage averages for number
of entitled voters and turnout in the sample cantons that narrowly rejected (approved)
their cantonal referendum.13 Estimating the effect of the franchise extension on the
number of entitled voters allows us to see by how much the municipal franchise grew
after the inclusion of women. I can further estimate the impact of suffrage on the elec-
toral turnout rate.
Cantons Narrowly
Rejected Referendum Approved Referendum Overall
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Entitled Voters 467 1,143 509 1,831 495 1,625
Election Turnout 79.4 12.7 78.6 12.4 78.9 12.4
Table 1.4.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for number of entitled voters and
election turnout (in %) for the sample cantons with a narrowly rejected or
approved referendum on female suffrage, since 1940.
Share of women. With the number of entitled voters, I further proxied the number
of female voters in each municipality at the time of the franchise extension. To do this,
I calculated the difference between the number of entitled voters in the last cantonal
election before and the first election after women’s suffrage had been introduced.
Municipal expenditure. A change in party platforms as a response to women’s
suffrage can be hidden behind the same party labels. This is therefore something to be
aware of when we study the impact suffrage had on election outcomes. Unlike party
vote shares in an election, municipal expenditure is a direct policy outcome.
I located the annual budget reports for each municipality and each year I could find
in the cantonal archives and the Swiss National Library. Out of these, I coded an orig-
13For a municipal entitled voters and turnout averages listed by canton, see Table B.2.2 in Appendix
section B.2
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inal panel data-set on total expenditure between 1950-1990 for all eight cantons in my
sample, and social welfare expenditure for all but the canton of Ticino (TI). The mu-
nicipalities in this canton only kept records of their total expenditure. Table 2.4.2 lists
the pre-suffrage averages for municipal expenditure in the sample cantons that narrowly
rejected (approved) their cantonal referendum.14
Cantons Narrowly
Rejected Referendum Approved Referendum Overall
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Total expenditure 4,730,724 36,445,307 3,048,340 13,144,636 146,560 1,544,652
Total expenditure p.c. 462 704 1,182 3,621 552 1,460
Social welfare 929,273 4,170,934 281,627 1,259,229 737,833 3,578,959
Social welfare p.c. 27 54 73 487 43 291
Table 1.5.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal expenditure (in
CHF) for the sample cantons with a narrowly rejected or approved referen-
dum on female suffrage, since 1940.
Municipal parliaments. In four out of five municipalities in Switzerland, it is a
direct-democratic assembly that decides over the municipal budget. Whether a munici-
pality has a parliament or an assembly is the municipality’s free choice and is not bound
to, for example, a population threshold. Hence, even though larger municipalities are
slighlty more likely to switch to parliaments, we observe a great variation of municipal-
ities among both, municipalities with assemblies and those with a parliament (Ladner,
2016).
Based on a published book by Ladner (2016) and correspondence with the cantonal
archives, I coded for each municipality in the sample whether it had a municipal parlia-
ment or a direct-democratic assembly deciding over the annual budget. Almost 18% of
the municipalities in my sample ran a parliament instead of holding assemblies.
14For a municipal expenditure averages listed by canton, see Table B.2.3 in Appendix section B.2
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Adjustment for municipal mergers. In 1960, Switzerland had 3,095 municipal-
ities. Due to municipal mergers, the number had shrunk to 3,021 by 1990. Based on
information by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2020), I therefore identified all Swiss
municipalities that had undergone a merger. For those, I aggregated all outcome data
under the names of the new municipalities that existed by 1990.
1.5. Results
The main findings are shown in Table 1.7 and 1.8. In an aggregate effect, female suffrage
caused a shift to the right in both municipal party vote shares and municipal expendi-
ture. However, the results also reveal significant heterogeneity in the effects for most
outcomes.
The results in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 include the first election after suffrage is in-
troduced in each canton. Appendix section A.3 further shows the results including up
to four elections after suffrage. Similarly, the results in Table 1.9 include the first year
with suffrage in a municipality, while Appendix section A.4 shows the results including
up to five post-suffrage years.
Due to the small number of cantons in my sample, clustering the standard errors at the
cantonal level could still generate invalid significance (Steigerwald et al., 2020; Donald
and Lang, 2007). I therefore show for all effects both robust standard errors clustered
at the cantonal level in round brackets, and wild cluster robust confidence intervals in
square brackets.
Cantonal parliament elections: Female suffrage caused an immediate drop in left
party vote shares. Immediate winners of suffrage were conservative parties. Includ-
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ing more than one election after suffrage, I further find that liberal parties’ vote share
dropped, while independent and populist right-wing parties gained. Electoral turnout
dropped at first, but recovered with later elections.
Municipalities with a male majority in favour of female suffrage experienced a larger
loss for left parties, and increased more in conservative party vote shares. They further
show a decrease for right-wing populist parties. Finally, independent parties increased
their vote shares only in favourable municipalities. In summary, female suffrage caused
a political shift to the center-right in favourable municipalities, and a shift to the right
in unfavourable municipalities.
At pre-suffrage averages, the shown effects are considerable. Left parties lost 8.9% in
favourbale, and 5.8% in unfavourable municipalities. This change accounts for 12.9%
(6.7%) in the standard deviation before enfranchisement. In favourable municipalities,
the conservative party vote share increased by 13.8%, and 10.5% in unfavourable ones.
This effect is equivalent to 16.0% (9.5%) of the respective standard deviation.15
Right-wing populist parties lost 2.3% in favourable municipalities, i.e. 3.7% of their
pre-suffrage standard deviation. Another large change compared to pre-suffrage levels
occurred for independent parties, which gained 8.4% in a favourable environment. This
effect is equivalent to 3.8% of the respective standard deviation.
Female suffrage further caused a large drop of 11.2% in election turnout. In Table 1.6,
we can see that the negative effect on turnout is 2.8% smaller in favourable munici-
palities. This turnout gap between unfavourable and favourable municipalities sustains
15Pre-suffrage averages are calculated from pre-suffrage election data since 1940. Effects at the aver-
age and share of standard deviations use separate pre-suffrage baseline values for favourable and
unfavourable municipalities.
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until 3 elections post-suffrage (see Figure A.3.11 in Appendix section A.3).
Another finding shown in Table 1.6 is that favourable municipalities grew more in
numbers of entitled voters. The fact that favourable municipalities gained a higher
share of new voters makes the result for turnout even more significant. It suggests that
favourable municipalities had higher female turnout, assuming that male turnout did
not change as a result of suffrage.
Table 1.6.: Impact of female suffrage on number of entitled voters and turnout in can-
tonal parliament elections
Number of Voters and Election Turnout
log(Entitled voters) Electoral turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 0.654∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
[0.62, 0.69] [0.58, 0.69] [-0.15, -0.07] [-0.16, -0.08]
Enfranchised x In favour 0.140∗∗∗ 0.028∗
(0.028) (0.016)
[0.09, 0.19] [0, 0.06]
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.358 0.368 0.6 0.601
Observations 9728 9728 9728 9728
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
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Table 1.7.: Impact of female suffrage on municipal party vote shares (in %) in cantonal parliament elections
Party Vote Shares in Cantonal Parliament Elections
Left Parties Conservative Parties Independent Parties Liberal Parties Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Enfranchised −1.480∗∗ −1.169∗ 2.918∗∗∗ 2.591∗∗∗ −0.347 −0.549 −0.464 −0.695 0.270 0.651
(0.583) (0.607) (0.806) (0.867) (0.813) (0.867) (0.688) (0.723) (0.759) (0.796)
[-2.44, -0.52] [-2.23, -0.11] [1.65, 4.18] [1.2, 3.98] [-1.72, 1.03] [-1.94, 0.84] [-0.93, 0] [-1.91, 0.52] [-0.97, 1.51] [-0.68, 1.98]
Enfranchised x In favour −1.113∗∗ 1.173∗ 0.724∗∗ 0.829 −1.367∗∗
(0.557) (0.649) (0.338) (0.640) (0.624)
[-2.07, -0.16] [0.1, 2.24] [0.19, 1.26] [-0.22, 1.88] [-2.4, -0.33]
Municipality FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.012 0.012 0.05 0.05 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.016
Observations 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
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Municipal expenditure: I find that total expenditure dropped as a result of fe-
male suffrage. The coeffcient for social welfare is large and negative, but not significant.
However, I have less observations and therefore lower statistical power to estimate the
effect on this outcome.
In Table 1.9, we can see that municipalities with a municipal parliament instead of an
assembly making budget decisions, experienced no drop in total expenditure. Results
including more than one post-suffrage year show that suffrage even caused an increase in
total expenditure of municipalities with a parliament. Again, I find no significant effect
for social welfare, but the interaction coefficient is also large and positive.
One question could be whether the effect of suffrage in municipalities with a parlia-
ment was generally different from those with an assembly. I therefore test if having
a parliament also affected the impact suffrage had on cantonal election outcomes. In
Appendix section A.3, I show the results including one to four elections after cantonal
enfranchisement. Municipalities with a parliament experienced a larger drop in left par-
ties’ vote share and a larger increase in their number of entitled voters. Hence, this
result suggests that municipalities with a parliament had a higher share of women. For
all other outcomes, I find that effects were not different from municipalities with an
assembly.
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Table 1.8.: Impact of female suffrage on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure
log(Total expenditure) log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.128∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.253 −0.178
(0.036) (0.039) (0.165) (0.167)
[-0.19, -0.07] [-0.22, -0.08] [-0.43, -0.08] [-0.48, -0.09]
Enfranchised x In favour 0.069 0.194
(0.046) (0.163)
[-0.01, 0.15] [-0.09, 0.27]
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.042 0.042 0.1 0.003
Observations 11260 11260 4601 4601
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
Table 1.9.: Impact of female suffrage on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure
log(Total expenditure) log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.128∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.253 −0.282
(0.036) (0.038) (0.165) (0.172)
[-0.19, -0.07] [-0.22, -0.1] [-0.43, -0.08] [-0.47, -0.09]
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.159∗∗∗ 0.208
(0.052) (0.180)
[0.06, 0.25] [0, 0.41]
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.042 0.043 0.1 0.1
Observations 11260 11260 4601 4601
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.




One concern with difference in differences estimation is that error terms of the units of
analysis are correlated over time (Bertrand et al., 2004). Autcorrelated errors become
especially likely when panel data is used over a long time period, and with relatively few
years being treated at the end of it. To address this concern, I use the solution, which
Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest for samples with a small number of clusters. My sample
contains municipalities from only 8 cantons and therefore qualifies for this category.
As Bertrand et al. recommend, I regress my outcomes on municipality fixed effects,
time effects and a linear cantonal time trend in a first stage OLS estimation. In a second
step, I aggregate the residuals from the first stage regression into only two time periods
per municipality: The period before and the period after female suffrage. In a second
stage OLS estimation, I regress the aggregated residuals onto the binary treatment with
female suffrage. As standard errors need to be adjusted (Donald and Lang, 2007), I
again report wild cluster robust confidence intervals in square brackets.
The Appendix section A.5 shows the results for both election and expenditure out-
comes. All results remain substantively very similar to the ones I find with the conven-
tional difference in differences estimation.
1.6.2. Parallel Trends Assumption
Difference in differences rely on the parallel trends assumption (Steigerwald et al.,
2020). This assumption can by definition not be tested, because we never observe a
municipallity-level outcome both with and without female suffrage in the same year.
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However, we can observe if municipalities already had differential trends in outcomes
before female suffrage was introduced. Significant differences in pre-suffrage trends would
be a concern for identification.
The Appendix section B.4 shows autocorrelation-robust results (Bertrand et al., 2004)
for pre-trending one (Placebo 1-year), two (Placebo 2-year) and three (Placebo 3-year)
(election) years before female suffrage was introduced. Most of the placebo effects are
not only insignificant, but also close to zero.
An exception are electoral turnout, independent parties’ vote share and social wel-
fare. For electoral turnout and social welfare, the placebos suggest a positive pre-trend
two years before suffrage was introduced. Difference in differences could therefore be
capturing an underlying trend that is independent of the impact women’s suffrage had.
However, the pre-trending coefficient for turnout is almost zero. For social welfare, the
effect is larger. We therefore have to interpret the main findings of the effect on social
welfare with caution. The same applies for the effect on the independent parties’ vote
share, which shows differential pre-trending one election before suffrage is introduced.
As an additional robustness test, I estimate the main effects controlling for all placebo
treatments with female suffrage. The results are reported in Table A.6.1 and A.6.2 in
Appendix section B.4. The direction and the size of the effects remain very similar to




At this point, we know that women’s suffrage caused both electoral and expenditure
effects at the municipality level. A second important question is now who caused these
effects. Two intuitive mechanisms would be: A large enough number of women who
voted different than men. Or men who changed their voting behaviour as a response to
the franchise extension. Naturally, a mix of the two is also possible.
Because Switzerland does not record voting separated by gender, I cannot fully reveal
men’s versus women’s voting behaviour after suffrage was introduced. The second-best
solution is therefore to use techniques that allow me to shed light on how women may
have voted compared to men. In a first step, I test if the share of female voters in a
municipality moderated or amplified the effects I find. A similar technique is used by
Morgan-Collins (2019) and Morgan-Collins and Teele (2018). As a second approach, I
analyse a national election survey from 1972 to evaluate male versus female political
preferences at the time.
1.7.1. Share of Women
The proxy I use for the share of women is the difference between the municipal number
of entitled voters in the election year before and after the franchise extension. I use this
approximation instead of the municipal share of women from historical census data for
1970, because it excludes women who are either not old enough to vote or who have no
voting right (e.g. because they are foreigners). I therefore expect less noise in this proxy
than in the census data.
However, to exclude very noisy measures, I restrict the sample to observations for
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which the proxied share of women is between 30-70% of entitled voters. The distri-
bution of municipalities that fall outside of this range are shown in Figure A.10.1 in
the Appendix. For the remaining sample, Figure A.10.2 shows the distribution of the
municipal share of entitled female voters by canton.
To make the baseline effects more interpretable, I code each municipal share as per-
centage point deviation from the cantonal average share of female voters. The results
are shown in Table 1.11, 1.10 and 1.12. Even though this is a smaller sample, the
baseline effects are similar to the ones from the main analysis.
The share of female voters gives some evidence that the observed effects might be
driven by women. A higher share of women is associated with a larger drop in left par-
ties’ vote share and turnout. A higher proportion of women is further associated with
an increase in the independent and a lower drop in liberal parties’ vote share. Total
expenditure also drops less in municipalities with a higher share of women. All of the
effects remain very similar when I include more post-suffrage elections or years.
One concern could be that the proxied share of women in a municipality is highly cor-
related with it being favourable, and with having a municipal parliament. We can see
this in Figure A.3.13 and A.3.14 in Appendix section A.3. Suffrage caused a larger in-
crease in the number of entitled voters in favourable municipalities, and in municipalities
with a parliament. In Table A.10.1 in Appendix section A.10, I therefore interact suf-
frage both with the municipal share of women and having a municipal parliament. The
result suggests that the share of women still drives the lower drop in total expenditure.
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Table 1.10.: Interaction effect of female suffrage and share of women in a municipality






[-0.2, -0.09] [-0.21, -0.09]
Enfranchised x Share of women −0.006∗∗ −0.005∗
(0.002) (0.003)
[-0.01, 0] [-0.01, 0]
Enfranchised x In favour 0.048∗∗∗
(0.018)
[0.02, 0.07]
Enfranchised x In favour x Share of women −0.006
(0.004)
[-0.01, 0]
Municipality FEs X X
Election FEs X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X
Within R-squared 0.615 0.617
Observations 7790 7790
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
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Table 1.11.: Interaction effect of female suffrage and share of women in a municipality on party vote shares (in %) in cantonal
parliament elections
Party Vote Shares in Cantonal Parliament Elections
Left Parties Conservative Parties Independent Parties Liberal Parties Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Enfranchised −0.666 −0.364 1.936∗ 1.389 −0.727 −0.926 0.254 0.026 0.181 0.726
(0.757) (0.800) (1.042) (1.114) (1.025) (1.071) (0.894) (0.947) (0.998) (1.053)
[-1.79, 0.46] [-1.56, 0.83] [0.37, 3.51] [-0.31, 3.09] [-2.66, 1.21] [-2.58, 0.73] [-1.06, 1.57] [-1.35, 1.4] [-1.44, 1.81] [-0.92, 2.38]
Enfranchised x Share of women −0.266∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗ −0.057 −0.071 0.111∗ 0.086 0.212∗∗ 0.114 −0.026 0.057
(0.090) (0.099) (0.096) (0.104) (0.058) (0.075) (0.091) (0.094) (0.097) (0.123)
[-0.41, -0.12] [-0.38, -0.09] [-0.2, 0.09] [-0.22, 0.08] [0, 0.22] [-0.03, 0.2] [0.07, 0.36] [-0.02, 0.25] [-0.19, 0.14] [-0.13, 0.24]
Enfranchised x In favour −1.094 2.306∗∗ 0.695 0.281 −1.786∗
(0.781) (0.964) (0.473) (0.928) (0.918)
[-2.25, 0.06] [0.85, 3.76] [-0.01, 1.4] [-1.22, 1.78] [-3.21, -0.36]
Enfranchised x In favour x Share of women −0.009 −0.129 0.018 0.254 −0.102
(0.218) (0.228) (0.098) (0.233) (0.208)
[-0.35, 0.34] [-0.5, 0.24] [-0.12, 0.16] [-0.1, 0.61] [-0.41, 0.21]
Municipality FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.05 0.051 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.012
Observations 7980 7980 7980 7980 7980 7980 7980 7980 7980 7980
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
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Table 1.12.: Interaction effect of female suffrage and share of women in a municipality
on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure
log(Total expenditure) log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.090 −0.141 −0.275 −0.277
(0.081) (0.093) (0.197) (0.207)
[-0.21, -0.04] [-0.23, -0.05] [-0.47, -0.08] [-0.48, -0.07]
Enfranchised x Share of women 0.029∗∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.032 0.018
(0.010) (0.013) (0.021) (0.027)
[0.02, 0.04] [0.01, 0.04] [0.01, 0.05] [-0.01, 0.04]
Enfranchised x In favour 0.014 −0.168
(0.133) (0.186)
[-0.12, 0.15] [-0.34, 0]
Enfranchised x In favour x Share of women 0.012 0.059
(0.025) (0.042)
[-0.02, 0.04] [0.02, 0.1]
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.012 0.024 0.089 0.092
Observations 3916 3916 3775 3775
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
1.7.2. National Election Survey 1972
A second way to make inferences about women’s versus men’s political preferences is
through surveys. There were no surveys carried out at the municipality level in this time
period in Switzerland. However, the first Swiss national election survey was conducted
in 1972 (Kerr et al., 1976). It used a representative sample of 1,917 respondents from
the Swiss population. I decrypted the punched card format in which the survey was
saved to analyse the political preference distributions of male and female respondents.
For this analysis, I plot the gender distributions for several questions on party and policy
preferences.
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All response distributions are shown for both the population-representative sample
and the sample containing only respondents from the eight cantons. Showing the dis-
tributions for both samples visualises that the respondents from the eight cantons were
very similar to the Swiss overall population. In the Appendix section A.11.1, we can
further see the sample composition for both, with regard to the number of respondents
from each canton, their age, education, employment and civil status distribution.
This paper’s findings show a political shift to the right as a result of female suffrage.
The first question is therefore whether women had more right-wing preferences than
men. In Figure 1.4, we see that women and men placed themselves similarly on a left-
right scale. Both are concentrated on the center-right. However, a much larger share of
women claimed to not know their political preferences. This finding is further consistent
with other questions that proxy both genders’ political preference distribution, such as
their sympathy for the Schwarzenbach referendum on heavy immigration restrictions
in 1970 (see Figure A.11.14), or their party choices in the 1971 national elections (see
Figure A.11.15).
The next question is whether both genders perceived party platforms the same way.
In the Appendix section A.11.2, we see where the survey respondents placed the different
main parties on a left-right scale. The distributions suggest both women and men saw
the party platforms from the left-labelled parties as considerably left. Parties labelled as
conservative are perceived to be center to center-right, similar to the liberal-labelled par-
ties. Among both genders, the most right-wing party platforms are associated with the
label of right-wing populist. Again, a much higher share of female respondents claimed
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Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Placing Yourself On A Left−Right Scale
Figure 1.4.: Left-right scale: Distribution of female and male responses to survey ques-
tion on placing themselves on a left-right scale, from the Swiss Voting Study
in 1972 by Kerr et al. (1976).
Questions on turnout and political interest further point towards women being con-
siderably less interested in politics than men at the time. In Figure A.11.17, we can
observe that women reported much lower turnout than men, in both federal and can-
tonal elections. This finding contributes to previous evidence suggesting that the new
female voters were driving the drop in turnout caused by suffrage.
Together, these survey results point to a possible mechanism for the findings in this
paper. In his model on lobbying, Baron (1994) shows that uninformed voters are easier
to influence with campaign spending. Similarly, low-informed women could have been
more susceptible to party rhethoric at a time when right-wing parties generally gained in
Swiss politics. Figure A.12.1 in the Appendix section A.12 shows how Swiss right-wing
parties increased their national vote share significantly in the 1970s. This was generally
associated with the 1970 Schwarzenbach referendum, which mobilised many right-wing
voters to campaign for more restrictive immigration policy.
39
Therefore, when low-informed women turned out at all, they could have been more
likely to vote for right-wing policy platforms. Such platforms included lower govern-
ment expenditure. My finding that favourable municipalities experienced a lower drop
in turnout suggests that their women were possibly more interested in politics. And
hence, these municipalities shifted less to the right and more to the center-right.
The question is if women became more interested in politics over time, once they were
included as voters. In a second step, I therefore test if women who were longer exposed
to the franchise expressed a higher interest in politics. Due to the limited sample size
of the survey, I cannot distinguish between respondents from different municipalities.
However, I can distinguish between cantons, which already had female suffrage for a few
years in 1972, and cantons, which had only recently or not yet enfranchised women in
that year.
Splitting the responses from both genders into these two groups in Figure 1.5, we
observe that the gender gap in political interest was larger in cantons with late female
suffrage. However, only at the lower end of the distribution. Among the very interested,
the gender gap was larger in longer enfranchised cantons. Within the eight sample can-
tons, having female suffrage by 1972 was quasi-random. Hence, observing this difference
in the gender gap suggests that enfranchisement may increase the interest in politics
among women. However, due to the small number of respondents from these cantons,




























































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972




























































Sample includes only the 8 cantons



















































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972



















































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Do You Discuss Politics With Friends And Acquaintances?
Figure 1.5.: Interest in politics: Distribution of female and male responses to survey
questions on interest in politics, from the Swiss Voting Study in 1972 by
Kerr et al. (1976).
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1.8. Conclusion
Women’s political inclusion is often associated with a liberal impact on policies. This
paper shows that extending the franchise to women can also cause a shift to the right.
I reveal significant heterogeneity in this effect and argue that it could be driven by dif-
ferences in women’s political interest.
This paper’s empirical strategy tests the political impact of female suffrage in the
municipalities of eight Swiss cantons, in which women received the vote quasi-randomly
through close referenda held between 1966-1971. I test for heterogeneous effects in mu-
nicipalities with a male majority in favor of women’s vote and ones with a majority
against it. I further study municipalities with a parliament versus direct-democratic
assemblies.
My findings show that female suffrage caused an overall shift to the right in municipal
party vote shares, and a drop in expenditure. However, favourable municipalities moved
more center-right, while unfavourable ones moved more to the right. Unfavourable mu-
nicipalities further experienced a larger drop in election turnout. Municipalities with a
parliament instead of an assembly making budget decisions, increased instead of dropped
their expenditure.
In a complementary analysis, I proxy the municipal share of women to show that
municipalities with a higher female proportion shifted more to the center-right than the
right. As a second source for ecological inference, I use a national election survey from
1972. The survey reveals that politically interested women had similarly center-right
preferences as men. However, a much higher share of women was uninterested in politics.
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I therefore propose an explanation for the heterogeneous effects based on differences
in women’s political interest. Politically less informed women could have been more
susceptible to campaign rhetoric of rising right-wing parties at the time. As a con-
sequence, unfavourable municipalities may have moved more to the right. The fact
that unfavourable municipalities experienced a larger drop in turnout is consistent with
women being possibly less interested and, hence, more impressionable in these localities.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Suffrage Timeline in Sample
Female suffrage <1968 1968 1969 1970 1971 >=1972
Introduced Bern (BE) Bern (BE) Bern (BE) Bern (BE) all 8 cantons
Thurgau (TG) Thurgau (TG) Thurgau (TG)
Ticino (TI) Ticino (TI) Ticino (TI)
Solothurn (SO) Solothurn (SO)
Aargau (AG)
Schaffhausen (SH)
Not Yet Introduced all 8 cantons rest of cantons (7) rest of cantons (5) rest of cantons (4) rest of cantons (2) no more cantons
Table A.1.1.: Timeline of municipal voting right for women introduced through cantonal
referendum. In bold: Cantons that passed female suffrage through narrow
referendum outcome in that year.
A.2. Cantonal Election Timeline
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Ticino (TI) St. Gallen (SG) Aargau (AG) Bern (BE) Ticino (TI) St. Gallen (SG) Aargau (AG) Bern (BE)
Schwyz (SZ) Solothurn (SO) Schwyz (SZ) Solothurn (SO)
Thurgau (TG) Thurgau (TG)
Table A.2.1.: Timeline of last cantonal parliament elections before cantonal voting right
for women is introduced, and first elections afterwards (in bold).
44
A.3. Effects including several post-suffrage elections
Table A.3.1.: DID effects of female suffrage on left parties’ vote share (in %)
Left parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −1.169∗ −1.251∗∗∗ −1.124∗∗∗ −0.450
(0.607) (0.401) (0.410) (0.424)
Enfranchised x In favour −1.113∗∗ −1.440∗∗∗ −1.414∗∗ −1.672∗∗∗
(0.557) (0.532) (0.576) (0.546)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.029 0.038 0.054 0.06
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.1.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.2.: DID effects of female suffrage on left parties’ vote share (in %)
Left parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −1.432∗∗ −1.555∗∗∗ −1.381∗∗∗ −0.763∗
(0.582) (0.370) (0.382) (0.404)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament −1.020 −1.463∗∗ −1.581∗∗ −1.684∗∗
(0.726) (0.667) (0.734) (0.710)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.029 0.037 0.053 0.059
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.2.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.3.: DID effects of female suffrage on conservative parties’ vote share (in %)
Conservative parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 2.591∗∗∗ 1.688∗∗∗ 0.736 1.066∗
(0.867) (0.567) (0.579) (0.594)
Enfranchised x In favour 1.173∗ 0.947 0.927 0.802
(0.649) (0.592) (0.593) (0.631)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.022
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.3.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.4.: DID effects of female suffrage on conservative parties’ vote share (in %)
Conservative parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 2.883∗∗∗ 1.912∗∗∗ 0.933∗ 1.212∗∗
(0.810) (0.520) (0.533) (0.548)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.736 0.692 0.739 0.856
(0.991) (0.908) (0.922) (0.947)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.021
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.4.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
48
Table A.3.5.: DID effects of female suffrage on liberal parties’ vote share (in %)
Liberal parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.695 −1.056∗∗ −1.385∗∗∗ −2.075∗∗∗
(0.723) (0.480) (0.462) (0.480)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.829 0.918 0.976∗ 0.979∗
(0.640) (0.578) (0.581) (0.577)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.014 0.012 0.024 0.025
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.5.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.6.: DID effects of female suffrage on liberal parties’ vote share (in %)
Liberal parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.435 −0.760∗ −1.073∗∗ −1.755∗∗∗
(0.689) (0.448) (0.435) (0.455)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament −0.615 −0.224 −0.315 −0.490
(0.989) (0.836) (0.810) (0.822)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.013 0.012 0.023 0.025
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.6.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.7.: DID effects of female suffrage on populist parties’ vote share (in %)
Populist parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 0.651 0.849 1.106∗∗ 0.776
(0.796) (0.540) (0.516) (0.520)
Enfranchised x In favour −1.367∗∗ −1.218∗∗ −1.103∗∗ −0.780
(0.624) (0.565) (0.558) (0.541)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.016 0.02 0.018 0.017
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.7.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.8.: DID effects of female suffrage on populist parties’ vote share (in %)
Populist parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 0.244 0.422 0.705 0.463
(0.759) (0.502) (0.487) (0.494)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.539 0.658 0.879 1.021∗
(0.745) (0.641) (0.637) (0.615)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.015 0.02 0.017 0.017
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.8.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.9.: DID effects of female suffrage on independent parties’ vote share (in %)
Independent parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.549 0.365 1.364∗∗ 1.867∗∗∗
(0.867) (0.596) (0.554) (0.527)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.724∗∗ 1.146∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.280) (0.242) (0.221)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.05 0.041 0.029 0.024
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.9.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.10.: DID effects of female suffrage on independent parties’ vote share (in %)
Independent parties’ vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.361 0.681 1.560∗∗∗ 2.024∗∗∗
(0.816) (0.571) (0.542) (0.516)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.304 0.330 0.204 0.099
(0.266) (0.261) (0.282) (0.266)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.05 0.039 0.028 0.024
Observations 10153 11300 12399 13190
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.10.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.11.: DID effects of female suffrage on electoral turnout
Electoral turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.118∗∗∗ −0.035∗ −0.0005 −0.002
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.028∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.018
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.601 0.566 0.55 0.569
Observations 9728 10669 11609 12399
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.11.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.12.: DID effects of female suffrage on electoral turnout
Electoral turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.111∗∗∗ −0.029 0.003 0.0001
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament −0.054 −0.047 −0.046 −0.007
(0.038) (0.035) (0.032) (0.026)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.601 0.565 0.55 0.568
Observations 9728 10669 11609 12399
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.12.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.13.: DID effects of female suffrage on log(number of entitled voters)
log(Number of entitled voters)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 0.615∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.140∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.368 0.344 0.314 0.285
Observations 9728 10669 11609 12399
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.3.13.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.3.14.: DID effects of female suffrage on log(number of entitled voters)
log(Number of entitled voters)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 0.644∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.226∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.062) (0.059) (0.042)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.363 0.331 0.292 0.271
Observations 9728 10669 11609 12399
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 78 1941− 82 1941− 86
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Figure A.3.14.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three and four elections after women’s enfranchisement.
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A.4. Effects including several post-suffrage years
Table A.4.1.: DID effects of female suffrage on log(total expenditure)
log(Total expenditure)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfranchised −0.151∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.058
(0.039) (0.044) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.069 0.065 0.067 0.020 0.034
(0.046) (0.057) (0.046) (0.053) (0.057)
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Year FEs X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.042 0.047 0.039 0.036 0.039
Observations 11260 10042 11885 11793 11465
Time Frame 1940− 1972 1940− 1973 1940− 1974 1940− 1975 1940− 1976
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.4.1.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three, four and five years after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.4.2.: DID effects of female suffrage on log(total expenditure)
log(Total expenditure)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfranchised −0.162∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.043) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.159∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055)
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Year FEs X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.043 0.05 0.042 0.041 0.044
Observations 11260 10042 11885 11793 11465
Time Frame 1940− 1972 1940− 1973 1940− 1974 1940− 1975 1940− 1976
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.4.2.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three, four and five years after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.4.3.: DID effects of female suffrage on log(social welfare)
log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfranchised −0.283 −0.168 −0.204 0.031 0.100
(0.178) (0.194) (0.140) (0.160) (0.157)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.091 0.225 0.051 0.108 0.060
(0.155) (0.277) (0.142) (0.229) (0.259)
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Year FEs X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.159 0.088 0.118
Observations 4601 3272 4860 4396 3968
Time Frame 1940− 1972 1940− 1973 1940− 1974 1940− 1975 1940− 1976
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.4.3.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three, four and five years after women’s enfranchisement.
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Table A.4.4.: DID effects of female suffrage on log(social welfare)
log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfranchised −0.282 −0.136 −0.215∗ 0.058 0.109
(0.172) (0.162) (0.127) (0.142) (0.137)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.208 0.202 0.142 0.052 0.060
(0.180) (0.244) (0.182) (0.248) (0.282)
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Year FEs X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.1 0.099 0.159 0.087 0.118
Observations 4601 3272 4860 4396 3968
Time Frame 1940− 1972 1940− 1973 1940− 1974 1940− 1975 1940− 1976
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.4.4.: DID point estimates and 0.95-confidence intervals for sample including
one, two, three, four and five years after women’s enfranchisement.
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A.5. Autocorrelation-robust Effects (Bertrand et al., 2004)
A.5.1. Cantonal Elections
Table A.5.1.: Impact of female suffrage on municipal party vote shares (in %) in cantonal parliament elections
Party Vote Shares in Cantonal Parliament Elections
Left Parties Conservative Parties Independent Parties Liberal Parties Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Enfranchised −0.182 0.121 0.363 0.025 −0.052 −0.249 −0.058 −0.384 0.037 0.476
(0.192) (0.231) (0.235) (0.283) (0.151) (0.182) (0.211) (0.254) (0.241) (0.290)
[-0.6, 0.24] [-0.39, 0.64] [-0.19, 0.92] [-0.62, 0.67] [-0.39, 0.28] [-0.69, 0.19] [-0.5, 0.38] [-0.89, 0.12] [-0.5, 0.58] [-0.2, 1.15]
Enfranchised x In favour −0.979∗∗ 1.088∗∗ 0.635∗ 1.051∗∗ −1.415∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.508) (0.326) (0.456) (0.520)
[-1.94, -0.02] [-0.03, 2.2] [0.05, 1.22] [-0.06, 2.17] [-2.44, -0.39]
Municipality FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X X X X X X
Within R2 in 1st stage 0.032 0.032 0.007 0.007 0.059 0.059 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.015
Adj. R2 in 2nd stage 0 0.003 0.001 0.003 0 0.001 0 0.002 0 0.003
N in 1st stage 10183 10183 10183 10183 10183 10183 10183 10183 10183 10183
N in 2nd stage 2508 2508 2508 2508 2508 2508 2508 2508 2508 2508
Time Frame 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
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Table A.5.2.: Impact of female suffrage on number of entitled voters and turnout in
cantonal parliament elections
Number of Voters and Election Turnout
log(Entitled voters) Electoral turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 0.089∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
[0.07, 0.11] [0.03, 0.07] [-0.02, 0] [-0.03, -0.01]
Enfranchised x In favour 0.126∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.010)
[0.08, 0.18] [0, 0.05]
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R2 in 1st stage 0.211 0.211 0.596 0.596
Adj. R2 in 2nd stage 0.052 0.083 0.003 0.007
N in 1st stage 9728 9728 9728 9728
N in 2nd stage 2274 2274 2274 2274
Time Frame 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74 1940− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
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A.5.2. Municipal Expenditure
Table A.5.3.: Impact of female suffrage on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure
log(Total expenditure) log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.032∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.051 −0.063
(0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.039)
[-0.07, 0] [-0.09, -0.01] [-0.13, 0.03] [-0.16, 0.03]
Enfranchised x In favour 0.057 0.041
(0.035) (0.075)
[-0.02, 0.13] [-0.1, 0.18]
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R2 in 1st stage 0.04 0.04 0.095 0.095
Adj. R2 in 2nd stage 0.002 0.003 0.001 0
N in 1st stage 11260 11260 4601 4601
N in 2nd stage 1582 1582 1050 1050
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
Table A.5.4.: Impact of female suffrage on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure
log(Total expenditure) log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.032∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.051 −0.057∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.033) (0.034)
[-0.07, 0] [-0.09, -0.01] [-0.13, 0.03] [-0.14, 0.03]
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.109∗∗ 0.086
(0.044) (0.131)
[0.02, 0.19] [-0.09, 0.26]
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R2 in 1st stage 0.04 0.04 0.095 0.095
Adj. R2 in 2nd stage 0.002 0.007 0.001 0
N in 1st stage 11260 11260 4601 4601
N in 2nd stage 1582 1582 1050 1050
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Wild cluster bootstrapped 0.95 confidence intervals in bottom parantheses.
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Figure A.6.1.: Autocorrelation-robust DID point estimates (Bertrand et al., 2004) and
0.95-confidence intervals for sample including one, two and three elections
before women’s enfranchisement.
Table A.6.1.: Placebo and actual effects of female suffrage on parties’ vote share (in %)
Party Vote Shares in Cantonal Parliament Elections
Left Parties Conservative Parties Independent Parties Liberal Parties Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfranchised −1.587∗∗∗ 0.010 2.484∗∗∗ −0.841∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.280) (0.279) (0.232) (0.246)
Placebo 1-year 0.654∗∗∗ −1.636∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.205 −0.143
(0.238) (0.325) (0.171) (0.264) (0.265)
Placebo 2-year −1.251∗∗∗ −2.607∗∗∗ 3.463∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗ −0.658
(0.311) (0.402) (0.337) (0.357) (0.405)
Placebo 3-year 0.019 −2.914∗∗∗ 2.376∗∗∗ 0.061 0.802∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.345) (0.347) (0.315) (0.303)
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.056 0.013 0.041 0.023 0.017
Observations 12429 12429 12429 12429 12429
Time Frame 1940− 82 1940− 82 1940− 82 1940− 82 1940− 82
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.6.2.: Autocorrelation-robust DID point estimates (Bertrand et al., 2004) and




Table A.6.2.: Placebo and actual effects of female suffrage on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure




Placebo 1-year 0.006 0.262∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.070)
Placebo 2-year −0.028 0.570∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.062)
Placebo 3-year 0.081∗∗∗ −0.034
(0.016) (0.036)
Municipality FEs X X
Year FEs X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X
Within R-squared 0.039 0.193
Observations 11885 4860
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A.6.3.: Autocorrelation-robust DID point estimates (Bertrand et al., 2004) and




We can exploit more variation in men’s support for enfranchisement when we use the
referendum margin in each municipality. Hence, instead of a binary indicator for how
each municipality’s majority voted (i.e. in favour or against women’s suffrage), we can
use the municipal percentage margin above (below) a 50%-Yes-vote share in the can-
tonal referendum. For example, the cantonal Yes-vote share in the narrow referendum of
Aargau in 1971 was 51.7%. In the municipality of Aarau, 64.9% of male voters approved
the referendum, while in Boswil, only 37.8% voted Yes. The referendum margin is there-
fore 14.9% in Aarau and 12.2% in Boswil. I split the sample into municipalities with
a Yes-vote share above and below 50% and interact the introduction of female suffrage
with the municipal referendum margin. The margin can be understood as an intensity
measure for being against or in favour of female suffrage. The findings are presented in
Table A.7.1, A.7.2 and A.7.3. As we can see, all of the results remain substantively
the same as when I used the binary indicator for male support of female suffrage.







Enfranchised x Referendum margin 0.001
(0.001)
Municipality FEs X X
Election FEs X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X
Within R-squared 0.493 0.737
Observations 6741 2987
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Table A.7.2.: Impact of female suffrage on municipal party vote shares (in %) in cantonal parliament elections
Party Vote Shares in Cantonal Parliament Elections
Left Parties Conservative Parties Independent Parties Liberal Parties Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Enfranchised −1.480∗∗ −1.481∗∗ 2.918∗∗∗ 2.918∗∗∗ −0.347 −0.346 −0.464 −0.463 0.270 0.269
(0.583) (0.585) (0.806) (0.807) (0.813) (0.812) (0.688) (0.688) (0.759) (0.760)
Enfranchised x Referendum margin −0.058∗∗∗ 0.022 0.020 0.041∗ −0.031
(0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020)
Municipality FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.029 0.03 0.012 0.012 0.05 0.05 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015
Observations 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Table A.7.3.: Impact of female suffrage on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure
log(Total expenditure) log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.128∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.253 −0.274∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.165) (0.166)
Enfranchised x Referendum margin 0.003∗ 0.008
(0.002) (0.007)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.042 0.042 0.1 0.102
Observations 11260 11260 4601 4601
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
A.8. Further Heterogeneous Effects
Table A.8.1.: Three-way interaction effect of female suffrage on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure
log(Total expenditure) log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.162∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.282 −0.299∗
(0.038) (0.041) (0.172) (0.181)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament 0.159∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.208 0.567∗
(0.052) (0.077) (0.180) (0.325)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.098∗ 0.077
(0.056) (0.179)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x In favour −0.244∗∗ −0.468
(0.107) (0.386)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.1 0.101
Observations 11260 11260 4601 4601
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Table A.8.2.: Three-way interaction effect of female suffrage on party vote shares (in %) in cantonal parliament elections
Party Vote Shares in Cantonal Parliament Elections
Left Parties Conservative Parties Independent Parties Liberal Parties Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Enfranchised −1.432∗∗ −1.133∗ 2.883∗∗∗ 2.531∗∗∗ −0.361 −0.548 −0.435 −0.733 0.244 0.704
(0.582) (0.607) (0.810) (0.871) (0.816) (0.870) (0.689) (0.722) (0.759) (0.798)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament −1.020 −1.620 0.736 2.169 0.304 0.011 −0.615 0.671 0.539 −1.102
(0.726) (1.025) (0.991) (1.824) (0.266) (0.175) (0.989) (1.766) (0.745) (0.987)
Enfranchised x In favour −1.213∗ 1.485∗∗ 0.703∗ 1.264∗ −1.920∗∗∗
(0.629) (0.734) (0.381) (0.717) (0.693)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x In favour 1.581 −3.048 0.106 −2.700 3.604∗∗∗
(1.398) (2.054) (0.484) (2.099) (1.360)
Municipality FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.029 0.03 0.012 0.013 0.05 0.05 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.016
Observations 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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A.9. Descriptives
AG BE SG SH SO SZ TG TI
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Left parties’ vote share 25.9 16.9 26.2 20.0 11.1 10.3 - - 24.8 19.8 8.6 13.4 18.5 12.2 15.8 12.0
Conservative parties’ vote share 30.6 25.8 9.1 19.7 51.8 25.3 - - 25.8 20.0 29.5 32.9 30.8 27.1 35.6 18.8
Independent parties’ vote share 3.7 5.4 0.3 2.5 3.8 5.1 - - 0.5 2.2 15.4 34.6 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.7
Liberal parties’ vote share 14.3 10.6 14.9 17.3 30.2 18.7 - - 48.9 21.1 12.7 18.5 15.6 11.2 40.4 17.3
Populist parties’ vote share 25.5 20.6 49.4 30.0 1.8 5.0 - - 0.0 0.0 1.8 8.1 35.0 25.2 8.0 10.9
Table A.9.1.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal party vote shares (in %) for each canton since 1940.
AG BE SG SH SO SZ TG TI
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Entited voters 396 544 556 2,413 936 1,886 - - 431 806 831 856 597 672 220 475
Election turnout 85.7 6.6 74.2 13.7 77.2 7.7 - - 89.7 8.8 62.4 13.7 79.3 6.7 75.8 13.6
Table A.9.2.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for number of entitled voters and election turnout (in %) for each
canton since 1940.
AG BE SG SH SO SZ TG TI
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Total expenditure 903,583 1,642,204 9,877,831 25,953,863 809,744 1,697,612 61,082,583 124,936,494 1,046,472 2,609,276 1,107,671 1,596,802 1,991,222 1,769,748 337,654 1,544,652
Total expenditure p.c. 989 1,015 2,031 7,560 444 390 - - 1,029 1,615 778 1,169 420 322 391 529
Social welfare 25,931 70,994 1,077,764 2,434,568 21,607 61,078 4,099,693 8,198,749 36,651 161,885 124,898 215,664 218,668 270,576 - -
Social welfare p.c. 19 21 267 1,031 11 28 - - 16 38 73 79 38 37 - -




















Figure A.10.1.: Share of each canton in number of outlier observations before and after
female suffrage in sample. Outlier observations have a proxied municipal
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Figure A.10.2.: Within-canton distribution of proxied share of women in municipali-
ties (excluding outliers). The sample contains municipality-election year
observations.
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Table A.10.1.: Four-way interaction effect of female suffrage on municipal expenditure
Municipal Expenditure
log(Total expenditure) log(Social welfare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.110 −0.132 −0.289 −0.287
(0.085) (0.093) (0.204) (0.210)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament −0.333∗∗ −0.145 −0.256 0.418
(0.129) (0.221) (0.241) (0.358)
Enfranchised x Share of women 0.030∗∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.029 0.017
(0.011) (0.014) (0.023) (0.027)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.074 −0.153
(0.146) (0.210)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x Share of women 0.041 0.036 0.076 0.033
(0.027) (0.033) (0.052) (0.058)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x In favour −0.241 −0.538
(0.202) (0.364)
Enfranchised x Share of women x In favour 0.011 0.055
(0.027) (0.046)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.026 0.027 0.09 0.092
Observations 3916 3916 3775 3775
Time Frame 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72 1940− 72
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised −0.111∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.034) (0.034)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament −0.054 −0.022 0.009 0.027
(0.038) (0.014) (0.060) (0.065)
Enfranchised x In favour 0.039∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
Enfranchised x Share of women −0.006∗∗ −0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x In favour −0.060 −0.060
(0.040) (0.046)
Enfranchised x Share of women x In favour −0.004
(0.004)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x Share of women −0.010 −0.005
(0.012) (0.013)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Election FEs X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X
Within R-squared 0.601 0.601 0.615 0.617
Observations 9728 9728 7790 7790
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Table A.10.3.: Three-way interaction effect of female suffrage on party vote shares (in %) in cantonal parliament elections
Party Vote Shares in Cantonal Parliament Elections
Left Parties Conservative Parties Independent Parties Liberal Parties Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Enfranchised −1.432∗∗ −0.514 2.883∗∗∗ 1.771∗ −0.361 −0.734 −0.435 0.400 0.244 0.065
(0.582) (0.762) (0.810) (1.051) (0.816) (1.040) (0.689) (0.903) (0.759) (1.004)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament −1.020 −3.897∗∗∗ 0.736 4.031∗∗ 0.304 −0.401 −0.615 −3.357 0.539 3.400∗
(0.726) (1.479) (0.991) (1.567) (0.266) (1.697) (0.989) (2.199) (0.745) (1.758)
Enfranchised x Share of women −0.245∗∗∗ −0.083 0.101∗ 0.238∗∗ −0.037
(0.095) (0.098) (0.061) (0.093) (0.100)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x Share of women 0.207 −0.119 0.265 0.014 −0.347
(0.298) (0.386) (0.312) (0.646) (0.540)
Municipality FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.029 0.016 0.012 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.013 0.007 0.015 0.011
Observations 10153 7980 10153 7980 10153 7980 10153 7980 10153 7980
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Table A.10.4.: Four-way interaction effect of female suffrage on party vote shares (in %) in cantonal parliament elections
Party Vote Shares in Cantonal Parliament Elections
Left Parties Conservative Parties Independent Parties Liberal Parties Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Enfranchised −1.133∗ −0.336 2.531∗∗∗ 1.375 −0.548 −0.902 −0.733 0.045 0.704 0.673
(0.607) (0.803) (0.871) (1.116) (0.870) (1.078) (0.722) (0.947) (0.798) (1.055)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament −1.620 4.559∗∗ 2.169 0.052 0.011 −2.040 0.671 −3.436 −1.102 1.247
(1.025) (1.916) (1.824) (2.280) (0.175) (1.585) (1.766) (3.546) (0.987) (3.030)
Enfranchised x Share of women −0.237∗∗ −0.071 0.086 0.117 0.057
(0.099) (0.105) (0.075) (0.094) (0.123)
Enfranchised x In favour −1.213∗ −0.769 1.485∗∗ 2.026∗∗ 0.703∗ 0.691 1.264∗ 0.724 −1.920∗∗∗ −2.211∗∗
(0.629) (0.828) (0.734) (1.004) (0.381) (0.484) (0.717) (0.969) (0.693) (0.952)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x Share of women 0.139 0.060 0.288 −0.182 −0.302
(0.361) (0.428) (0.308) (0.682) (0.564)
Enfranchised x Municipal parliament x In favour 1.581 −7.978∗∗∗ −3.048 2.432 0.106 1.147 −2.700 −0.277 3.604∗∗∗ 3.743
(1.398) (1.796) (2.054) (1.864) (0.484) (0.897) (2.099) (2.353) (1.360) (2.529)
Enfranchised x Share of women x In favour 0.027 −0.170 0.0001 0.323 −0.140
(0.236) (0.239) (0.100) (0.244) (0.214)
Municipality FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Election FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Linear Canton-Specific Trend X X X X X X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.03 0.016 0.013 0.011 0.05 0.051 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.013
Observations 10153 7980 10153 7980 10153 7980 10153 7980 10153 7980
Time Frame 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74 1941− 74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972
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Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Distribution of Respondents Across Cantons
Figure A.11.1.: Count of respondents from each canton: Distribution of respon-







































































































































































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Age
Figure A.11.2.: Age: Age distribution of respondents in the Swiss Voting Study in 1972























































































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972



















































































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
What Is The Last School That You Attended?
men women
12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 N.










Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972
At What Age Exactly Did You Leave School?
men women
12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 N.











Sample includes only the 8 cantons
At What Age Exactly Did You Leave School?
Figure A.11.3.: Education: Distribution of highest education degree and school-leaving















































































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972













































































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Are You Currently Employed?
Figure A.11.4.: Employment: Employment status distribution of respondents in the





























































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Civil Status
Figure A.11.5.: Civil status: Civil status distribution of respondents in the Swiss Vot-
ing Study in 1972 by Kerr et al. (1976).
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Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972




































Sample includes only the 8 cantons




































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972




































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Placing PdA On A Left−Right Scale
Figure A.11.6.: Left-right scale: Distribution of female and male responses to sur-
vey questions on placing the Socialist Party (SP) and the Labour Party







































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972




































Sample includes only the 8 cantons





































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972





































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Placing CSP On A Left−Right Scale
Figure A.11.7.: Left-right scale: Distribution of female and male responses to survey
questions on placing the Christian-democratic People’s Party (CVP) and
the Christian-socialist Party (CSP) on a left-right scale, from the Swiss






































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972




































Sample includes only the 8 cantons




































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972




































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Placing FDP On A Left−Right Scale
Figure A.11.8.: Left-right scale: Distribution of female and male responses to survey
questions on placing the Liberal Party and the Free Democratic Party







































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972




































Sample includes only the 8 cantons





































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972





































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Placing National Action On A Left−Right Scale
Figure A.11.9.: Left-right scale: Distribution of female and male responses to survey
questions on placing the Farmer, Business and Citizen party (BGB, later
Swiss People’s Party (SVP)) and the National Action Party (NA) on a






































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972





































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Placing LdU On A Left−Right Scale
Figure A.11.10.: Left-right scale: Distribution of female and male responses to survey
questions on placing the Alliance of Independents (LdU) on a left-right
scale, from the Swiss Voting Study in 1972 by Kerr et al. (1976).











































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972












































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
The Differences Between The Left And The Right Are Very Important
Figure A.11.11.: Importance of left-right: Distribution of female and male responses
to survey questions on importance of political left-right, from the Swiss


































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972

































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Switzerland Has Many Parties, Yet Their Programs Do Not Have Different Programs
Figure A.11.12.: Difference in party platforms: Distribution of female and male
responses to survey questions on difference in party platforms, from












































































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972









































































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972
































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Switzerland Has Referenda, Parties Are Not So Important
Figure A.11.13.: Importance of parties: Distribution of female and male responses
to survey questions on importance of political parties, from the Swiss




















































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972

















































Sample includes only the 8 cantons












































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972











































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
What Would You Say If A New Referendum Were Launched?
Figure A.11.14.: Schwarzenbach referendum: Distribution of female and male re-
sponses to survey questions on sympathy for Schwarzenbach referen-
dum on heavy immigration restrictions in 1970, from the Swiss Voting



































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972


































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons

















































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972

















































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
For Which Parties Have You Voted (If You Voted) − 1st Party
Figure A.11.15.: Vote choice in federal elections 1967 & 1971: Distribution of
male responses to survey question on their first party choice in the
1967 federal election, and distribution of female and male responses to
survey question on their first party choice in the 1971 federal election,























































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972
















































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons















































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972
















































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Did Your Spouse Vote Like You (If Married/Eligible)?
Figure A.11.16.: How respondents think their spouses vote: Distribution of female
and male responses to survey questions on how they think their spouses
vote, from the Swiss Voting Study in 1972 by Kerr et al. (1976).
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Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972














































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons












































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972












































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
Have You Voted In All Cantonal Elections?
Figure A.11.17.: Turnout: Distribution of female and male responses to survey question
on federal and cantonal election turnout, from the Swiss Voting Study



















































































Sample representative of Swiss population in 1972


















































































Sample includes only the 8 cantons
The Area Of Politics That Interests You The Most
Figure A.11.18.: Area of interest: Distribution of female and male responses to survey
question on area in politics, which they are most interested in, from the
Swiss Voting Study in 1972 by Kerr et al. (1976).
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Figure A.12.1.: Vote shares of the four main party blocks (right-wing populist, socialist,
liberal and conservative) in Swiss national council elections 1919-2019.
In 1971, Swiss women are allowed to vote for the first time in national
council elections, even though women are still not enfranchised to vote




Canton Parties (in German/French) Parties (in English)
Partei der Arbeit Labour Party
Progressive Organisationen der Schweiz (POCH) Progressive Organisations of Switzerland




AG Sozialdemokraten des Bezirks Muri Social Democrats of the District of Muri
Sozialdemokrat. Partei & Gewerkschaftskartell Social-democratic Party & Trade Union Council
Sozialdemokraten & Gewerkschafter Social Democrats & Trade Unionists
Sozialdemokratisch Social-democratic
Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP) Social-democratic Party
Sozialdemokratische Partei des Bezirks Aarau Social-democratic Party of the District of Aarau
Sozialdemokratische Partei des Bezirks Zurzach Socialdemocratic Party of the District of Zurzach
Sozialdemokratische Partei & Arbeitnehmerorganisationen Social-democratic Party & Workers’ Organisations
Sozialdemokratische Partei & Arbeitervereingung Social-democratic Party & the Workers’ Association
Sozialdemokratische Partei & Gewerkschaftskartell Socialist Party & Trade Unions
Sozialdemokratische Volkspartei Social-democratic People’s Party
Freiwirtschaftsverbund Free Economic Association
Jungsozialisten Young Socialists
Marxistische Liga Marxist League
Partei der Arbeit Labour Party
Parti Ouvrier et Populaire Open Population Party
BE Parti Socialiste Socialist Party
Parti Socialiste Autonome Autnomous Socialist Party
Parti Socialiste Romand French-Swiss Party
Progressive Organisationen der Schweiz (POCH) Progressive Organisations of Switzerland
Sozial-liberale Partei Europa¨ischer Fo¨deralisten Social-liberal Party of European Federalists
Sozialdemokratische Partei Socialdemocratic Party
Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Socialist Labour Party
Gerwerkschaftsbund (unabha¨ngige Trade Union (independent
ArbeitnehmerInnen, MieterInnen & RentnerInnen) Labour, Tenants & Retirees)
Kommunistische Partei Communist Party
Partei der Arbeit (PdA) Labour Party
Sozialdemokraten & Gewerkschafter Social Democrats & Trade Unionists
Sozialdemokraten & Umweltschu¨tzer Social Democrats & Environmentalists
SG Sozialdemokratinnen & Gewerkschafterinnen Female Social Democrats & Trade Unionists
Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP) Social-democratic Party
Sozialdemokratische Partei & Gewerkschaften Social-democratic Party & Trade Unions
SP Frauenliste Social-democratic Party Women’s List
SP Ma¨nnerliste Social-democratic Party Men’s List
Sozialdemokratische Volkspartei Social-democratic Population Party
SP, Gewerkschaften & Kleingewerbe Social-democratic Party, Trade Unions & Small Businesses
Vereinigte Linksopposition United Opposition from the Left
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Left Parties
Canton Parties (in German/French) Parties (in English)
Jungsozialisten (JUSO) Young Socialist Party
Progressive Organisationen der Schweiz (POCH) Progressive Organisations of Switzerl&
SO Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP) Social-democratic Party
SP & Gru¨ne Social-democratic Party & Greens
SP & Unabha¨ngige Social-democratic Party & Independents
SP/JUSO Social-democratic Party/Young Socialist Party
Arbeiter- & Gewerbepartei Labour & Business Party
Arbeiterkartells Worker Cartel
Arbeiterpartei Labour Party
Arbeiterpartei & unabha¨ngige Bauern, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Labour Party & Independent Farmers, Business & Citizens Party
Arbeiterpartei Vorderthal Labour Party of Vorderthal
Gewerbeverein Oberiberg Business Association of Oberiberg
Gewerbler, Bauern & Angestellte von Morschach & Stoos Tradesmen, Farmers & Employees of Morschach & Stoos
Sozialdemokraten & der Gewerkschaften Social Democrats & Trade Unions
Sozialdemokratisch-gewerkschaftliche Liste Social-democratic Trade Union List
Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Social-democratic Labour Party
Sozialdemokratische Bewegung Steinen Social-democratic Movement of Steinen
Sozialdemokratische Partei Social-democratic Party
Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP) der Gemeinde Schwyz Social-democratic Party of the Municipality of Schwyz
Sozialdemokratische Volkspartei Ingenbohl-Brunnen Social-democratic People’s Party of Ingenbohl-Brunnen
Sozialdemokratischen Partei Wangen Social-democratic Party Wangen
Sozialdemokratischer Wahlvorschlag Social-democratic Election Proposal
SP Arth-Goldau Social-democratic Party of Arth-Goldau
SP Arth-Goldau & Gewerkschaften Social-democratic Party of Arth-Goldau & Trade Unions
SZ SP der Gemeinde Feusisberg Social-democratic Party of the Municipality of Feusisberg
SP der Gemeinde Freienbach Social-democratic Party of the Municipality of Freienbach
SP der Gemeinde Freienbach Social-democratic Party of the Municipality of Freienbach
SP der Gemeinde Wangen Social-democratic Party of the Municipality of Wangen
SP des Bezirkes Einsiedeln Social-democratic Party of the District of Einsiedeln
SP Ingenbohl-Brunnen & Unabha¨ngige Social-democratic Party of Ingenbohl-Brunnen & Independents
SP Ku¨ssnacht-Immensee Social-democratic Party of Ku¨ssnacht-Immensee
SP Reichenburg Social-democratic Party of Reichenburg
SP Reichenburg Social-democratic Party of Reichenburg
SP Schu¨belbach Social-democratic Party of Schu¨belbach
SP & Kritisches Forum Ku¨ssnacht Social-democratic Party & Critical Forum of Ku¨ssnacht
SP & Gewerkschaften Social-democratic Party & Trade Unions of the Municipality of Arth
SP & Gewerkschaften der Gemeinde Arth Social-democratic Party & Trade Unions of the Municipality of Arth
SP & Gewerkschafter des Bezirkes Ku¨ssnacht Social-democratic Party & Trade Unionists of the District of Ku¨ssnacht
SP & Unabha¨ngige Social-democratic Party & Independents
SP von Altendorf Social-democratic Party of Altendorf
SP Wangen Social-democratic Party of Wangen
Liste der Arbeit List of Labour
Liste der Arbeiter, Gewerbebetreiber & Kleinbauern List of Workers, Small Business Owners & Farmers
Liste der Gewerkschaften & der Arbeiterpartei List of the Trade Unions & the Labour Party
Liste der SP List of the Social-democratic Party
TG Liste der Sozialdemokraten & Gewerkschafter List of Social Democrats & Trade Unionists
Liste des Werkta¨tigen Volkes List of the Working People
SP & Freie Gewerkschaften Social-democratic Parties & Free Trade Unions
SP & Gewerkschaften Social-democratic Party & Trade Unions
Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP) Social-democratic Party
Volk der Arbeit (Sozialdem., Gewerkschaft, Freiwirtschaft) People of Labour (Social Dem., Business, Free Economy)
CST (Comunita dei socialisti ticinesi) Socialist Community of Ticino
PDL (Partito del Lavoro) Labour Party
PDL - IS Labour Party
Partito Socialista (PS) Socialist Party
TI Partito Socialista Autonomo (PSA) Autonomous Socialist Party
Partito Operaio e Popolare (PST) Labour & Population Party
Partito Socialista Unitario (PSU) United Socialist Party
Table A.13.1.: Left-labelled parties by canton.
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Conservative Parties
Canton Parties (in German/French) Parties (in English)
Christlich-demokratische Volkspartei (CVP) Christian-democratic People’s Party
Christlich-soziale Partei (CSP) Christian-socialist Party
Christlichsoziale Christian-socialists
CVP - CSP Bu¨nztal Christian-democratic People’s Party - Christian Socialist Party Bu¨nztal
CVP - CSP Reusstal Christian-democratic People’s Party - Christian Socialist Party Reusstal
CVP Bu¨nztal Christian-democratic People’s Party Bu¨nztal
CVP Limmathal Christian-democratic People’s Party Limmathal
CVP Limmettal Christian-democratic People’s Party Limmettal
CVP Reusstal Christian-democratic People’s Party Reusstal
CVP Reussted Christian-democratic People’s Party Reussted
Evang. Volkspartei des Bezirks Brugg Evang. People’s Party of the District of Brugg
Evangelische Evangelicals
Evangelische Volkspartei (EVP) Evangelic-democratic Party
Evangelische Volkspartei des Bezirks Brugg Evang.-dem. Party of the District of Brugg
JCVP (Junge Christlichdem. Volkspartei) Young Christian-dem. People’s Party
Katholisch Christlichsoziale Volkspartei Catholic Christian-socialist People’s Party
Katholisch & Christlichsoziale Catholic & Christian-socialists
Katholisch-Konservative Volkspartei Catholic-Conservative People’s Party
Katholische Catholics
AG Katholische Konservative Catholic Conservatives
Katholisch-Konservative Partei Catholic Conservative Party
Katholisch-Konservative & Christlichsoziale Partei Catholic Conservative & Christian-socialist Party
Katholisch-Konservative & Christlichsoziale Volkspartei Catholic Conservative & Christian-socialist People’s Party
Katholische Konservative & CVP des Bezirks Zurzach Cath. Cons. & Christian-democratic People’s Party of the District of Zurzach
Katholische Konservative Volkspartei Catholic Conservative People’s Party
Katholische & Christlichsoziale Partei Catholic & Christian-socialist Party
Katholische & Christlichsoziale Volkspartei Catholic & Christian-socialist People’s Party
Katholische Volkspartei Catholic People’s Party
Katholische Volkspartei & Christlichsoziale Catholic People’s Party & Christian-socialists
KK (Katholisch Konservative) Catholic Conservatives
KK. Region Limattal Catholic-Conservatives in the region of Limattal
KK. Region Reusstal Catholic-Conservatives in the region of Reusstal
Konservativ-Christliche (K-Chr.) Conservative Christian-democratic
Konservativ-Christlichsoziale Conservative Christian-socialists
Konservativ-christlichsoziale Volkspartei Conservative Christian-socialist People’s Party
Konservativ-christlichsoziale Volkspartei des Bezirks Muri Conservative Christian-socialist People’s Party of the District of Muri
Konservative Conservatives
Konservative Christlichsoziale Partei Conservative Christian-socialist Party
Konservative Volkspartei Conservative People’s Party
Christlich-demokratische Volkspartei (CVP) Christian-democratic People’s Party
Evanglische Volkspartei (EVP) Evangelic-democratic Party
BE Parti De´mocrate-chre´tien Christian-democratic People’s Party
Parti Chre´tien-social Christian-socialist People’s Party
Parti Chre´tien-social Inde´pendent Independent Christian-socialist People’s Party
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP) Christian-democratic People’s Party
Christlichsoziale Partei (CSP) Christian-socialist Party
CVP (Landsgemeinden) Christian-democratic People’s Party (Rural Municipalities)
CVP (Stadt Gossau) Christian-democratic People’s Party (City Gossau)
CVP A Christian-democratic People’s Party A
CVP B Christian-democratic People’s Party B
CVP Gams Christian-democratic People’s Party Gams (Town)
CVP Land Christian-democratic People’s Party Countryside
CVP Nord Christian-democratic People’s Party North
CVP Oberer Gaster Christian-democratic People’s Party Gaster (Town)
SG CVP Oberer Seebezirk Christian-democratic People’s Party Upper Lake District
CVP Stadt Christian-democratic People’s Party City
CVP Su¨d Christian-democratic People’s Party South
CVP & CSP Christian-democratic People’s Party & Christian-socialist People’s Party
CVP Unterer Gaster Christian-democratic People’s Party Lower Gaster (Town)
CVP Unterer Seebezirk Christian-democratic People’s Party Lower Lake District
CVP Wil-Land Christian-democratic People’s Party Rural Wil (Town)
CVP Wil-Stadt Christian-democratic People’s Party Urban Wil (Town)
EVP Evangelic-democratic Party
Freie Konservative Free Conservatives
Kahtolische Volkspartei Catholic People’s Party
Konservativ-christlichsoziale Volkspartei Conservative Christian-socialist Party
Konservativchristliche Volkspartei Conservative-christian People’s Party
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Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP) Christian-democratic People’s Party
CVP & JCVP Christian-dem. People’s Party & Young Christian-dem. People’s Party
SO Evangelische Volkspartei (EVP) Evangelic-democratic Party
Solothurnische Volkspartei & Christlichsoziale Solothurn People’s Party & Christian-socialists
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP) Christian-democratic People’s Party
Christlichdemokratische Volspartei Muotathal Christian-democratic People’s Party of Muotathal
Christliche Bu¨rger-, Bauern-, & Arbeiterpartei Christian-socialist Party of Citizens, Farmers & Labour
Christlichesoziale Volkspartei Sattel Christian-democratic People’s Party of Sattel
Christlichsoziale Arbeiter- & Gewerbepartei Christian-socialist Party of Labour & Trade
Christlichsoziale Freie & Unabha¨ngige Wa¨hlerinnen & Wa¨hler Christian-socialist Free & Independent Voters
Christlichsoziale Freie & Unabha¨ngige Wa¨hlerinnen & Wa¨hler Christian-socialist Free & Independent Voters
Christlichsoziale Partei Christian-socialist Party
Christlichsoziale Partei Altendorf & freie Wa¨hlerinnen & Wa¨hler Christian-democratic People’s Party & Free Voters
Christlichsoziale Partei Arth-Goldau Christian-socialist Party of Arth-Goldau
Christlichsoziale Partei & konservative Volkspartei Christian-socialist Party & Conservative People’s Party
Christlichsoziale & freie Wa¨hler Christian Social & Free Voters
Christlichsoziale & Freie Wa¨hler Christian-socialists & Free Voters
Christlichsoziale & freie Wa¨hler von Altendorf Christian-socialist & Free Voters of Altendorf
Christlichsoziale & Konservative Partei Christian-socialist & Conservative Party
Christlichsoziale Volkspartei Ingenbohl-Brunnen Christian-democratic People’s Party of Ingenbohl-Brunnen
CSP Christian-socialist Party
CVP der Gemeinde Lauerz Christian-democratic People’s Party of the Municipality of Lauerz
CVP der Gemeinde Schu¨lbelbach Christian-democratic People’s Party of the Municipality of Schu¨belbach
CVP der Gemeinde Wangen Christian-democratic People’s Party of the Municipality of Ku¨ssnacht
CVP Freienbach Christian-democratic People’s Party of Freienbach
CVP Gersau Christian-democratic People’s Party of Gersau
CVP Ku¨ssnacht Christian-democratic People’s Party of the District of Ku¨ssnacht
CVP Ku¨ssnacht Christian-democratic People’s Party of Ku¨ssnacht
CVP Reichenburg Christian-democratic People’s Party of Reichenburg
CVP Reichenburg Christian-democratic People’s Party of Reichenburg
CVP Rothenthurm Christian-democratic People’s Party Rothenthurn
CVP Schu¨belbach Christian-democratic People’s Party Schu¨belbach
SZ CVP & Jung-CVP des Bezirkes Einsiedeln Christian-democratic People’s Party & Young Christian-democratic People’s Party of the District of Einsiedeln
CVP Unteriberg Christian-democratic People’s Party of Unteriberg
CVP Alpthal Christian-democratic People’s Party of Alphtal
CVP Arth-Goldau Christian-democratic People’s Party of Arth-Goldau
CVP Arth-Oberath-Goldau Christian-democratic People’s Party of Arth-Oberath
CVP der Gemeinde Feusisberg Christian-democratic People’s Party of the Municipality of Feusisberg
CVP der Gemeinde Freienbach Christian-democratic People’s Party of the Municipality of Freienbach
CVP der Gemeinde Sattel Christian-democratic People’s Party of the Municipality of Sattel
CVP der Gemeinde Steinen Christian-democratic People’s Party of the Municipality of Steinen
CVP des Bezirkes Einsiedeln Christian-democratic People’s Party of the District Einsiedeln
CVP des Bezirkes Einsiedeln Christian-democratic People’s Party of the District of Einsiedeln
CVP des Bezirkes Ku¨ssnacht Christian-democratic People’s Party of the District of Ku¨ssnacht
CVP Illgau Christian-democratic People’s Party of Illgau
CVP Morschach Christian-democratic People’s Party of Morschach
CVP Nr. 1 Christian-democratic People’s Party No. 1
CVP Nr. 2 Christian-democratic People’s Party No. 2
CVP Oberiberg Christian-democratic People’s Party of Oberiberg
CVP Oberiberg Christian-democratic People’s Party of Oberiberg
CVP Sattel Christian-democratic People’s Party of Sattel
CVP Steinen Christian-democratic People’s Party of Steinen
CVP Steinen Christian-democratic People’s Party Steinen
CVP Steinerberg Christian-democratic People’s Party of Steinerberg
CVP Steinerberg Christian-democratic People’s Party of Steinerberg
CVP Vorderthal & Liberale Bauern, Gewerbe & Bu¨rgerpartei Vorderthal Christian-democratic People’s Party of & Liberal Farmers, Business & Citizen Party
CVP-Gruppe Oberiberg Christian-democratic People’s Group of Oberiberg
Evangelische Volkspartei (EVP) Evangelical People’s Party
Freie Volkspartei Free People’s Party
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Katholisch-Konservative Bauernpartei Catholic-Conservative Peasant Party
Katholisch-Konservative Volkspartei Catholic Conservative People’s Party
Katholisch-Konservative Volkspartei & CSP Catholic Conservative People’s Party & Christian-socialist Party
Katholisch-Konservative Volkspartei & CSP Catholic Conservative People’s Party & Christian-socialist Party
Katholische unabha¨ngige Bu¨rger Catholic Independent Citizens
Katholische unabha¨ngige Volkspartei Catholic Independent People’s Party
Konservativ-Christlichsoziale Volkspartei Conservative & Christian-socialist People’s Party
Konservative Conservatives
Konservative Arth-Goldau Conservatives of Arth-Goldau
Konservative Bauernvereinigung Conservative Farmers Union
Konservative Partei Conservative Party
Konservative & Christlichsoziale Volkspartei (CSP) Conservative & Christian-socialist People’s Party
Konservative & Jungkonservative Partei Conservatives & Young Conservatives Party
Konservative & Jungkonservative Volkspartei Conservative & Young Conservative People’s Party
SZ Konservative Volkspartei Conservative People’s Party
Konservative Volkspartei Conservative People’s Party
Konservative Volkspartei & CSP Konservative Volkspartei & Christlichsoziale Partei
Konservative Volkspartei & CSP Conservative People’s Party & Christian-socialist Party
Konservative Volkspartei & Jung-konservative Bewegung Conservative People’s Party & Young Conservative Movement
Konservative Volkspartei & Jung-konservative Bewegung Conservative People’s Party & Young Conservative Movement
Konservative Volkspartei, Jung-konservative Bewegung & Christlichsoziale Partei Conservative People’s Party, Young Conservative Movement & Christian-socialist Party
Konservative Volkspartei, Christlichsoziale Partei & Jung-konservative Bewegung Conservative People’s Party, Christian-socialist Party & Young Conservative Movement
Konservative-Christlichsoziale & Liberale Volkspartei Liberal, Christian-socialist & Conservative People’s Party
Konservative, Christlichsoziale & Jung-konservative Volkspartei Conservative, Christian-socialist & Young Conservative People’s Party
Konservative, Jung-konservative & CSP Conservative, Young Conservative & Christian-socialist Party
Konservativen Volkspartei & unabha¨ngigen Wa¨hlerinnen & Wa¨hler von Altendorf Conservative People’s Party & independent Voters of Altendorf
Konservativen, Christlichsoziale & Liberale Partei Conservative, Christian-socialist & Liberal Party
Unabha¨ngige Katholisch-Konservative Partei Independent Catholic Conservative Party
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP) Christian-democratic People’s Party
Christlichsoziale Liste Christian-socialist List
Christlichsoziale Liste der Werkta¨tigen Christian-socialist List of the Working People
Evang. Bauern, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerliste Evangelical List of Farmers, Business & Citizens
Evang. Bauern, Gewerbebetreiber & Bu¨rger Evangelical Farmers, Business & Citizens
Evangelische Bauern, Bu¨rger, des Gewerbes & Freisinn Evangelical Farmers, Citizen, Business & Liberals
Evangelische Volkspartei (EVP) Evangelic-democratic Party
TG Katholische Volkspartei Catholic People’s Party
Liste der Christlich-sozialen Partei List of the Christian-socialist Party
Liste der Christlichsozialen List of Christian-socialists
Liste der Christlichsozialen & Werkta¨tigen List of the Christian-socialists & Working People
Liste der Demokraten & EVP List of Democrats & Evangelic-democratic Party
Liste der EVP List of Evangelic-democratic Party
Liste der Evangelisch-sozialen Vereinigung List of the Evangelical-socialist Association
Liste der katholischen Arbeiter & Angestellten List of Catholic Workers & Employees
Liste der katholischen Volkspartei List of the Catholic People’s Party
PPD (Partito Popolare Democratico) Christian-democratic People’s Party
TI PPD - Sopra Christian-democratic People’s Party - Sopra
PPD - Sotto Christian-democratic People’s Party - Sotto
Table A.13.2.: Conservative-labelled parties by canton.
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Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP) Free-democratic Party
FDP - Land Free-democratic Party - Countryside
FDP - Stadt Free-democratic Party - City
Freidemokratische (FD) Free-democratics
Freisinnig Demokratische Liberal Democrats
Freisinn - Reusstal Liberals - Reusstal
Freisinn - Bu¨nztal Liberals - Bu¨nztal
AG FDP & Jungliberale Free-democratic Party & Young Liberals
FDP - Bezirk Free-democratic Party - District
Freisinnige Liberals
FDP & Jungliberale Bewegung Free-democratic Party & Young Liberal Movement
FDP Bezirk Muri Free-democratic Party of the District of Muri
FDP Bezirk Zurzach Free-democratic Party of the District of Zurzach
FDP des Bezirks Muri Free-democratic Party of the District of Muri
Freisinnige Partei Liberal Party
Freisinnige Partei & Jungliberale Bewegung Liberal Party & Young Liberal Movement
Freisinnige & Jungliberale Liberals & Young Liberals
Freisinnige Volkspartei Liberal People’s Party
Freisinnige Partei & Jungeliberale Liberal Party & Young Liberals
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP) Free-democratic People’s Party
Jungfreisinn Young Liberals
Liberal-sozialistische Partei Liberal-socialist Party
BE Parti Liberal Liberal Party
Parti libe´ral-radical Radical-liberal Party
Parti Libe´ral-radicale Inde´pendent Independent Radical-liberal Party
Parti Radical Radical Party
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP) Free-democratic People’s Party
FDP Land Free-democratic People’s Party Rural
FDP Stadt Free-democratic People’s Party City
SG FDP & Jungliberale Bewegung Free-democratic People’s Party & Young Liberal Movement
FDP Wil-Land Free-democratic People’s Party Rural Wil
FDP Wil-Stadt Free-democratic People’s Party Urban Wil
Jungfreisinn Young Liberals
Liberale Liste Liberal List
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP) Free-democratic People’s Party




Canton Parties (in German/French) Parties (in English)
Bu¨rgerliche Opposition Civic Opposition
Liberale Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Liberal Party of Farmers, Business & Citizens
Liberale Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Siebnen-Wangen-Nuolen Liberal Farmers, Business & Citizens Party of Siebnen-Wangen-Nuolen
Liberale Partei Liberal Party
Liberale Partei & Jungliberale Liberal Party & Young Liberals
Liberale Partei von Goldau Liberal Party of Goldau
Liberale & freie Wa¨hler Liberals & Free Voters
Liberale & freie Wa¨hler von Altendorf Liberals & Free Voters of Altendorf
Liberale & Jungliberale Partei Liberal & Young Liberal Party
Liberale & Jungliberale Volkspartei Liberal & Young Liberal People’s Party
Liberale & Konservative Volkspartei Liberal & Conservative People’s Party
Liberale Volks- & Arbeiterpartei Liberal People’s & Labour Party
Liberale Volkspartei Liberal People’s Party
Liberale Volkspartei Liberal People’s Party
Liberale Volkspartei Arth-Oberarth-Goldau & Jungliberale Bewegung Arth-Goldau Liberal People’s Party Arth-Oberarth-Goldau & Young Liberal Movement of Arth-Goldau
Liberale Volkspartei der Gemeinde Lauerz Liberal People’s Party of the Municipality of Lauerz
Liberale Volkspartei der Gemeinde Sattel Liberal People’s Party of the Municipality of Sattel
Liberale Volkspartei der Gemeinde Schu¨belbach Liberal People’s Party of the Municipality of Schu¨belbach
Liberale Volkspartei des Bezirkes Einsiedeln Liberal People’s Party of the District of Einsiedeln
SZ Liberale Volkspartei des Bezirkes Ku¨ssnacht Liberal People’s Party of the District of Ku¨ssnacht
Liberale Volkspartei Einsiedeln Liberal People’s Party of Einsiedeln
Liberale Volkspartei Freienbach Liberal People’s Party of Freienbach
Liberale Volkspartei Gersau Liberal People’s Party of Gersau
Liberale Volkspartei Goldau & Umgebung Liberal People’s Party of Goldau & Surroundings
Liberale Volkspartei Ingenbohl-Brunnen Liberal Party of Ingenbohl-Brunnen
Liberale Volkspartei Lachen Liberal People’s Party of Lachen
Liberale Volkspartei Muotathal Liberal People’s Party Muotathal
Liberale Volkspartei Schu¨belbach Liberal People’s Party of Schu¨belbach
Liberale Volkspartei & Arbeiterpartei Steinen Liberal People’s Party & Labour Party of Steinen
Liberale Volkspartei & freie Wa¨hler Liberal People’s Party & Free Voters
Liberale Volkspartei & Freie Wa¨hler Liberal People’s Party & Free Voters
Liberale Volkspartei & Jungliberale Bewegung Liberal People’s Party & Young Liberal Movement
Liberale Volkspartei & Jungliberale Bewegung Wangen Liberal People’s Party & Young Liberal Movement of Wangen
Liberale Volkspartei von Altendorf Liberal People’s Party of Altendorf
Liberale Volkspartei von Arth & Oberarth & Umgebung Liberal People’s Party of Arth & Oberarth & Surroundings
Liberale Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei & Jungliberale Bewegung Liberal Farmers, Business & Citizens Party & Young Liberal Movement
Liberale Volkspartei Liberal People’s Party
Liberale Volkspartei Arth-Oberarth-Goldau Liberal People’s Party of Arth-Oberarth-Goldau
Liberale Volkspartei der Gemeinde Feusisberg Liberal People’s Party of the Municipality of Feusisberg
Liberale Volkspartei der Gemeinde Freienbach Liberal People’s Party of the Municipality of Freienbach
Liberale Volkspartei des Bezirkes Einsiedeln Liberal People’s Party of the District of Einsiedeln
Liberale Volkspartei des Bezirks Ku¨ssnacht Liberal People’s Party of the District of Ku¨ssnacht
Liberale Volkspartei Steinen Liberal People’s Party of Steinen
Bu¨rgerlich-freisinnige Liste Civic-liberal List
Bu¨rgerlich-freisinnige Partei Civic-liberal Party
Bu¨rgerliche Liste Citizen List
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP) Free-democratic People’s Party
FDP - Land Free-democratic People’s Party - Countryside
FDP - Stadt Free-democratic People’s Party - City
Freie demokratische Wa¨hler Free-democratic Citizens
Freisinnig-bu¨rgerliche Partei Liberal-civic Party
Freisinnige aller Sta¨nde Liberals of all Ranks
Freisinnige-demokratische Liste Liberal-democratic List
Liste der Bauern, Gewerbebetreiber & Freisinnige Bu¨rger aller Sta¨nde List of Farmers, Business & Self-employed Citizens
Liste der Bu¨rgerlichen Citizens’ List
Liste der Freien Bu¨rger & des Mittelstandes List of the Free Citizens & the Middle Class
TG Liste der Freisinnigen Bu¨rger, Bauern & Gewerbebetreiber List of the Self-Employed Citizens, Farmers & Business
Liste der Freisinnigen Demokratischen Partei & der Gewerbebetreiber List of the Liberal-democratic Party & Business
Liste der Freischaffenden Bu¨rger & Gewerbebetreiber List of the Self-employed Citizens & Business
Liste der Freisinnig-Bu¨rgerlichen List of Liberal Citizens
Liste der FDP List of the Liberal-democratic Party
Liste der Freisinnige Bu¨rger aller Sta¨nde List of the Liberal Citizens of all Ranks
Liste der Freisinnigen Liberals’ List
Liste der Freisinnigen aller Sta¨nde List of the Liberals of all Ranks
Liste der Freisinnigen & Gewerbetreibenden Bu¨rger List of Liberals & Business
Liste der Freisinnigen & Unabha¨ngigen aller Sta¨nde List of the Liberals & Independents of all Ranks
Liste der Freisinnigen & Gewerbebetreibenden List of Liberals & Business
Liste der Gewerbetreibenden & Bu¨rger aller Sta¨nde List of Business & Citizens of all Ranks
Liste der Jung-Liberalen Bewegung List of the Young Liberal Movement
Liste der Jungliberalen List of Young Liberals
Liste der Liberalsozialisten & freien Bu¨rger List of Liberal Socialists & Free Citizens
Liste des Bu¨rgerlichen Miteinander & des Gewerbes List of Civic Togetherness & Business
Liste des Bu¨rgerlichen Blocks List of the Civic Bloc
Liste von Freisinn & Gewerbe List of Liberalism & Business
Liberale Sopraneceri Liberal Party of Sopra
Liberale Sottonoceri Liberal Party of Sotto
TI Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI) Italian Liberal Party
Liberali Radicali (PLR) Free-democratic People’s Party
Liberali Radicali Ticino (PLRT) Free-democratic People’s Party Ticino
Polo Della Liberta (Polo) Pole of Freedom
Partito Radicale (PR) Radical Party
Table A.13.3.: Liberal-labelled parties by canton.
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Aargauische Republikanische Bewegung des Bezirks Muri Republican Movement of the District of Muri in Aargau
Aarg. Rep. Bewegung & Nationale Aktion (NA) Bezirksgruppen Republican Movement & National Action District Groups in Aargau
Bauern Farmers
Bauern & Bu¨rgerpartei Farmer & Citizen Party
Bauern & Gewerbepartei Farmer & Business Party
Bauernheimatbewegung (Jungbauern) Farmers’ HomelandMovement (Young Farmers)
Bauerns-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei (BGB) Farmer, Business & Citizen Party
Bauerns-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Bezirk Muri Farmer, Business & Citizen Party of the District of Muri
Bauerns-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Bezirk Zurzach Farmer, Business & Citizen Party of the District of Zurzach
AG Bauerns-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei dez Bezirks Brugg Farmer, Business & Citizen Party of the District of Brugg
Jungbauern Young Farmers
Nationale Aktion (NA) National Action
Nationale Front National Front
REP (Repupublikaner) Republicans
Republikaner & NA Republicans & National Action
Republikaner Republicans
Schweizerische Bauernheimatbewegung (Jungbauern) Swiss Farmers’ Homeland Movement (Young Farmers)
Schweizerische Bauernheimatbewegung Swiss Farmers’ Homeland Movement
Schweizerische Bauernheimatbewegung (Jungbauern) des Bezirks Brugg Swiss Farmers’ Homeland Movement (Young Farmers) of the District of Brugg
Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) Swiss People’s Party
SVP des Bezirks Kulm S.V.P. (B.G.B) Swiss People’s Party of the District of Kulm
SVP des Bezirks Muri S.V.P. (B.G.B) Swiss People’s Party of the District of Muri
Bu¨rgerparteien Citizen Parties
Eidgeno¨ssisch-demokratische Union Swiss-democratic Union
Jungbauern Young Farmers
Nationale Aktion (NA) National Action
BE Parti National Romand French-Swiss National Party
Promotion Biennoise/Pro Biel Pro-Biel Party
Republikanische Bewegung Republican Movement
Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) Swiss People’s Party
Union De´mocratique du Centre Democratic Union of the Centre
Arbeiter- & Bauernpartei Labour & Farmer Party
Auto-Partei Automobile Party
Auto-Partei/Die Freiheitlichen Autmobile Party/The Free Ones
Bauern- & Mittelstandspartei Farmer, Business & Citizen Party
Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Arbeiterpartei Farmer, Business & Labour Party
BGB Partei Farmer, Business & Citizen Party
BGB & Mittelstandspartei Farmer, Business & Citizen Party & Middle-Class Party
Demokratische Fortschrittspartei Democratic Advancement Party
Demokratische Partei Democratic Party
SG Demokratische & Arbeiterpartei Democratic & Labour Party
Jungbauern Young Farmers
Jungbauern & Demokraten Young Farmers & Democrats
Nationale Aktion (NA) National Action
Republikaner & NA Republicans & National Action
Schwarzenbach-Republikaner Schwarzenbach Republicans
Schwarzenbach-Republikaner & Parteilose Schwarzenbach Republicans & Independents
Schweizer Demokraten Swiss Democrats
Schweizerische Republikanische Bewegung Swiss Republican Movement
Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) Swiss People’s Party
SVP & Junge Mitte Swiss People’s Party & Young Center
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Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) Swiss Population Party
Auto-Partei/Die Freiheitlichen Automobile Party/The Free Ones
SO Nationale Aktion (NA) fu¨r Volk & Heimat National Action for Population & Home Country
Nationale & Jungnationale Aktion National & Young National Action
Schweizer Demokraten Swiss Democrats
Bauern-, Arbeiter- & Konservative Volkspartei Farmers, Workers & Conservative People’s Party
Bauern-, Arbeiter-, & Gewerbepartei Farmers, Workers & Business Party
Bauern-, Bu¨rger- & Gewerbepartei Farmers, Citizens & Business Party
Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Farmers, Trade & Citizens Party
Bauernvereinigung Farmers Association
Bu¨rger- & Bauernpartei Citizens & Farmers Party
Demokratische Autopartei & SVP Democratic Car Party & Swiss People’s Party
Fortschrittliche Volks- & Bauernpartei Progressive People’s & Farmers Party
Freiheitspartei (FPS) Freedom Party (FPS)
Freiheitspartei Schwyz (FPS) Freedom Party of Schwyz (FPS)
Konservative Volkspartei & unabha¨ngige Wa¨hler & Wa¨hlerinnen Conservative People’s Party & Independent Voters
Konservative Volkspartei & unabha¨ngige Wa¨hlerinnen & Wa¨hler von Altendorf Conservative People’s Party & Independent Voters of Altendorf
Konservative Volkspartei & unabha¨ngige Wa¨hler & Wa¨hlerinnen von Altendorf Conservative People’s Party & Independent Voters of Altendorf
Konservative Volkspartei & unabha¨ngige Wa¨hlerinnen & Wa¨hler Conservative People’s Party & Independent Voters
Konservativer Wahlvorschlag Conservative Election Proposal
Kritische Forums Ku¨ssnacht Critical Forum of Ku¨ssnacht
Kritisches Forum Arth-Goldau (kfag) Critical Forum of Arth-Goldau (kfag)
Kritisches Forum Brunnen Critical Forum of Brunnen
Kritisches Forum Einsiedeln Critical Forum of Einsiedeln
SZ Kritisches Forum Ho¨fe & Freie & unabha¨ngige Wa¨hler Wollerau Critical Forum Ho¨fe & Free & Independent Voters of Wollerau
Kritisches Forum Ho¨fe/Freienbach Critical Forum of Ho¨fe/Freienbach
Kritisches Forum Ibach Critical Forum of Ibach
Kritisches Forum Ibach (KFI) Critical Forum of Ibach (KFI)
Kritisches Forum Schwyz Critical Forum of Schwyz
Kritisches Forum Schwyz - Liste Ingenbohl Critical Forum of Schwyz - List Ingenbohl
Kritisches Forums March Critical Forum of March
Liberale Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Liberal Farmers, Business & Citizens Party
Liberale Volkspartei & SVP Liberal People’s Party & Swiss People’s Party
Schweizer Autopartei Swiss Automobile Party
Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) Swiss People’s Party
Schweizerischen Volkspartei Schu¨belbach Swiss People’s Party of Schu¨belbach
Schweizerischen Volkspartei Arth-Oberarth-Goldau Swiss People’s Party of Arth-Oberarth-Goldau
Schwyzerische Volkspartei People’s Party of Schwyz
Schwyzerische Volkspartei (Bauern-, Bu¨rger-, & Gewerbepartei) Swiss People’s Party (Farmers, Citizens & Business Party)
SVP Bezirk Einsiedeln Swiss People’s Party of the District of Einsiedeln (SVP)
SVP der Gemeinde Freienbach Swiss People’s Party of the Municipality of Freienbach
SVP des Bezirkes Einsiedeln Swiss People’s Party of the District of Einsiedeln (SVP)
SVP des Bezirks Einsiedeln Swiss People’s Party of the District of Einsiedeln
SVP Ingenbohl-Brunnen Swiss People’s Party of Ingenbohl Brunnen
SVP Rothenthurm Swiss People’s Party of Rothenturm (SVP)
SVP & Demokratische Autopartei Swiss People’s Party & Democratic Automobile Party
SVP von Altendorf Swiss People’s Party of Altendorf (SVP)
SVP Ybrig Swiss People’s Party of Ybrig
Unabha¨ngige Arbeiter-, Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Independent Labour, Farmers, Business & Citizens Party
Vereinigten Ba¨uerlichen Institutionen & Arbeitnehmer Morschach/Stoos United Farmers Associations & Employees of Morschach/Stoos
Agrario Populare Ticinese Farmer Party
Azione Nazionale Ticinese (ANT) National Action of Ticino
Contadini, Artigiani et Patrizi Farmer, Business & Citizen Party
TI Democratici Svizzeri (DS) Swiss Democrats
Lega dei Ticinesi (LEGA) League of Ticino
Operaio e Contadino Worker & Farmer Party
Partito Svizzero della Liberta (PSL) Swiss Party of Freedom Party (Automobile Party)
Unione Democratica di Centro (UDC) Swiss People’s Party
Table A.13.4.: Populist-labelled parties by canton.
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Independent Parties
Canton Parties (in German/French) Parties (in English)
Aktion Freie Stimmbu¨rger Action Free Voters
Alternative Alternative
Freie Himmiber Free Himmibens
Freie Stimmberechtige Free Entitled Voters
AG Landesring National Ring
Landesring der Unabha¨gigen (LdU) National Ring of Independents
Ohne Parteibezeichnung Without Party Label
Team Team
TEAM 67 Team 67
Alliance des Inde´pendants Alliance of Independents
Parti Autonome (APO) Autonomous Party
De´fense des Inte´reˆts Defence of the Interests
Freie Bu¨rger Free Citizens
Freie Stimmberechtigte Free Voters
BE Junges Bern Young Bern
Landesring der Unabha¨ngigen (LdU) National Ring of Independents
Parteilos Without Party
Sektion Mu¨hlberg Section Mu¨hlberg
Unabha¨ngige Bu¨rger Independent Citizens
Unite´ Jurassienne Jura Union
Denken mit Herz & Verstand Think with Heart & Common Sense
Die “andere” Liste - fu¨r eine lebendige Mitwelt The “other” List - for a Lively Environment
Die Unabha¨ngigen The Independents
Europa¨ische Fo¨deralisten Partei European Federalists Party
Festbesoldete Women with Permanent Jobs
Freie Liste Free List
SG Freie Liste/Landesring der Unabha¨ngigen (LdU) Free List/National Ring of Independents
Freie Wa¨hler Free Voters
Junge Liste Young List
Junges Werdenberg Young Werdenberg
Landesring der Unabha¨ngigen (LdU) National Ring of Independents
Landesring der Unabha¨ngigen (LdU)/Lust auf Zukunft National Ring of Independents/Eager for a Future
Radikale Wahlliste Radical Voting List
Sachbezogene Politik, parteilos Policy-oriented Politics, without Party Affiliation
U¨berparteiliche Aktion Action without Party Affiliation
Unabha¨ngige Demokratische Gruppe Independent Democratic Group
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Independent Parties
Canton Parties (in German/French) Parties (in English)
Freiheitspartei Freedom Party
Humanistische Hanfpartei Humanist Cannabis Party
Individual Individual Candidate
Landesring der Unabha¨ngigen (LdU) National Ring of the Independents
SO Landesring Solothurn National Ring of Solothurn
Offene Liste Open List
Oppositionspartei Opposition Party
Parteilos No Party Affiliation
Unabha¨ngige Liste Independent List
Allgemeine Volkspartei General People’s Party
Bu¨rger von Lauerz Citizens of Lauerz
Dorfkreis Illgau Village District of Illgau
Eigenwerkfreunde Friends of Eigenwerk
Einzelkandidat Individual Candidate
Fortschrittlich-demokratische Volkspartei Progressive-democratic People’s Party
Freie Bu¨rger Free Citizens
Freie Liste Free List
SZ Freie Stimmberechtigte Free Voters
Freie Wa¨hler des Bezirkes Ku¨ssnacht Free Voters of the District of Ku¨ssnacht
Gemeinderat Municipal Council
Gemeinsamer Wahlvorschlag Joint Election Proposal
Gewerbeverein Trade Association
Kein Wahlvorschlag No Election Proposal
Keine Wahlliste No Electoral List
Landesring der Unabha¨ngigen National Ring of Independents
Volksbewegung fu¨r eine gesunde Gesellschaftsgestaltung People’s Movement for the Creation of a Healthy Society
Freie Wa¨hler Free Citizens
Landesring der Unabha¨ngigen (LdU) National Ring of Independents
Liste der Demokratisch-Unabha¨ngigen List of the Democratic Independents
TG Liste der Freien Wa¨hler Free Voters’ List
Liste der Unabha¨ngig-Wirtschaftspolitischen List of the Politically-economic Independent
Liste des freien Volkes Free People’s List
Liste des LdU List of the National of Ring of Independents
Noldi Holtz Noldi Holtz (individual candidate)
Alternativa (ALTER) The Alternative
Il Centro (CH-TI) The Center
Comunita dei Pensionati Invalidi Ticinesi (CP IT) Community of Disabled People of Ticino
Doveri e Diritti Democratici (DDD) Duties & Democratic Rights
Diritti democratici ticinesi (DDT) Ticino Democratic Rights
TI Independente Independents
Mobilitazione degli assenti (MDA) Mobilization of Absentees
Movimento degli indipendentisti (MDI) Movement of Separatists
PAD Unknown
Partito ticinese per la protezione dei cittadini (PTPC) Ticino Party for the Protection of Citizens
Table A.13.5.: Independent-labelled parties by canton.
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Party Coalitions
Canton Parties (in German/French) Parties (in English)
Alle Politischen Parteien All Political Parties
Aller Parteien All Parties
Arbeiterpartei der Christlichsozialen Partei (CSP) & der unabha¨ngigen Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei Labour Party of the Christian Social Party & the Independent Farmers, Business & Citizens Party
Arbeiterpartei & unabha¨ngige Bauern-, Gewerbe-, & Bu¨rgerpartei Labour Party & Independent Farmers, Business & Civic Party
Arbeiterpartei, Konservative Volkspartei & liberale Partei Labour Party, Conservative Party & Social-democratic Party
Arbeiterpartei, Liberale Volkspartei, freie Bu¨rger & Bauernpartei & Konservativ-CSP Labour Party, Liberal People’s Party, Free Citizens & Farmers Party & Conservative Christian-socialist Party
Bestehende 4 Parteien Existing 4 Parties
CSP, liberale Volkspartei & Arbeiterpartei Christian-socialist Party, Liberal People’s Party & Labour Party
Christlichdemokratische & Liberale Volkspartei Christian-democratic & Liberal People’s Party
Christlichdemokratische & Liberale Volkspartei Christian-democratic & Liberal People’s Party
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP) Gersau & Liberale Volkspartei Gersau Christian Democratic People’s Party CVP Gersau & Liberal People’s Party Gersau
CVP Galgenen, SP (SP) Galgenen & Liberale Volkspartei Galgenen Christian-democratic People’s Party Galgenen, Social-democratic Party of Galgenen & Liberal People’s Party of Galgenen
CVP Schu¨belbach, Liberale Volkspartei Schu¨belbach & SP Schu¨belbach Christian-democratic People’s Party Schu¨belbach, Liberal People’s Party Schu¨belbach & Social-democratic Party Schu¨belbach
CVP Vorderthal, Liberale Bauern-, Gewerbe- & Bu¨rgerpartei (BGB) Vorderthal & Arbeiterpartei Vorderthal Christian-democratic People’s Party of Vorderthal, Liberal Farmers, Business & Citizens Party of Vorderthal & Workers Party of Vorderthal
CVP Wangen, Liberale Volkspartei Wangen & SP Wangen Christian-democratic People’s Party Wangen, Liberal People’s Party Wangen & Social-democratic Party Wangen
CVP, Liberale Volkspartei & SP Lachen Christian Democratic People’s Party, Liberal People’s Party & Social Democratic Party Lachen
Christlichsoziale & konservative Partei Christian-socialist & Conservative Party
CVP & Liberale Volkspartei Muotathal CVP & Liberal People’s Party of Muotathal
CVP & Liberale Volkspartei Muotathal CVP & Liberal People’s Party Muotathal
CVP & Liberale Volkspartei Tuggen Christian-democratic People’s Party & Liberal People’s Party of Tuggen
Einzelk&idat Individual C&idate
Fortschrittlich-demokratische Volkspartei Progressive-democratic People’s Party
Freier Wahlvorschlag Free Election Proposal
Gemeindera¨tlicher Wahlvorschlag Municipal Election Proposal
SZ Katholisch-konservativen Volkspartei, CSP, fortschrittlich-demokratische Partei & Arbeiterpartei Catholic Conservative People’s party, Christian Social party, Progressive Democratic party & Workers’ party
Konservativ-Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei, unabha¨ngige Bu¨rger- & Bauernpartei, Conservative Christian Social People’s Party, Independent Civil & Farmers Party,
liberale & jungliberale Partei & Arbeiterpartei Liberal & Young Liberal Party & Workers Party
Konservativ-Christlich-Soziale, Liberale sowie unabha¨ngige Bu¨rgerpartei & Arbeiterpartei Conservative Christian-socialist, Liberal & Independent Civil Party & Labour Party
Konservativ-christlich-soziale, Liberale & Arbeiterpartei Conservative Christian-socialist, Liberal & Labour Party
Konservativ-christlichsoziale Volkspartei & Liberale & Bu¨rgerpartei Conservative-christian-socialist People’s Party & Liberals & Citizens Party
Konservativ-christlichsoziale Volkspartei, Liberale Volkspartei & Jungliberale Ortsgruppe & Arbeiterkartell Young Liberal Local Group & Labour Cartel
Konservativ-Christlichsoziale Volkspartei, Liberale & Jungliberale Volkspartei & Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Conservative Christian-socialist People’s Party, Liberal & Young Liberal People’s Party & Social-democratic Labour Party
Konservative Partei, Fortschrittliche Volks- & Bauernpartei & Arbeiterpartei Conservative Party, Progressive People’s & Farmers Party & Labour Party
Konservative Partei, liberale Partei & CSP Conservative Party, Liberal Party & Christian-socialist Party
Konservative & Arbeiterpartei Conservative Labour Party
Konservative & CSP, Arbeiterpartei & Liberale & Jungliberale Bauern- & Bu¨rgerpartei Conservative & Christian Social Party, Labour Party & Liberal & Young Liberal Peasant & Citizens’ Party
Konservative & CSP, Liberale Volkspartei, Jungliberale Ortsgruppe & Arbeiterpartei Conservative & Christian Social Party, Liberal People’s Party, Young Liberal Local Group & Labour Party
Konservative & Liberale Partei Conservative & Liberal Party
Konservative & liberale Partei Conservative & liberal Party
Konservative & liberale Volkspartei Conservative & Liberal People’s Party
Konservative Volkspartei & CSP, Partei der Bauernvereinigung, liberale Partei & SP Conservative People’s Party & Christian-socialist Party, Farmers Union Party, Liberal Party & Social-democratic Party
Konservative Volkspartei & Bauern-, Arbeiter- & Gewerbepartei Conservative People’s Party & Farmers, Worker & Business Party
Konservative Volkspartei & Christlichsoziale Arbeiterpartei, Liberale Volkspartei & SP Conservative People’s Party & Christian-socialist Labour Party, Liberal People’s Party & Social-democratic Party
Konservative Volkspartei, CSP & BGB Conservative People’s Party, Christian-socialist Party & Farmers, Business & Citizens Party
Konservative Volkspartei, Liberale Volkspartei & jungliberale Bewegung, CSP & Arbeiterpartei Conservative People’s Party, Liberal People’s Party & Young Liberal Movement, Christian-socialist Party & Labour Party
Konservative Volkspartei, liberale Partei, Bauern-, Bu¨rger- & Gewerbepartei & allg. Arbeiterpartei Conservative People’s Party, Liberal Party, Farmers, Civic & Trade Party & General Workers Party
Konservative Volkspartei, Liberale Volkspartei & Jungliberale Bewegung, CSP & SP Conservative People’s Party, Liberal People’s Party & Young Liberal Movement, Christian-socialist Party & Social-democratic Party
Konservative, Arbeiter- & Liberale Partei Conservative, Liberal Workers Party
Konservative, Christlichsoziale & Liberale Volkspartei Conservative-Christian-Social & Liberal People’s Party
Konservative, Jungkonservative, Christlichsoziale, Liberale & Jungliberale Partei Conservative, Young Conservative, Christian-socialist, Liberal & Young Liberal Party
Konservative, liberale & freie Volkspartei Conservative, Liberal & Free People’s Party
Liberale Partei Tuggen & Christlichdemokratischen Volkspartei Tuggen Liberal Party Tuggen & Christian Democratic People’s Party Tuggen
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Party Coalitions
Canton Parties (in German/French) Parties (in English)
Liberale BGB & konservative Volkspartei Liberal Farmers, Commercial & Citizens Party & Conservative People’s Party
Liberale Bauern-, Gewerbe-, & Bu¨rgerpartei, CVP & Arbeiterpartei Vorderthal Liberal Farmers, Business & Citizens Party, Christian-democratic People’s Party & Vorderthal Workers Party
Liberale Bauern-, Gewerbe-, & Bu¨rgerpartei & Konservative Volkspartei Liberal Farmers, Business & Civil Party & Conservative People’s Party
Liberale Bauern-, Gewerbe-, & Bu¨rgerpartei & der Christlich-demokratischen Volkspartei Vorderthal Liberal Farmers, Business, & Citizens Party & the Christian-democratic People’s Party Vorderthal
Liberale Partei & Konservativ-CSP Liberal Party & Conservative Christian-socialist Party
Liberale & Jungliberale Bewegung, Arbeiterpartei, Konservative & CSP Liberal & Young Liberal Movement, Labor Party, Conservative & Christian Social Party
Liberale Volkspartei Tuggen & CVP Gersau Liberal People’s Party Tuggen & Christian Democratic People’s Party Gersau
Liberale Volkspartei Tuggen & CVP Tuggen Liberal People’s Party Tuggen & Christian-democratic People’s Party of Tuggen
Liberale Volkspartei & CVP Tuggen Liberal People’s Party & Christian-democratic People’s Party of Tuggen
SZ Liberale Volkspartei & Konservative Volkspartei Liberal People’s Party & Conservative People’s Party
Liberale Volkspartei von Arth, Oberarth & Umgebung Liberal People’s Party of Arth & Oberarth & Surro&ings
Liberale, Konservative & Arbeiterpartei Liberal, Conservative & Labor Party
Libreale Volkspartei, CVP & SP Liberal People’s Party, Christian-democratic People’s Party & Social-democratic Party
SP Wangen, CVP Wangen & Liberale Volkspartei Wangen Social-democratic Party Wangen, Christian-democratic People’s Party Wangen & Liberal People’s Party Wangen
SP, CSP & Unabha¨ngige Bauern-, Gewerbe-, & Bu¨rgerpartei der Gemeinde Reichenburg Social-democratic Party, Christian-socialist Party & Independent Farmers, Business, & Citizens Party of the Municipality of Reichenburg
SP, Liberale Volkspartei & CVP Social-democratic Party, Liberal People’s Party & Christian-democratic People’s Party
U¨berparteiliche Schwyzer Opposition Non-partisan Opposition of Schwyz
U¨berparteiliches Komitee Nonpartisan Committee
U¨berparteiliches Komitee fu¨r die Kantonsratswahl 1996 Non-partisan Committee for the 1996 Cantonal Elections
U¨berparteiliches Komitee fu¨r die Kantonsratswahl 2000 Non-partisan Committee for the 2000 Cantonal Elections
Freisinnige & Demokraten Liberals & Democrats
Jungliberale Bewegung & EVP Young Liberals & Evangelic-democratic Party
L&esring der Unabha¨ngigen (LdU) - Gru¨ne Rheintaler National Ring of Independents - Green Rheintaler
SG LdU/Freie Umweltliste National Ring of Independents/Free Environment List
Partei der Arbeiter & Kleinbauern & der Parteilosen Labour Party & Small Farmers & Independents
Versta¨ndigungsliste L&esring, Demokraten, Jungbauern Coalition List National Ring, Democrats & Young Farmers
Table A.13.6.: Coalition-labelled party alliances by canton. Parties that are not from the same political ideology running on
a combined party list are categorised as “coalition”. Party coalitions are labelled as such when several party
blocks run together for cantonal elections on a mutual party list. In the canton of Schwyz (SZ), this was
common before 1960. After that, parties started to run for elections with separate party lists.
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2. What Drives Support For
Enfranchisment? The Case of Swiss Female Suffrage
Abstract: Democratisation literature mostly focuses on the elite’s decision to extend
the franchise. But in many cases, current voters have to decide whether to grant the vote
to a broader population. Little evidence exists on what factors drive the support among
those who are already enfranchised. In this paper, I exploit the change in municipal
Yes-vote shares among male voters for two Swiss national referenda on female suffrage
between 1959 and 1971. I show that municipalities, which quasi-randomly introduced
local female suffrage in between the two referenda, increased their support much more.
This increase is driven by municipalities in which a majority of men was initially opposed
to national suffrage. Conditioning on similar initial support, I further show that this
difference cannot be explained by a “ceiling effect”. My findings can also not corroborate
that the rise in support is driven by post-suffrage change in municipal party vote shares,
expenditure, or cultural proxies, such as female labour market participation.
2.1. Introduction
What drives voting right holders’ support for a franchise extension? The introduc-
tion of universal suffrage, usually first for men and later for women, is a milestone in
democratic history of many countries. In the common case, the franchise was extended
through the passing of a law in parliament, such as in the UK for all voting right Acts
between 1832 and 1928, or in the US for the 15th and 19th Amendment in 1870 and 1920.
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Both theoretical and empirical findings have suggested what drives representatives
towards granting suffrage to a wider population. Among those factors are a credible
threat for revolution (Dower et al., 2020; Acemoglu et al., 2006; Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2001, 2000), a conflict within the elite on the scope and goal of government (Lizzeri
and Persico, 2004), and the anticipated chance of parties to increase their vote shares
(Teele, 2018; Przeworski, 2009).
However, we have little evidence on what explains public opinion among those vot-
ers who already have the vote. We know that parliaments take voters’ preferences into
account when passing legislation1. Hence, many of the factors driving the decisions of
their representatives may also explain why they support enfranchisement. For example,
the British elite in the 19th century was likely to fear revolution as much as their repre-
sentatives in parliament. The hope for a change in party vote shares, on the other hand,
was unlikely to find support by the current average voter.
Historically, there are several examples in which public opinion played an important
role for franchise extensions. The British general election of 1831 was generally per-
ceived as a referendum on the 1832 Great Reform Act, which extended voting rights to
a broader male population (Aidt and Franck, 2015). Prior to the Fifteenth Amende-
ment, several US states held referenda on the extension of voting rights to the black
population between 1846-1870 (Walton et al., 2012). The Twenty-sixth Amendment,
reducing the US voting age from 21 to 18, was further regarded as a franchise extension
largely driven by public opinion (Keyssar, 2000).
1For empirical evidence that voters’ preferences do drive representatives’ decision-making, see e.g.
Caughey et al. (2017), Miller (2008).
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Knowing what explains the support among those who already have a right to vote is
important for several reasons. Representatives take current voters’ opinons into account
when passing enfranchisement laws. Once a law is passed, public opinion among those
previously privileged voters may matter for how the newly enfranchised turn out and
vote. Opposition by the previously privileged may further cause direct (e.g. violence)
or indirect (e.g. extremist voting) backlash against the new voters.
In this paper, I therefore study the change in support for national female suffrage
among Swiss male voters between a first national referendum in 1959 and a second one
in 1971. While the first referendum was rejected with an approval from only 33.1% of
male voters, the second one passed with a 65.7% Yes-vote share.2 Both referenda asked
voters to either approve or reject the same constitutional amendment: The introduction
of voting and eligibility rights for women in federal matters.3 And in both, only men at
or above the age of 20 could vote.
The approval of the national referendum granted Swiss women the franchise only in
federal elections and referenda. At the cantonal and the municipality level, voting right
laws could only be changed through the cantonal constitution. The last Swiss canton
extended its local franchise to women in 1990.
The Swiss case has several advantages to study what drives the support for franchise
extensions. I observe the change in male Yes-vote shares between the two referenda at the
municipality level. Moreover, I exploit the fact that eight Swiss cantons quasi-randomly
introduced local female suffrage through cantonal referenda between 1966-1971. All
eight of these referenda had very close outcomes, with an approval or rejection margin
2In both, the turnout rate was relatively high with 66.7% in 1971, and 57.7% in 1959.
3Swiss Federal Council archives of national referenda outcomes since 1848. Referendum from 1 Febru-
ary 1959, and from 7 February 1971.
109
of 3% or below. By the time of the second national referendum in 1971, only four of the
eight cantons had introduced local female suffrage.
Within this sample of eight cantons, I identify the impact local female suffrage had on
male approval of a national franchise extension. I further test if change differs between
municipalities, in which a male majority initially voted against the national referendum
in 1959, and municipalities, which already favoured national women’s suffrage back then.
Quasi-random exposure to local female suffrage reveals a few possible channels for the
change in support of women’s vote. Men may update their beliefs about the new voters’
political preferences. Updating might always be noisy, but seems more likely if men
observe large enough changes in election and policy outcomes at the local level. Men
may further update their beliefs about women’s abilities in and contributions to politics.
Finally, men may not only update on the political, but also the cultural change, which
women’s suffrage might induce. For example, enfranchisement might foster women’s
emancipation in the labour market, which could result in increased female labour mar-
ket participation and lower marriage rates.
My findings show that exposure to local female suffrage increased support for the
national franchise extension. Moreover, this increase is much stronger in municipalities,
in which a male majority had intially rejected the national referendum in 1959. By
conditioning the sample of municipalities on similar Yes-vote shares in 19594, I show
that this result is not driven by a simple “ceiling effect”.
From another study, we know that Swiss female suffrage caused a political shift to the
4To still have a sufficiently large sample size, I run the analysis with municipalities, which had a
Yes-vote share between 30-60% in 1959.
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right at the local level (Hofstetter, 2020). I therefore also test if the positive impact of
local suffrage on men’s support for a national franchise extension is associated with the
municipal change in party vote shares or expenditure, before and after local women can
vote. I only find weak, indicative evidence that a stronger increase in the conservative
party vote share mediated the effect.
Finally, I also interact treatment with local female suffrage with a change in cultural
proxies, such as female employment and marriage rates within the municipality. I find
no evidence that changes in these variables drove the impact local female suffrage had
on men’s support.
2.2. Literature Review
The current literature on what drives franchise extensions concentrates mainly on an
elite. This focus is motivated by the early history of democratisation in Western Europe
and Latin America when only a very small percentage of the population possessed voting
rights. Usually, this group was not only politically but also economically privileged.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) provide a theory that the early suffrage reforms were
strategic decisions by the elite to prevent social unrest, or even a revolution. This was
during a time when socialist ideas gained popularity among the large, disenfranchised
working class. Granting the lower class voting rights allowed the elite to credibly com-
mit to not only current but also future wealth redistribution. Minor corrections to their
model were more recently proposed (Dower et al., 2020; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2017).
In a related theory, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) further show that the revolu-
tionary threat is high when opportunity costs are low among the disenfranchised poor.
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However, highly unequal societies are less likely to extend the franchise, even when op-
portunity costs for a revolution are low, because a disproportionately wealthy elite has
an incentive to overturn any democratically elected government with a coup.
Empirical evidence provides support for these theories. Aidt and Franck (2015) show
that constituencies’ proximity to the widespread Swing riots in 1830 led to electoral
success of pro-reform politicians in the British general election of 1831. The UK Great
Reform Act was passed in 1832. It was the first reform to extend voting rights to a
broader male population. On the one hand, this finding suggests that revolutionary
threat can lead to suffrage extensions. On the other hand, it shows how public opinion
among the already enfranchised matters for the expansion of voting rights.
An alternative model by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) argues that elites may want to
expand suffrage even in the absence of revolutionary threats. Extending the franchise
can induce net welfare benefits for the elite by changing incentives of politicians away
from particularistic politics. Instead, political competition for the provision of public
goods increases, improving their quality.
Democratisation was not complete after suffrage was granted to working class men.
In often more recent history, women, ethnic minorities, younger people or foreigners
(Vernby, 2013) were enfranchised. The canonical models on democratisation may not
equally apply to these voting right extensions. The literature on women’s suffrage, for
example, emphasises the role of political parties instead. Teele (2018) and Przeworski
(2009) both argue that suffrage reform succeeded when parties in power believed female
voters could secure their electoral fate.
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We also have indicative evidence that public opinion played a direct or indirect role
in several of these reforms. An example were 27 referenda on voting right extensions to
black people in US states between 1846-1870 (Walton et al., 2012). Only two of them
were approved.5 US Congress followed in 1870 to pass the Fifteenth Amendement, which
extended voting rights nationwide to the former slave population. We have however no
evidence on what caused white voters to approve or reject black suffrage at that time.
Similar to female suffrage, revolutionary threats seem less plausible in this case.
Keyssar (2000) further argues that American student protests around the Vietnam
war in the late 1960s contributed to the passing of the Twenty-sixth Amendment in
1971. The new law reduced the US voting age from 21 to 18, the minimum age at which
young Americans could get drafted. As for female and black suffrage, we have however
no causal evidence for what drove current voters’ opinion in this case.
In summary, the democratisation literature suggests that revolutionary threat or ex-
pected net benefits by the elite led to the early franchise extensions. Other mechanisms,
such as party competition, were possibly more likely to induce suffrage reforms later on.
Many cases throughout history indicate that public opinion among the already enfran-
chised played an important role. This paper contributes to the current literature with
causal evidence on what may drive current voters towards approving franchise exten-
sions, apart from fear of revolution. It shows that exposure to the newly enfranchised
can change current voters’ support.
It further tests for different possible mechanisms, which could lead to this change. In
a separate study, Hofstetter (2020) identifies the political impact of local female suffrage
in Swiss municipalities. Using the same empirical strategy as in this paper, it finds that
5In the state of Minnesota in 1868, and in the district of the Dakotas in 1867.
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women’s franchise led to a shift to the right in both municipal party vote shares and
expenditure. I exploit these findings to test if current male voters change their support
for suffrage upon observing this political effect at the local level.
2.3. Extending the Franchise in the Swiss Context
2.3.1. The Swiss Political System
Similar to the US, Switzerland is a democracy with strong federalism.6 The political
system of the country is split into three adminstrative units: The federal level, the can-
tons, and the municipalities. Politically the most powerful of the three is the canton.
Each of the today 26 cantons has its own constitution, which also regulates the local
voting rights. Both the cantons and their municipalities further have strong financial
autonomy, both in terms of taxation and expenditure. Both political and policy out-
comes at the Swiss municipality level can therefore vary considerably.
In Switzerland, laws and policy decisions can be passed at all three administrative
levels. Most legislative decisions are made by a parliament, which is elected at both the
national and the cantonal level. Some municipalities also have an elected parliament.
The majority, however, holds municipal assemblies around 1-2 times per year to vote on
local laws and policy decisions (Ladner, 2016).
Because Switzerland is a direct democracy, it also frequently holds referenda, both
at the local and the national level. Both the federal and the cantonal level have a re-
quirement to hold a referendum in order to approve a constitutional amendement, or an
6For a more detailed description of Swiss federalism, see for example Hofstetter (2020), or Moeckli
(2008).
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international agreement. But Swiss citizens can also launch a legal initiative or require
a referendum on parliamentary decisions, conditional on collecting a sufficient number
of signatures.
All Swiss referenda are binding and in order to pass, they require approval of above
50% of the voters who turn out. National referenda further require a majority of can-
tons to approve the referendum. In the federal constition, six of the 26 cantons are
half-cantons and therefore only count half. Hence, adding the votes from half- and full
cantons means that at least 12 need to vote in favour of the referendum.7 The approval
or rejection of a referendum is not conditioned on a minimum turn-out rate.
Extending the franchise to women required a constitutional amendement. Any change
to female suffrage rights therefore needed to pass a referendum, in which only men could
vote. At the national level, the minimum age to vote was 20 until 1991.
2.3.2. Swiss Female Suffrage - Local and National
Due to their constitutional autonomy, cantons could extend the franchise to women
independent of voting right amendments in the Swiss federal constitution. The Swiss
federal constitution only regulates the national-level franchise in the country. Hence,
when women got the vote at the cantonal or municipality level, they attained the right
to vote in cantonal or municipal elections, referenda and assemblies. However, they
could not vote in national elections nor in national referenda.
The same holds the other way around. In 1971, when Switzerland extended the fran-
7Before the secession of Jura from the canton of Bern in 1979, Switzerland had only 25 cantons, i.e. 6
half-cantons and 19 full cantons. Therefore, at least 11.5 cantonal votes were required to pass the
referendum.
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chise to women at the national level, the women in eight remaining cantons could still
not vote in their canton. The last canton extended its franchise to women in 1990.8
Switzerland held two national referenda on female suffrage, the first in 1959 and the
second in 1971. Both proposals for a constitutional amendment first passed a majority
in the two chambers of national parliament. Both proposed the same constitutional
amendment: The introduction of voting and eligibility rights for women in federal mat-
ters.9
The referendum in 1959 followed the national debate on extending the requirement
for civil service to women.10 It was considered to be fair to grant women full political
rights in exchange for this requirement (Ruckstuhl, 1991). However, the referendum
in 1959 was rejected. Only 33.1% of male voters had voted in favour of the national
franchise extension to women. The cantonal majorities in the referendum are shown on
top in Figure 2.3.1. A majority of 57.7% of the male voting population participated in
the referendum.
After this defeat, it took a long time until the Swiss Federal Council suggested again
to parliament to grant women’s suffrage. The reason this time was that Switzerland con-
sidered to sign the UN Human Rights Charter. Since Swiss women still had no national
voting rights, the Council however considered to include a clause excluding equal voting
rights among citizens. This triggered a national protest of women’s rights movements,
8Appenzell-Innerrhoden rejected female suffrage in its last referendum on this matter in 1990, but
was then forced by the Swiss supreme court to introduce it. The court argued that the canton’s
constitution violated a basic right (i.e. the right to vote independent of gender) in the national
constitution. This intrusion by the supreme court into cantonal matters was without precedence
and hence a surprise at the time.
9Swiss Federal Council archives of national referenda outcomes since 1848. Referendum from 1 Febru-
ary 1959, and from 7 February 1971.
10Until today, Switzerland maintained the draft, which however only applies for men. Men can choose
civil over military service, but women are not required to do either. They can however volunteer.
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which resulted in 5,000 men and women participating in the “March to Bern” in March
1969 (Banaszak, 1996; Ruckstuhl, 1991).
Following this political pressure, both chambers in parliament passed the constitu-
tional amendment granting women the right ot vote at the federal level. In the male
population, this second referendum passed in 1971 with a 65.7% Yes-vote share. The
cantonal majorities in this referendum are shown at the bottom in Figure 2.3.1. In this
referendum, 66.7% of male voters turned out.
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Cantonal majority: rejected national female suffrage approved national female suffrage
Cantonal majority: rejected national female suffrage approved national female suffrage
Figure 2.3.1.: Cantonal majorities in the national referenda on female suffrage in 1959
and in 1971.
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Meanwhile, at the cantonal level, local referenda on the question of cantonal and/or
municipal female suffrage started in 1919.11 However, none of these referenda were suc-
cessful until 1959. On 7 February 1959, the same data as the national referendum, the
two partially French-speaking cantons of Waadt and Neuenburg extended their cantonal
franchise to women.
After 1959, cantonal referenda continued to take place and varied by year. By far
not all of them succeeded. In 1990, however, all Swiss women eventually attained full
voting rights. Figure 2.3.2 shows the number of cantonal referenda each year since the
beginning of the 20th century and the accumulative number of cantons, which introduced
cantonal female suffrage.
























Figure 2.3.2.: History of Swiss local female suffrage: Timeline of cantonal referenda
with Yes-vote share (in %) at the cantonal level and count of cantons with
cantonal female suffrage.
11Neuenburg held a cantonal referendum on introducing the cantonal and municipal voting right for
women in June 1919, which was however rejected with a 69.2% majority in the popular vote, and
not a single municipality voting in favour.
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2.4. Empirical Strategy
The following section has three parts. I first introduce the empirical model I use to
estimate difference in differences, which identify the effect local female suffrage had on
municipal Yes-vote shares in the national referenda of 1959 and 1971. I then describe
my sample, which first includes the municipalities of all Swiss cantons. Endogeneity in
the treatment with local female suffrage could be a concern in this sample. In a second
step, I therefore reduce it to eight cantons, which quasi-randomly extended their local
franchise. The last part provides information on the dataset I created to estimate the
effect local female suffrage had on male support for national suffrage.
2.4.1. Specifications
My empirical model is split into two specifications. First, I identify the impact of a local
franchise extension to women on the municipal Yes-vote shares in the two national ref-
erenda on female suffrage. My second specification tests for heterogeneity in this effect.
To identify the impact of local women’s suffrage, I exploit the fact that the Swiss
cantons extended their franchise to women in different years. The earliest canton to
introduce local female suffrage was Basel-Stadt in 1957. In the national referendum of
1959, all but this canton had therefore not been exposed to women’s vote yet. In 1971,
only five cantons had not yet introduced any kind of local suffrage.
I use panel data on municipal Yes-vote shares in the national referena on a national
franchise extension to women in 1959 and 1971 to estimate the difference in differences
between municipalities in cantons with and without local female suffrage. I use the
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following specification in an OLS regression:
Yes-vote sharem,c,y = αm + γy + βEnfranchisedc,y + m,c,y (2.1)
where Yes-vote sharem,c,y is the Yes-vote share for the national referendum on female
suffrage in municipality m in canton c in year y. αm are municipality fixed effects and γy
are year effects. There are only two years in the data, the national referenda years 1959
and 1971. β is the difference-in-differences estimator of local female suffrage. Thus,
Enfranchisedc,y is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of 1 in year y if local
female suffrage was successfully introduced by a cantonal referendum before the date
of the national referendum in year y. m,c,y is the error term for each municipality-year
observation.
In a second step, I estimate the following model:
Yes-vote sharem,c,y = αm + γy + βEnfranchisedc,y
+ρ(Enfranchisedc,y × In favourm) + m,c,y
(2.2)
where In favourm is a dummy variable, which equals 0 (1) if a municipality’s majority
voted against (in favour of) the franchise extension in the national referendum of 1959.
The coefficient of interest in this model is ρ. It is the difference-in-difference-in-
differences estimator. In other words, it captures the between-municipality difference in
the effect of female suffrage on Yes-vote sharem,c,y. Whether a municipality favoured or
voted against female suffrage remains fixed over time. The individual effect of In favourm
on Yes-vote sharem,c,y is therefore absorbed in the municipality fixed effect αm. However,
I can exploit the variation in the enfranchisement status of cantons (Enfranchisedc,y)
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over the time period in the panel data. This allows me to identify the interaction
effect between enfranchisement (Enfranchisedc,y = 1) and municipalities, which favoured
national female suffrage already in 1959 (In favourm = 1).
2.4.2. Sample Description
I first estimate my specifications for all Swiss cantons, which reported municipal Yes-vote
shares in the national referenda of 1959 and 1971.12 Within the cantons, I identified the
municipalities in which a majority of men had voted in favour of national female suf-
frage in 1959, and municipalities in which a majority of men had voted against it. With
this variation, I can identify the heterogeneity in the effect of female suffrage, which is
specified as interaction effects in model (2).
However, difference in differences rely on the parallel trends assumption (Steigerwald
et al., 2020; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This assumption could be challenged if it is
not random which cantons introduced local female suffrage earlier or later. If that is the
case, these cantons may follow different instead of parallel trends in the Yes-vote shares,
and the estimated effect will be biased.
A common practice to address this concern is to provide evidence against differential
trends before suffrage was introduced. There were however only two national referenda
on female suffrage. I therefore canot show evidence against differential trends in Yes-vote
shares before cantons extended their local franchise.
In a second step, I therefore reduce the sample to eight cantons, which had very narrow
referenda outcomes on female suffrage. All of the cantonal referenda happened within a
12Four cantons held cantonal assemblies to vote on the referenda, and therefore did not report their
municipal Yes-vote shares.
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relatively short time frame between 1966-1971. I provide more detail in the Appendix
section B.1, in which Table B.1.1 shows for each canton the year in which the cantonal
referendum was held, the Yes-vote share in the referendum and the suffrage bill that was
voted on. Each of the eight referenda had a margin of 3% or less. However, only three
of them were narrowly approved and therefore extended their local franchise. The other
five were narrowly rejected. These cantons introduced local female suffrage in later years.
Using the municipalities in these eight cantons to estimate the difference in differences
brings a few improvements for identification. All eight cantons voted on local female
suffrage around the same time. This makes selection bias from calling a referendum
earlier or later less likely. Moreover, all expressed almost identical (dis)approval of a
local franchise extension. In other words, none of these cantons was a female suffrage
enthusiast, but instead rather hesitant to give women the vote. Finally, the very narrow
margin of all referenda suggests that it was extremely difficult to anticipate the outcome
of the referendum.
In summary, the narrow referenda margins in these cantons make the introduction of
female suffrage credibly quasi-random. In expectation, these cantons should therefore
be similar. More importantly, they should not follow differential political trends. To
corroborate the plausibility of this assumption, I provide evidence against pre-trending
in other political outcomes at the municipality level in Appendix section B.4.
2.4.3. Data
Full and Reduced Sample
For the sample containing all Swiss cantons, and the subsample of eight cantons, I col-
lected the following data.
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Referenda Yes-vote shares at the municipality level. I created a data-set from
the referenda records of each cantonal and each national referendum ever held on female
suffrage, which I retrieved from the different cantonal archives in Switzerland. For each
referendum, I coded the Yes-vote share of each municipality. Based on this data, I iden-
tified the municipalities, in which a majority of men had voted in favour of the national
referendum in 1959, and the ones, which had voted against. Based on the cantonal
referenda outcomes on local suffrage, I further selected the eight close referenda for my
reduced sample.
Adjustment for municipal mergers. In 1960, Switzerland had 3,095 municipal-
ities. Due to municipal mergers, the number had shrunk to 3,021 by 1990. Based on
information by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2020), I therefore identified all Swiss
municipalities that had undergone a merger. For those, I aggregated all outcome data
under the names of the new municipalities that existed by 1990.
Reduced Sample
For my subsample of eight cantons, I further use the following data.
Change in municipal party vote shares. A possible mechanism through which
men may become more or less supportive of national suffrage is through updated beliefs
on women’s political preferences. I therefore calculated the change in municipal party
vote shares between the last election before local female suffrage and the first cantonal
election afterwards.
I don’t include more elections for two reasons. Male voters may forget the results
of pre-suffrage elections lying too far behind the introduction of local suffrage. It is
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therefore most likely that male voters compare post-suffrage election results with the
most recent election before local women had the vote. I can further not inlcude more
post-suffrage elections, since they all take place long after 1971. By the time of the na-
tional referendum in 1971, male voters can therefore not observe the results or forecasts
of these elections.
For this purpose, I created an original panel data-set on cantonal parliament elec-
tions between 1967-1974. All election records were retrieved from the eight cantonal
archives.13 For seven of the eight cantons, I was able to collect and code the munic-
ipal vote shares of each party in the pre- and post-suffrage election. For the canton
of Schaffhausen (SH), electoral results were only recorded at the district level. For my
analyses of party vote share changes at the municipality level, I therefore had to drop
this canton from the sample.
Cantonal elections are held every four years. They all use PR system. Switzerland
has four main parties, which run in almost all localities along with several fringe parties.
These four parties are the Socialist Party (SP), the Christian-Democracts (CVP/EVP),
the Free Democratic Party (FDP, former FDP/LPS ) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP,
former BGB/DP). The order on a left-right scale of these four parties would be the same
as the order they were mentioned in.
For the fringe parties, the number and type running in cantonal elections varies be-
tween years and cantons. But fringe parties can almost always be associated with one
of the four main parties. As a second step, I therefore aggregated them together with
the main parties into four party blocks: Socialist, conservative, liberal and right-wing
populist parties.
13The same dataset on cantonal elections and municipal expenditure is used in Hofstetter (2020).
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In addition, I created a fifth party block for usually smaller parties, which could not
be associated with any of the four main parties. This block is called independent. The
largest among these independent parties was the Alliance of Independents (LdU ), which
existed from 1936-1999 and ran a policy platform that could be located at the center of
a left-right scale.
Table 2.4.1 lists the pre-suffrage averages for the five party blocks in the sample can-
tons that narrowly rejected (approved) their cantonal referendum.14 At the time, the
right-wing populist block had the highest average vote share, followed by the conserva-
tives, the liberals, the left, and independent parties. This distribution reflects the rather
conservative Swiss political landscape. However, we can also observe considerable vari-
ation in vote shares across and within the cantons.
Cantons Narrowly
Rejected Referendum Approved Referendum Overall
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Left parties’ vote share 16.3 14.9 25.1 18.4 21.9 17.7
Conservative parties’ vote share 37.0 23.9 18.9 25.2 25.2 26.2
Independent parties’ vote share 2.1 9.7 1.4 4.0 1.6 6.7
Liberal parties’ vote share 38.2 20.8 14.8 14.7 23.2 20.5
Populist parties’ vote share 4.2 8.7 39.8 28.8 26.9 29.2
Table 2.4.1.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal party vote shares
(in %) for the sample cantons with a narrowly rejected or approved refer-
endum on female suffrage, since 1940.
Change in municipal expenditure. Male voters may further update their beliefs
about women after observing changes in local policy. Since party platforms could change
as a response to local suffrage, men may rely more on policy outcomes to observe actual
change in political outcomes. Unlike party vote shares in an election, municipal expen-
14For a municipal party vote share averages listed by canton, see Table B.2.1 in Appendix section B.2
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diture is a direct policy outcome.
I therefore calculated the difference in municipal expenditure in the year before and
in the year after local suffrage was introduced. Again, I only use the last year before and
the first year after, because men are most likely to remember and associate the most
recent change with the introduction of women’s vote. Including more years after suf-
frage would further go beyond 1971 for some cantons. To keep year observations across
cantons balanced, I therefore include only the first year after suffrage for all eight cantons.
To retrieve this data, I located the annual budget reports for each municipality and
each year I could find in the cantonal archives and the Swiss National Library. Out
of these, I coded an original panel data-set on total expenditure between 1967-1970 for
all eight cantons in my sample, and social welfare expenditure for all but the canton of
Ticino (TI). Ticino’s municipalities only kept records of their total expenditure.
Table 2.4.2 lists the pre-suffrage averages for municipal expenditure in the sample
cantons that narrowly rejected (approved) their cantonal referendum.15
Cantons Narrowly
Rejected Referendum Approved Referendum Overall
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Total expenditure 4,730,724 36,445,307 3,048,340 13,144,636 146,560 1,544,652
Total expenditure p.c. 462 704 1,182 3,621 552 1,460
Social welfare 929,273 4,170,934 281,627 1,259,229 737,833 3,578,959
Social welfare p.c. 27 54 73 487 43 291
Table 2.4.2.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal expenditure (in
CHF) for the sample cantons with a narrowly rejected or approved refer-
endum on female suffrage, since 1940.
15For a municipal expenditure averages listed by canton, see Table B.2.3 in Appendix section B.2
127
Change in municipal census data. At last, male voters may associate changes
outside of politics with the introduction of local suffrage. For example, changes in the lo-
cal gender culture may affect men’s support for a national franchise extension to women.
In order to proxy such cultural change at the municipality level, I use trends in female
labour market participation and the size of the female and the married population at
the municipality level between 1960 and 1970.
I coded the historical census data at the Swiss municipality level for all eight cantons
in my sample for the census years in 1960, 1970, and 1980. Figure B.3.1 in the Appendix
section B.3 shows the trends in all three census outcomes over the years in municipalities
of cantons, which narrowly approved (rejected) local female suffrage in their cantonal
referenda between 1966-1971.
Cantons Narrowly
Rejected Referendum Approved Referendum Overall
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Employed women 329 997 528 2,716 391 1,724
Employed women p.c. 0.22 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.22 0.07
Women 1,207 3,002 982 4,152 1,055 3,816
Women p.c. 0.50 0.03 0.50 0.19 0.50 0.16
Married residents 1,207 4,089 879 3,702 987 3,835
Married residents p.c. 0.44 0.24 0.44 0.15 0.44 0.19
Table 2.4.3.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal female labour
market participation, female and married population for the sample cantons
with a narrowly rejected or approved referendum on female suffrage, in
1960.
2.5. Results
The main findings are shown in Table 2.5.1 for all Swiss cantons, and in Table 2.5.2 for
the subsample of eight cantons, which had narrow cantonal referendum outcomes on lo-
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cal female suffrage between 1966-1972. In aggregate, female suffrage caused an increase
in the Yes-vote share for a national franchise extension to women in 1971.
However, municipalities, which already favoured female suffrage in 1959 show a nega-
tive effect of local enfranchisement on their growth in support. This differential impact
could be driven by a ceiling effect. A ceiling effect could occur if municipalities, which
had already high approval rates in 1959, could not inrease much more. Since Yes-vote
shares can only reach a maximum of 100%.
I therefore re-ran the analysis after conditioning the sample on municipalities, which
had a similar Yes-vote share between 30-60% in 1959. As we can see in the second col-
umn of both tables, the total effect in those municipalities turns positive, but remains
smaller than in municipalities, which opposed national suffrage in 1959.
This differential impact suggests that initially unfavourable municipalities experienced
local female suffrage differently from favourable ones. This could for example be due
to the information, which the local franchise extension revealed about women’s political
preferences. This possible mechanism connects with findings in Hofstetter (2020). The
study shows that women’s suffrage caused a right-wing shift in electoral and expenditure
outcomes at the municipality level.
Observing political changes could induce men to update their beliefs about the new
voters. For example, if public opinion believed that women have more left-wing prefer-
ences than men. Male voters on the right of the political spectrum may therefore increase
their support of women’s vote after updating their belief about women’s left-wing pref-
erences. Indeed, anecdotes from pre-suffrage years suggest that many people believed
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that Swiss women were going to vote more left than men, and therefore expected an
opposite effect.16
Another possible mechanism could be that male voters updated on the cultural effects
female suffrage has. An example could be if enfranchisement had a broader emancipat-
ing effect on women, such as increasing their labour market participation. In the next
section, I therefore test for those potential mechanisms behind the main effects.
Table 2.5.1.: All Swiss cantons - Impact of female suffrage on municipal yes-vote share
in national referendum
Dependent variable:
Yes-vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 10.345∗∗∗ 11.114∗∗∗ 7.786∗∗ 8.369∗∗
(0.936) (0.919) (3.507) (3.520)
Enfranchised x In favour in 1959 −16.652∗∗∗ −5.416∗∗
(4.302) (2.243)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year effects X X X X
Match on 1959 Yes-voteshare X X
Within R-squared 0.084 0.136 0.02 0.045
Observations 4361 3956 968 968
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
16For anecdotal evidence, see e.g. New Zurich Newspaper (NZZ), “Gegnerinnen der Gleichberechtigung”
(Enemies of (Gender) Equality), 6 February 2011, Banaszak (1996) or Ruckstuhl (1991).
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Table 2.5.2.: Eight cantons - Impact of female suffrage on municipal yes-vote share in
national referendum
Dependent variable:
Yes-vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enfranchised 6.222∗∗∗ 7.095∗∗∗ 8.481∗∗ 9.114∗∗
(0.988) (0.941) (3.951) (3.970)
Enfranchised x In favour in 1959 −13.378∗∗∗ −4.688∗
(4.964) (2.741)
Municipality FEs X X X X
Year effects X X X X
Match on 1959 Yes-voteshare X X
Within R-squared 0.068 0.13 0.056 0.088
Observations 2054 2036 431 431
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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2.6. Possible Mechanisms
Results in this section are exclusively shown for the sample of eight cantons. Three
different possible mechanisms are tested. All three suggest an information-related nar-
rative: Male voters changed their support for national suffrage upon observing local
changes after women’s franchise was granted in their municipality.
Change in municipal party vote shares. The first way by which local female suf-
frage could reveal information is through a change in election outcomes. In Table 2.6.1,
we can see only weak evidence that the change in municipal party vote shares is driving
the effect of local suffrage on approval rates for a national franchise extension.
The negative and weakly significant coefficient suggests that municipalities experi-
encing a larger increase in their conservative parties’ vote share experienced a lower
increase in support for national female suffrage. Hofstetter (2020) finds that female
suffrage caused a positive impact on the municipal vote share of conservative parties.
Hence, these two findings match, even though the association is weak.
One percentage point deviation from the cantonal average change in conservative
parties’ vote share decreased the municipal Yes-vote share by 0.169%. As we can see
in Table 2.6.2, municipalities that were in favour of suffrage in 1959 show no signifi-
cantly different association. But their coefficient is positive and relatively large. Hence,
in favourable municipalities, one percentage point deviation from the cantonal average
change in conservative parties’ vote share is associated with a 0.124% increase in support
for suffrage.
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Table 2.6.1.: Eight cantons - Impact of female suffrage on municipal yes-vote share in
national referendum
Dependent variable:
Yes-vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfranchised 6.155∗∗∗ 6.155∗∗∗ 6.155∗∗∗ 6.155∗∗∗ 6.155∗∗∗
(1.025) (1.022) (1.023) (1.024) (1.023)
Enfranchised x ∆ Left vote share 0.011
(0.105)
Enfranchised x ∆ Conservative vote share −0.169∗
(0.095)
Enfranchised x ∆ Independent vote share 0.336
(0.205)
Enfranchised x ∆ Liberal vote share −0.072
(0.089)
Enfranchised x ∆ Populist vote share 0.110
(0.076)
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Year effects X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.067 0.076 0.073 0.069 0.074
Observations 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Table 2.6.2.: Eight cantons - Impact of female suffrage on municipal yes-vote share in
national referendum
Dependent variable:
Yes-vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfranchised 7.044∗∗∗ 7.033∗∗∗ 7.039∗∗∗ 7.042∗∗∗ 7.037∗∗∗
(0.974) (0.970) (0.971) (0.973) (0.971)
Enfranchised x ∆ Left vote share 0.003
(0.103)
Enfranchised x ∆ Conservative vote share −0.173∗
(0.098)
Enfranchised x ∆ Independent vote share 0.316
(0.200)
Enfranchised x ∆ Liberal vote share −0.059
(0.086)
Enfranchised x ∆ Populist vote share 0.105
(0.071)
Enfranchised x In favour in 1959 −13.559∗∗ −13.693∗∗ −13.548∗∗ −13.486∗∗∗ −13.550∗∗
(5.254) (5.389) (5.294) (5.204) (5.318)
Enfranchised x ∆ Left vote share x In favour in 1959 0.122
(0.668)
Enfranchised x ∆ Conservative vote share x In favour in 1959 0.297
(0.450)
Enfranchised x ∆ Independent vote share x In favour in 1959 −0.190
(2.173)
Enfranchised x ∆ Liberal vote share x In favour in 1959 −0.158
(0.476)
Enfranchised x ∆ Populist vote share x In favour in 1959 −0.074
(0.586)
Municipality FEs X X X X X
Year effects X X X X X
Within R-squared 0.13 0.138 0.135 0.074 0.073
Observations 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Change in municipal expenditure. In the same paper, Hofstetter (2020) further
finds that local suffrage caused a drop in municipal expenditure. Men may therefore
update on women’s policy preferences after a local franchise extension. The results in
Table 2.6.3 provide however no evidence that an increase in total or social welfare ex-
penditure mediated the effect suffrage had on male approval of national suffrage.
The coefficients are negative, but not significant. However, their magnitude is large:
One percentage point deviation from the cantonal mean percentage change in total ex-
penditure is associated with a 1.812% decrease in the municipal Yes-vote share. For
social welfare expenditure, the decrease per percentage point deviation from the can-
tonal average is even 4.213%.
Results in Table 2.6.4 do not indicate any differences in this effect between munici-
palities favourable or unfavourable towards suffrage in 1959. Due to the small sample
size, this analysis is however too low-powered to make any conclusions.
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Table 2.6.3.: Eight cantons - Impact of female suffrage on municipal yes-vote share in
national referendum
Dependent variable:




Enfranchised x ∆ log(Total expenditure) −1.812
(10.854)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Social welfare) −4.213
(3.076)
Municipality FEs X X
Year effects X X
Within R-squared 0.061 0.08
Observations 720 705
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Table 2.6.4.: Eight cantons - Impact of female suffrage on municipal yes-vote share in
national referendum
Dependent variable:




Enfranchised x ∆ log(Total expenditure) −1.540
(10.787)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Social welfare) −3.718
(2.775)
Enfranchised x In favour in 1959 −5.980 −3.530
(3.953) (5.108)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Total expenditure) x In favour in 1959 −18.329
(12.608)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Social welfare) x In favour in 1959 −7.324
(6.792)
Municipality FEs X X
Year effects X X
Within R-squared 0.068 0.085
Observations 704 689
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Change in municipal census data. Finally, men may also learn about the effects
female suffrage had on cultural outcomes, such as gender roles. I proxy these changes
with municipal changes in female employment and the married population between the
Swiss census years in 1960, 1970 and 1980. Table 2.6.5 shows no evidence that the effect
of local suffrage is mediated by any of these two proxies. I further test if changes in the
size of the female population within a municipality drove the effect. An increasing share
of women in a municipality could also change the local gender culture.
I find no evidence for this hypothesis. But magnitudes of the interaction effects are
again quite large: One percentage point deviation from the cantonal average percentage
change in employed women is associated with a 0.864% decrease in the municipal Yes-
vote share. Similarly, a one percentage point deviation from the cantonal mean change
in the number of women is associated with a 0.645% increase in the municipal Yes-vote
share. For the number of married persons, the associated increase is 5.973%.
My data has no observations for female employment in municipalities, which were
in favour of suffrage in 1959. Table 2.6.6 therefore only shows the triple interaction
between local suffrage, being favourable and the change in number of female and married
residents. Coefficients for municipalities unfavourable towards suffrage look very similar
to the aggregate analysis. Again, interaction effects are under-powered and therefore
allow no conclusions.
138
Table 2.6.5.: Eight cantons - Impact of female suffrage on municipal yes-vote share in
national referendum
Dependent variable:
Yes-vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3)
Enfranchised 4.276 6.145∗∗∗ 6.097∗∗∗
(2.639) (1.182) (1.151)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Employed women) −0.864
(7.638)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Female population) 0.645
(1.705)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Married population) 5.973
(4.022)
Municipality FEs X X X
Year effects X X X
Within R-squared 0.046 0.063 0.075
Observations 765 1758 1796
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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Table 2.6.6.: Eight cantons - Impact of female suffrage on municipal yes-vote share in
national referendum
Dependent variable:
Yes-vote share (in %)
(1) (2) (3)
Enfranchised 4.276 7.069∗∗∗ 6.990∗∗∗
(2.639) (1.120) (1.087)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Employed women) −0.864
(7.638)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Female population) 0.789
(1.659)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Married population) 4.790
(3.657)
Enfranchised x In favour in 1959 −13.793∗∗ −13.088∗∗
(6.120) (5.919)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Female population) x In favour in 1959 −6.873
(36.598)
Enfranchised x ∆ log(Married population) x In favour in 1959 19.078
(34.744)
Municipality FEs X X X
Year effects X X X
Within R-squared 0.046 0.131 0.136
Observations 765 1741 1779
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses.
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2.7. Conclusion
This paper studies mechanisms to explain why voters may support a franchise exten-
sion. Specifically, I study men’s support for an extension of voting rights to women. I
estimate the impact exposure to local female suffrage has on municipal approval rates
for a Swiss national referendum on female suffrage between 1959 and 1971. In order to
identify a plausibly causal impact, I exploit quasi-random franchise extensions of local fe-
male suffrage in eight Swiss cantons through close cantonal referenda between 1966-1971.
My findings show that exposure to local female suffrage caused an increase in male
support for a national franchise extension. However, this increase is much larger in mu-
nicipalities, which did initially not approve national women’s vote in 1959. This impact
cannot be explained through a simple ceiling effect.
Results show further no evidence that post-suffrage changes in local elections or ex-
penditure mediated the increase in male support. I can therefore not corroborate the
hypothesis that revealed information about the new voters’ political preferences caused
the change in male approval rates. I further find no evidence that the change is driven by





Referendum in Yes-vote share Suffrage right voted on Canton
1968 52.1% Municipal Bern (BE)
1969 50.8% Municipal (education policy) Thurgau (TG)
1971 51.7% Cantonal and municipal Aargau (AG)
Referendum in Yes-vote share Suffrage right voted on Canton
1966 48.3% Cantonal and municipal Ticino (TI)
1968 47.3% Municipal Solothurn (SO)
1969 47.2% Cantonal and municipal Schaffhausen (SH)
1970 47.3% Municipal St. Gallen (SG)
1971 47.0% Cantonal and municipal Schwyz (SZ)
Table B.1.1.: The eight cantons with a narrow cantonal referendum outcome on female
suffrage. At the top: The three cantons, which narrowly approved their
referendum with a Yes-vote share below 53%. At the bottom: The five
cantons, which narrowly rejected their referendum with a Yes-vote share
at or above 47%.
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B.2. Descriptives
AG BE SG SH SO SZ TG TI
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Left parties’ vote share 25.9 16.9 26.2 20.0 11.1 10.3 - - 24.8 19.8 8.6 13.4 18.5 12.2 15.8 12.0
Conservative parties’ vote share 30.6 25.8 9.1 19.7 51.8 25.3 - - 25.8 20.0 29.5 32.9 30.8 27.1 35.6 18.8
Independent parties’ vote share 3.7 5.4 0.3 2.5 3.8 5.1 - - 0.5 2.2 15.4 34.6 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.7
Liberal parties’ vote share 14.3 10.6 14.9 17.3 30.2 18.7 - - 48.9 21.1 12.7 18.5 15.6 11.2 40.4 17.3
Populist parties’ vote share 25.5 20.6 49.4 30.0 1.8 5.0 - - 0.0 0.0 1.8 8.1 35.0 25.2 8.0 10.9
Table B.2.1.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal party vote shares (in %) for each canton since 1940.
AG BE SG SH SO SZ TG TI
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Entited voters 396 544 556 2,413 936 1,886 - - 431 806 831 856 597 672 220 475
Election turnout 85.7 6.6 74.2 13.7 77.2 7.7 - - 89.7 8.8 62.4 13.7 79.3 6.7 75.8 13.6
Table B.2.2.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for number of entitled voters and election turnout (in %) for each
canton since 1940.
AG BE SG SH SO SZ TG TI
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Total expenditure 903,583 1,642,204 9,877,831 25,953,863 809,744 1,697,612 61,082,583 124,936,494 1,046,472 2,609,276 1,107,671 1,596,802 1,991,222 1,769,748 337,654 1,544,652
Total expenditure p.c. 989 1,015 2,031 7,560 444 390 - - 1,029 1,615 778 1,169 420 322 391 529
Social welfare 25,931 70,994 1,077,764 2,434,568 21,607 61,078 4,099,693 8,198,749 36,651 161,885 124,898 215,664 218,668 270,576 - -
Social welfare p.c. 19 21 267 1,031 11 28 - - 16 38 73 79 38 37 - -
Table B.2.3.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal expenditure (in CHF) for each canton since 1940.
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AG BE SG SH SO SZ TG TI
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Employed women 323 556 1,099 4,824 526 1,523 214 828 232 551 297 350 256 467 - -
Employed women p.c. 0.23 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.23 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.23 0.08 - -
Women 811 1,188 1,031 4,791 1,932 4,513 830 2,765 824 1,635 1,225 1,289 907 1,469 - -
Women p.c. 0.49 0.02 0.50 0.22 0.50 0.02 0.49 0.03 0.49 0.03 0.49 0.03 0.49 0.03 - -
Married residents 735 1,111 923 4,268 2,105 6,707 761 2,600 761 1,510 962 985 800 1,323 - -
Married residents p.c. 0.43 0.05 0.44 0.18 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.04 0.44 0.04 0.38 0.03 0.43 0.05 - -
Table B.2.4.: Pre-suffrage means and standard deviations for municipal female labour market participation, female and




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.3.1.: Municipal trends in number of employed women, number of women, and
number of married residents in the eight sample cantons, which narrowly
rejected (approved) local female suffrage between 1960-1980.
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B.4. Pre-suffrage Parallel Trends
Difference in differences rely on the parallel trends assumption (Steigerwald et al., 2020;
Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This assumption can by definition not be tested, because we
never observe a municipallity-level Yes-vote share both with and without female suffrage
in the same national referendum year. I can further not provide evidence that municipal-
ities had no differential trends in Yes-vote shares before female suffrage was introduced.
Because evidence against differential trends would require that I could already observe
Yes-vote shares at least two years before local female suffrage was introduced. We have
however only one national referendum year before suffrage, which is in 1959.
Instead, I provide evidence against pre-trending in most election and expenditure
outcomes within the eight cantons in my sample. Figure B.4.2, B.4.1 and B.4.3 show
autocorrelation-robust results (Bertrand et al., 2004) for pre-trending one (Placebo 1-
year), two (Placebo 2-year) and three (Placebo 3-year) (election) years before female
suffrage was introduced. Most of the placebo effects are not only insignificant, but also
close to zero.
An exception are electoral turnout, independent parties’ vote share and social welfare.
For electoral turnout and social welfare, the placebos suggest a positive pre-trend two
years before suffrage was introduced. However, the pre-trending coefficient for turnout
is almost zero. For social welfare and indpendent parties’ vote share, the effect is larger.
Still, the overall evidence against differential pre-suffrage trends dominates. This finding
allows for more confidence that the estimated difference in differences are not confounded
by underlying differential trends between treated and control cantons.
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Figure B.4.1.: Autocorrelation-robust DID point estimates (Bertrand et al., 2004) and
0.95-confidence intervals for sample including one, two and three elections
before women’s enfranchisement.
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Figure B.4.2.: Autocorrelation-robust DID point estimates (Bertrand et al., 2004) and
0.95-confidence intervals for sample including one, two and three elections
before women’s enfranchisement.
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Figure B.4.3.: Autocorrelation-robust DID point estimates (Bertrand et al., 2004) and
0.95-confidence intervals for sample including one, two and three years
before women’s enfranchisement.
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3. Partisan Incumbency Disadvantage
A Revised Empirical Strategy To Identify It
Abstract: Partisan incumbency disadvantage is the extent to which a candidate is
impeded by her party’s incumbency status in an open-seat race. The current literature
suggests its prevalence in young democracies and explains it through weak parties or
corruption. However, we show that canonical regression discontinuity designs (RD)
to estimate this quantity can be downward biased. Cause is an imbalance in voters’
uncertainty about the candidate’s quality at the RD cut-off. We propose a revised
empirical strategy to circumvent bias. With data from Brazilian mayoral elections in
1996-2012, we apply both the canonical and the revised strategy to identify the electoral
disadvantage incumbent parties face. We find that using the new approach cuts the
effect by three quarters (from -13.2% to -3.1%).
3.1. Introduction
Incumbency effects remain among the most widely tested theories in empirical political
economy.1 The literature distinguishes between a personal and a partisan incumbency
effect (Magalhaes, 2015; Erikson and Titiunik, 2015; Fowler and Hall, 2014). It is of
1Important contributions include: Erikson (1971); Fiorina (1977); Alford and Hibbing (1981); Cain
et al. (1987); Gelman and King (1990); King (1991); Cox and Morgenstern (1993); Cox and Katz
(1996); Levitt and Wolfram (1997); Ansolabehere et al. (2000); Ansolabehere and SnyderJr (2002);
Lee (2008); Ferreira and Gyourko (2009).
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substantive interest if it is her individual or her party’s incumbency status that affect a
candidate’s chances of being elected.
In the US, studies find a clear incumbency advantage2, and research in other estab-
lished democracies shows similar effects (e.g., Kendall and Rekkas (2012); Hainmueller
and Kern (2008)). In younger democracies such as in Latin America or Eastern Europe,
however, evidence suggests an incumbency disadvantage (e.g., Klasnja and Titiunik
(2017); Ariga (2015); Klasnja (2015a)).
Given its important implications for young democracies, this article focuses on the
latter. More specifically, the quantity of interest is partisan incumbency disadvantage.
Following Fowler (2016), this quantity is the extent to which a candidate is impeded by
her party’s incumbency status in an open-seat race.
Across the literature, most interpretations of incumbency effects are negative for
democracy. Partisan incumbency disadvantage, specifically, suggests flawed electoral
accountability allowing incumbents to behave badly, for example by slacking off (Klas-
nja and Titiunik, 2017) or by engaging in corruption (Klasnja, 2015b).
In contrast to these conclusions, some authors offer an explanation based on differ-
ences in candidate quality (Eggers, 2017; Ashworth and de Mesquita, 2008; Carson et al.,
2007). According to them, incumbency effects may occur, because the best candidates
win. “Best” candidates have the highest expected performance in office, or are the most
successful at generating turnout (Carson et al., 2007).3
2For a comprehensive review and critical appraisal of the literature on the US, see Lee (2008); Caughey
and Sekhon (2011); Sekhon and Titiunik (2012).
3Performance could be measured by how close an incumbent moves policy towards the average voter’s
preference.
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In this article, we argue that the current empirical strategy to identify partisan in-
cumbency disadvantage fails to take candidate quality and voters’ uncertainty about it
into account. Today’s dominant empirical strategy to identify incumbency effects is the
regression discontinuity design (RD; Lee (2008)). It exploits close elections to estimate
the effect of a party’s victory or loss in an election on its success in the next one.
Most studies that use this generic RD cannot disentangle a personal from a partisan
incumbency effect. We therefore focus on a literature, which uses a variation of this RD
to identify the partisan incumbency effect only. Findings from this literature show a
large partisan incumbency disadvantage in mayoral elections in Latin America (Klasnja
and Titiunik, 2017) and Romania (Klasnja, 2015a), and a null finding (with a negative
sign) in US state legislature elections (Fowler and Hall, 2014).
Their empirical strategy uses RD in combination with candidate term limits.4 In this
RD, all close races include an incumbent candidate against contenders. The incumbent’s
party only maintains incumbency status if she narrowly wins. If she wins, she faces a
term limit and cannot run again. Hence, her (still incumbent) party needs to run with
a new candidate in the next election.
However, the term limit is not triggered for an incumbent candidate who narrowly
loses, and hence becomes the runner-up. Her (no longer incumbent) party can run with
her or a new candidate in the next election. Hence, the idea is that parties above the
RD cut-off maintained incumbency status, while parties below lost it, both by a narrow
margin.
4Candidates can serve for a maximum of two terms.
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In this RD, the partisan incumbency disadvantage is the negative difference in the
probability of winning between candidates from parties that narrowly maintained in-
cumbency status and candidates from parties which narrowly lost it.
We first show theoretically that this strategy introduces the risk of a downward bias.
Cause is an imbalance in voters’ uncertainty about the candidate’s quality at the RD
cut-off. New candidates above the cut-off frequently face the runner-up from the previ-
ous election, while candidates below the cut-off are often runner-ups themselves running
against the incumbent against whom they just narrowly lost.
In expectation, both voters and parties are more certain about a runner-up’s or an
incumbent’s quality than about a new candidate’s (Prato and Wolton, 2018; Carrillo and
Mariotti, 2001). While voters learn about new candidates’ quality during the current
campaign, voters already learned about re-running candidates’ during their previous
campaigns or while they served in office.
Therefore, risk-averse parties and voters prefer them over new candidates. Hence, an
RD estimate is not only capturing the effect of the party’s incumbency status, but also
the effect of voters’ higher uncertainty about the candidate’s quality. Fowler and Hall
(2014) address this potential bias by assuming that runner-up re-running rates are close
to zero in US state legislatures.
We show that downward bias increases with voters’ risk aversion as well as their un-
certainty about new candidates’ quality, both of which might be higher in young than in
old democracies. For example, old democracies like the US may conduct a more rigorous
recruiting process for new candidates (Carson et al., 2007), which leads to lower variance
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in new candidates’ quality and hence to smaller downward bias. This could explain why
RD estimates in the US are less negative than e.g. in Latin America.
In a second step, we propose a revised empirical strategy without term limits to cir-
cumvent the risk of bias. To test our theory empirically, we replicate the study by
Klasnja and Titiunik (2017) using Brazilian mayoral elections from 1996-2012 to show
that the canonical estimation they use may indeed be biased.
We base this concern on two observations in the data. One, within the close elections
of the RD, we find that re-running rates among runner-ups are far beyond the necessary
assumption of zero: 24.3% of runner-ups re-run in their municipality’s next election after
they lost.
The second observation is that in the next election after a close race, candidates of
marginally winning incumbent parties are significantly younger (-8.6 years) than their
counterfactuals. If age is a strong proxy for years spent in politics, then this finding
suggests that new candidates above the cut-off are less experienced. Less experience
means that candidates have spent fewer years campaigning or serving in office. There-
fore, voters know less about them and, hence, are more uncertain about their quality.
Finally, we apply our revised empirical strategy to the replicated sample and find that
the partisan incumbency advantage is cut by three quarters from the initial result (from
-13.2% to -3.1%). We further show that our strategy largely increases the RD sample




3.2.1. The Canonical Empirical Strategy
Figure 3.2.1 shows how the current literature estimates the partisan incumbency effect.
The canonical empirical strategy is a regression discontinuity design (RD) with a close
election in year t. In the figure, we use party A as unit of analysis, with B as competitor
party. The model’s predictions are the same if elections have more than two parties.
Comparing average election outcomes of candidates from incumbent and non-incumbent
parties would be confounded, since the variation across candidates is most likely driven
by more than just the difference in their parties’ incumbency status. Therefore, state
of the art is to control for such endogeneity with a robust bias-corrected RD (Calonico
et al., 2014). The RD’s forcing varaible is the vote share margin between the first- and
second-ranked candidate in the mayor elections.
Closed-seat Election in t:
Aincumbent
B
below cut-off: Aincumbent marginally loses
above cut-off: Aincumbent marginally wins
Open-seat Election in t + 1:
Anew
Brunner−up/new
Closed-/Open-seat Election in t + 1:
Arunner−up/new
Bincumbent/new
Figure 3.2.1.: RD estimation from current literature: The effect of incumbent
party A winning a close election in t on its probability of unconditional
victory in t+ 1.
In the canonical RD, party A wins the election in t−1 and is therefore the incumbent
party in t who re-runs for office with its incumbent candidate (i.e. Aincumbent). Given
that politicians can only stay for two consecutive terms in office, A’s candidate faces a
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term limit if she narrowly wins in t. Hence, A needs to run with a new candidate in
t+ 1 (i.e. Anew). In the counterfactual case, A’s candidate narrowly loses the election in
t and is therefore the runner-up. A can run again with the runner-up in t + 1, or with
a new candidate (i.e. Arunner−up/new).
In both cases, A can also decide to not run at all. The current literature does not
condition on A (or any of the competitor parties) actually running in t + 1, since A’s
likelihood to re-run might systematically differ at the cut-off (Magalhaes, 2015).5 The
outcome we study is therefore the likelihood of victory by the incumbent party in the
next election, unconditional on actually running in t+ 1.
Relying on a weaker identification assumption (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Sekhon and
Titiunik, 2017), we expect that everything but incumbency status varies smoothly at
the RD cut-off where the winner and the runner-up tie. If and only if this assumption
holds, the partisan incumbency disadvantage is identified. The intuition is that we
compare the probability of winning between two very similar candidates in t+ 1, which
differ only by their party’s incumbency status. Since A’s candidate faces a term limit if
she wins in t, the estimated effect should be caused by the party’s incumbency status
and not by the candidate’s.
3.2.2. The Model
We present a simple model to show how term limits can introduce bias to the canonical
RD estimator. The model is theoretically founded in a model on electoral competition
by Carrillo and Mariotti (2001).6
5For example, marignal losers in t might be less frequent re-runners in t + 1 than marginal winners.
6In their model, parties are risk-averse and therefore choose in expectation to re-run with their can-
didate from the preceding election instead of a new candidate whose quality is uncertain, and thus
electoral competition leads to an excessive conservatism of parties in terms of candidate nomination.
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There are two parties, A and B. In a close election, their candidates are a and b
respectively. In the election following the close one, the parties can decide whether to
retain the old candidate or run with a new candidate n. In other words, party A needs
to nominate either a or n, and party B b or n. The parties care only about winning the
election and the winning party will enjoy an office rent normalized to 1.
Suppose, as assumed in the canonical empirical strategy, the qualities of the old can-
didates are θa = θb = θo. The new candidate is randomly drawn from a candidate pool,
which is the same for the two parties. We denote the quality of the new candidate
θn ∼ N(µn, σ2n). Note that we suppose there is no uncertainty about the old candidates’
quality, as voters have known them for years running election campaigns or serving in
office.
A representative voter needs to choose from the candidates nominated by the two
parties. The voter’s payoff depends on the quality of the elected candidate. We use
a mean-variance utility function to capture the fact that the voter, who is risk averse,
cares about both the quality of the elected candidate and the uncertainty of the new
candidate’s quality.
The utility function for the voter is UV (θi) = −e−λθi , where the utility is increasing
in θi, i ∈ {a, b, n}. λ is the degree of risk aversion. The voter dislikes uncertainty more
when λ is larger. Suppose the voter will elect an old candidate over a new one when
indifferent in an election between a new and an old candidate, and randomize when
indifferent in elections with other candidate compositions.
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The voter cannot observe the quality of the new candidate directly, but infers it
from his or her performance xn during the campaign. Formally, xn = θn + n, where
n ∼ N(0, σ2 ). Thus, by observing a performance xn, the expected quality of n is








We solve for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium by first considering the voter’s voting
strategy. In an election between the old candidate and a new one, based on the property
















































Given that E(xn) = µn, we can verify that µn > µ
∗










This means the party will only replace the old candidate when the mean quality of the
candidate pool µn is sufficiently higher than the quality of the old candidate. Otherwise,
keeping the old candidate is the equilibrium strategy for the parties. However, because
of the term limit, the barely winning party is legally bound to run with a new candidate
and thus is disadvantaged.
Hence, the model’s predictions can be explained in a few short steps: In the canonical
RD, barely winning parties are legally bound to run with a new candidate in an open-
seat election in t+ 1, due to the term limit their incumbent faces. But with whom will
the competitor parties run? The only competitor that matters is the runner-up party
from t. Its first-best choice to run against the new candidate from the incumbent party
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in t + 1 is their candidate from t (i.e. the runner-up) who only barely lost against the
incumbent in t.
Since the incumbent party has to choose the new candidate from the party’s pool
of candidates, her expected quality will be equal to the party’s average. The higher
the variance within the candidate pool, the more uncertain is the voter about the new
candidate’s quality. Hence, in the absence of a strong partisan incumbency advantage,
a risk-averse voter will choose the runner-up over the new candidate in expectation.7
Now, what about the candidate choice of a barely losing party? They run in a closed-
seat election in t+1 against the in t barely elected incumbent from the competitor party.
Hence, their first-best choice of candidate is also their runner-up candidate from t who
only barely lost against the now-incumbent.
Whenever the party chooses to run with a new candidate instead of the runner-up,
the new candidate’s expected quality has to be above that of the runner-up.8
Hence, we expect that, if the runner-up party from t chooses to run with a new can-
didate, she must be very strong and is expected to perform better against the current
incumbent than the bare loser from the previous election. Given the close election result
in t and under the assumption of no incumbency advantage, we expect the chances of
victory between the incumbent and the runner-up party to be about equal. If there was
a personal incumbency advantage, the incumbent would win in expectation.
7A strong partisan incumbency advantage could compensate for the lower relative quality of the
incumbent party’s new candidate.
8Following Carrillo and Mariotti (2001), that is because a risk-averse party would only ever choose a
new candidate when either (a) the current candidate has proven to be very bad, or (b) the party
has some private information about the new candidate (e.g. if she ran successfully for other offices
in the past), which tells the party that she is more competitive than the runner-up.
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In Appendix C.6, you can find the formal statement of our model. In Appendix
C.7, we further show comparative statics for an increase in voter’s uncertainty about
candidates’ quality or an increase in the voter’s degree of risk aversion.
3.2.3. The Revised Empirical Strategy
In the model, we discuss term limits and the discovery of high-quality new candidates as
exogenous reasons for a party to replace their old candidate. In the real world, there are
even more exogenous reasons, such as illness, death or existence of other career options.
We leverage exogenous candidate replacements to identify the partisan incumbency ef-
fect.
Our revised RD estimation no longer conditions on A being the incumbent party in
t. Instead, we use close open-seat elections in t. We then estimate the effect on party
A’s probability of winning when running with a new candidate in an all-new-candidate
race in t+ 1. This means that the competitor parties also all run with a new candidate.
The assignment of party incumbency status is equivalent to the canonical RD: Above
the cut-off, the new candidate’s party is the incumbent party, since she won the last
election in t. While below the cut-off, the new candidate’s party narrowly lost the elec-
tion in t, and, as a consequence, does not have incumbency status in t+ 1.
If replacements are exogenous, then all new candidates’ quality should be the same in
expectation. Because all new candidates are drawn from a candidate pool with the same
quality distribution. Hence, if the RD identifies a negative difference in the probability
of winning of the new candidate above and below the cut-off, it must be because of a
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partisan incumbency disadvantage.
Our identification strategy has two limitations. First, exogeneity of candidate replace-
ment is a strong assumption. For example, candidates from the incumbent party might
be more likely to face a scandal or alternative career options. In this case, the probabil-
ity of replacement would be asymmetric at the cut-off and the exogeneity assumption
violated.
Second, elections in which only new candidates run are particular. While this does
not endanger our identification, we might be estimating a very local average treatment
effect with limited external validity.
3.3. Empirical Replication
In order to provide evidence for our theory, we replicated the study by Klasnja and
Titiunik (2017) (henceforth KT) using Brazilian mayoral elections 1996-2012. A more
detailed description of the sample replication can be found in Appendix C.5. KT use
two different samples in their study.
The Incumbent Sample uses the canonical RD. Hence, in this sample, KT estimate
the effect of winning a close closed-seat election on the incumbent party’s probability of
winning the next election.
The Open-seat Sample refers to an RD in which the election in t is an open-seat elec-
tion. Parties do therefore not face a term limit in t + 1 and are allowed to re-run with
their previous candidate. KT show that they cannot identify a partisan incumbency
disadvantage in this sample.
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In the following, we focus on KT’s Incumbent Sample. For all of the following RD
estimations, we use the same cut-off as KT.
3.3.1. Runner-ups
First, our model predicts that a considerable share of parties run with their runner-up
candidates. Table C.2.2 in the Appendix lists the average share of different types of
candidates in all elections.
Re-runners include all types of candidates who have run at least once before (i.e.
previous and earlier incumbents, runner-ups and other losers). Among the incumbent
re-runners, we only count winners from the previous election running for re-election.
Runner-ups are the second-ranked candidates in the previous election who run again.
The table shows that the average share of runner-up candidates is 5.2% in closed-seat
and 3.9% in open-seat elections. However, parties should be mouch more likely to re-
run with their runner-up after an election was close. Using RD, we find this to be true.
Figure C.2.1 in the Appendix shows that on average 24.3% of bare losers from t re-run
with their runner-up in t+ 1.
Our model predicts that voters prefer runner-ups over new candidates who replace
the incumbent after a term limit. However, runner-ups’ probability of winning might be
impeded if competition is stronger in elections that follow a term limit. We therefore
measure the ratio of the runner-up to the number of candidates in an election to proxy
competition. We find no significant difference at the RD cut-off. As we can see in Fig-
ure C.2.3, the share of runner-ups in an election is about 17.4% below and 15% above
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the RD cut-off.
Based on our model, we further expect that runner-ups perform well. In Table C.3.1
in the Appendix, we show simple OLS regression estimates of the likelihood of winning
an election for different candidate types. All estimates are conditional on actually run-
ning in the election.9 Runner-up candidates from the previous election show a strong
performance in both open- and closed-seat elections. However, the estimate is much
higher for open-seat elections (+18.8% compared to +6.9%). Again, this is consistent
with our model’s prediction that voters prefer runner-ups over new candidates.
3.3.2. New Candidates
Our model further finds that parties only choose to replace an old candidate if they know
that the new one is very strong. We therefore run KT’s RD conditioning on candidates
being new. This means that we compare the likelihood of winning elections in t+1 when
both the barely losing and the barely winning party from t run with a new candidate.
New means that the candidate is neither the runner-up nor another re-running candidate
(e.g. a former incumbent). As we can see in Figure C.1.1, the RD effect is insignificant
but negative at c. -4.9%.
This result is also consistent with our model: We expect new candidates below the
cut-off to perform better than new candidates from above. Since below the cut-off, the
replacement of the old with a new candidate is the decision of the party. Above the
cut-off, the replacement is enforced by term limits.
However, even in the absence of term limits, running with new candidates is not always
9This condition deflates the otherwise even higher coefficients.
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endogenous. A party is sometimes forced to do so for other exogenous reasons (e.g.
candidates’ death, illness or a scandal). This introduces noise into the RD estimate,
which weighs more in smaller samples and may therefore generate insignificant RD
effects.
3.3.3. Uncertainty About Candidate Quality
Measuring voters’ uncertainty about candidates’ quality is difficult. We argue that age
is a plausible proxy for how many years a candidate spent in politics. Under this as-
sumption, a candidate’s age indicates how long voters have been exposed to and hence
have learned about the quality of a candidate. For example through the candidate’s
election campaigns or her years spent in political office.
We therefore used age from the Brazilian mayoral candidates data 1996-2012 and
merged it by candidate name, municipality and election year with the electoral data.
Row one and two in Table C.4.1 show that for the canonical RD estimation, the av-
erage candidate age in t + 1 is not smooth at the cut-off. Candidates from marginally
winning incumbent parties in t are 8.6 years younger than their counterfactuals from
marginally losing parties in t.
If age proxies years spent in politics, then this result suggests that new candidates
above the RD cut-off are not as well-known to the voter as the candidates below. There-
fore, voters are more uncertain about their quality.
This difference in candidates’ age also persists when we condition on candidates being
new in t+1. Again, we expect parties to replace an old with a new candidate only if the
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new one is of exceptional quality. It is therefore no surprise that barely losing parties
choose to replace their runner-up with an at least equally experienced new candidte.
To test for further imbalances at the RD cut-off, we also ran the RD with candidates’
education. Education is an imperfect but again plausible proxy for candidates’ quality.
Row three and four in Table C.4.1 show that we find no signifcant difference in can-
didates’ education at the RD cut-off. This finding is indicative. It suggests that it is
not candidate quality that is driving the RD’s downward bias, but voters’ uncertainty
about it. Thus, a candidate’s years spent in politics matters more than her academic
qualification.
3.4. Revised Estimation
Finally, we used KT’s replication sampe to estimate the partisan incumbency effect with
our revised estimation. Row (3) in Table C.1.1 shows that the revised result is cut by
one half from initially -13.2% to -6.1%. This suggests that a large share of the partisan
incumbency disadvantage estimated with the canonical RD might indeed be due to dif-
ferential candidate quality.
With the new approach, we now have partisan incumbency disadvantage working in
elections in t + 1 both above and below the RD cut-off. Both above and below the
cut-off, the party who narrowly won a close election is now the incumbent party in the
next election. Hence, the incumbency disadvantage should work against the party who
marginally won in t and in favour of the party who marginally lost. Following Erik-
son and Titiunik (2015) and Fowler and Hall (2014), we therefore need to divide the
estimated effect further by two, in order to avoid a double count. This division further
reduces the estimated disadvantage for incumbent parties to -3.05% with a robust con-
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fidence interval of [-5.15%, -1.5%].
For the revised estimation to be valid, it is important that the proxies for candidate
quality are smooth at the RD cut-off. In Row (5) and (6) in Table C.4.1, the RD
estimates show that we find no significant differences in neither age nor education of
candidates running in t+ 1.
Another advantage of our revised empirical strategy is that it increases the sample
size. This increase is due to the fact that we no longer exploit term limits and hence
do not need to condition on parties being incumbent parties in t. Hence, with electoral
data starting in 1996, we can use the close elections from every election year. A larger
sample size allows for more robust inference, both in the estimation of the incumbency
effect and the smoothness of covariates at the RD cut-off.
To conclude, we argue that we can identify the partisan incumbency disadvantage
through our revised strategy as long as there is no systematic difference in the quality
distribution of candidate pools across parties. This assumption only has to hold condi-
tional on a previous close election in districts.
3.5. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that a canonical RD to estimate paritsan incumbency dis-
advantage is downward biased if voters’ uncertainty about the candidate’s quality is
unbalanced at the cut-off. The reason is that these RDs exploit term limits that force
narrowly winning parties to nominate new candidates. At the same time, narrow losers
have a choice and will therefore go for the strongest possible competitor who is often
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the runner-up.
We propose a revised RD strategy without term limits, but conditioning on all parties
nominationg new candidates in order to avoid bias. With data from Brazilian mayoral
elections in 1996-2012, we apply both the canonical and the revised RD to identify a
partisan incumbency disadvantage. Our findings show that using the new approach cuts
the effect by three quarters, from -13.2% to -3.05%.
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C. Appendix
C.1. Results for Canonical & Revised RD
with replicated sample from Klasnja and Titiunik (2017)
Dependent Variable Election in t Estimate Robust CI Robust pval h Ntr Nco
(1) Unconditional Victory Pooled -0.094 [-0.169 , -0.036] 0.002 14.1 1453 1344
with Any Candidate in t+ 1 Closed-seat -0.132 [-0.246 , -0.033] 0.010 13.4 654 498
Open-seat -0.056 [-0.151 , 0.010] 0.088 17.3 880 907
(2) Unconditional Victory Pooled -0.045 [-0.106 , 0.004] 0.067 13.6 1199 1004
with New Candidate in t+ 1 Closed-seat -0.049 [-0.151 , 0.044] 0.281 12.5 603 384
Open-seat -0.032 [-0.110 , 0.027] 0.235 15.5 589 663
(3) Unconditional Victory Open-seat -0.061 [-0.103 , -0.030] 0.000 18.2 3851 4754
with all New Candidates in t+ 1
Table C.1.1.: Canonical RD effect of incumbent party’s victory in t on (1) unconditional
victory in t + 1 (i.e. KT replication), (2) victory in t + 1 conditional on
running with a new candidate, and revised RD effect of party’s victory
in t on (3) victory in t + 1 conditional on all parties running with new
candidates. h is the optimal bandwith (following Calonico et al. (2014)),
Ntr are number of treated observations within bandwith, and Nco are








































































Figure C.1.1.: Partisan incumbency disadvantage estimated with KT’s RD in which elec-
tions in t are closed-seat, include only incumbent parties and run with a






































































Figure C.1.2.: Partisan incumbency disadvantage estimated with KT’s RD in which elec-
tions in t are open-seat, include only incumbent parties and run with a







































































































































































































































Figure C.1.3.: Partisan incumbency disadvantage estimated with revised RD in which
elections in t are open-seat, include both incumbent and non-incumbent
parties and all parties run with new candidates in t+ 1.
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C.2. The Share of Runner-ups in Elections
Dependent Variable Election in t Estimate Robust CI Robust pval h Ntr Nco
(1) Runner-up runs in t+ 1 Pooled -0.150 [-0.204 , -0.106] 0.000 14.8 1503 1377
Closed-seat -0.243 [-0.340 , -0.157] 0.000 13.9 675 515
Open-seat -0.094 [-0.147 , -0.046] 0.000 17.5 886 917
(2) Share of Runner-ups in t+ 1 Pooled -0.003 [-0.045 , 0.052] 0.892 16.6 774 624
Closed-seat -0.024 [-0.112 , 0.091] 0.835 11.7 237 180
Open-seat 0.018 [-0.035 , 0.080] 0.445 17.8 470 401
Table C.2.1.: Canonical RD effect of incumbent party’s victory in t on (1) likelihood of
running with the runner-up from t in t + 1, and (2) the share of runner-
up candidates in election in t + 1. h is the optimal bandwith (following
Calonico et al. (2014)), Ntr are number of treated observations within
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Figure C.2.1.: Likelihood of running with the runner-up from t in t+ 1, using KT’s RD
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Figure C.2.2.: Likelihood of running with the runner-up from t in t+ 1, using KT’s RD


































































Figure C.2.3.: Share of runner-ups in t + 1, using KT’s RD in which elections in t are






















































Figure C.2.4.: Share of runner-ups in t + 1, using KT’s RD in which elections in t are
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Figure C.2.5.: Distribution of the candidate share of re-runners per election in the KT-
replicated sample of incumbent parties in Brazil’s mayoral elections be-
tween 1996-2012, both open- and closed-seat (pooled).
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Closed seat Elections Open seat Elections
Share of re-runners 53.0% 11.2%
Share of incumbents 36.4% 0%
Share of runner-ups 5.2% 3.9%
Share of new candidates 100 - 53.0 = 47.0% 100 - 11.2 = 88.8%
Table C.2.2.: Share of different types of candidates in the Brazilian mayoral elections
between 1996-2012.
C.3. Electoral Chances of Runner-up Candidates




Table C.3.1.: OLS estimates for the likelihood of winning in Brazilian mayoral elections
between 1996-2012 (conditional on running) from a simple regression on
different candidate types. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.00,∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗ : p < 0.05
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C.4. RD Effect on Proxies of Candidate Quality in t + 1
Dependent Variable Election in t Estimate Robust CI Robust pval h Ntr Nco
(1) Candidate’s age in t+ 1 Pooled -4.543 [-7.972 , -2.124] 0.001 9.5 487 441
Closed-seat -8.646 [-14.859 , -3.924] 0.001 8.7 584 284
Open-seat -1.044 [-4.567 , 2.059] 0.458 13.4 380 347
(2) New candidate’s age in t+ 1 Pooled -3.256 [-7.924 , 0.244] 0.065 10.1 324 217
Closed-seat -4.666 [-11.902 , 1.318] 0.117 10.5 204 84
Open-seat -0.872 [-7.218 , 4.238] 0.610 13.4 170 155
(3) Candidate’s likelihood Pooled -0.061 [-0.194 , 0.043] 0.211 13.0 638 536
of higher education in t+ 1 Closed-seat -0.029 [-0.226 , 0.162] 0.744 12.5 253 186
Open-seat -0.086 [-0.257 , 0.048] 0.181 12.7 368 338
(4) New candidate’s likelihood Pooled -0.059 [-0.255 , 0.090] 0.346 11.5 369 231
of higher education in t+ 1 Closed-seat 0.009 [-0.245 , 0.276] 0.909 11.6 222 89
Open-seat -0.162 [-0.464 , 0.055] 0.123 9.5 123 127
(5) Candidate’s age in t+ 1 Open-seat -1.136 [-3.149 , 0.729] 0.221 17.6 1366 1231
(6) Candidate’s likelihood Open-seat 0.031 [-0.036 , 0.118] 0.292 17.4 1352 1221
of higher education in t+ 1
Table C.4.1.: Canonical RD effect of incumbent party’s victory in t on (1) incumbent
party’s candidate’s age in t+1, (2) conditional on the candidate being new,
(3) the likelihood of the incumbent’s party’s candidate in t+1 having higher
education, (4) conditional on the candidate being new, and revised RD
effect of party’s victory in t on (5) party’s candidate’s age in t+ 1, and (6)
the likelihood of the party’s candidate in t+ 1 having higher education. h
is the optimal bandwith (following Calonico et al. (2014)), Ntr are number










Figure C.4.1.: Distribution of age of candidates within the KT-replicated sample of











































Figure C.4.2.: RD effect on age of incumbent party’s (from t) candidate in t + 1, using












































Figure C.4.3.: RD effect on age of incumbent party’s (from t) candidate in t+ 1, condi-
tional on her being a new candidate, using KT’s RD in which elections in





































































Figure C.4.4.: RD effect on age of party’s candidate in t + 1, conditional on all parties’
candidates in t+ 1 being new, using the revised RD in which elections in
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Figure C.4.5.: Distribution of educational attainment of candidates within the KT-



































































Figure C.4.6.: RD effect on likelihood of higher education of incumbent party’s (from t)
candidate in t + 1, using KT’s RD in which elections in t are closed-seat






























































Figure C.4.7.: RD effect on likelihood of higher education of incumbent party’s (from t)
candidate in t+ 1, conditional on her being a new candidate, using KT’s





























































































Figure C.4.8.: RD effect on likelihood of higher education of party’s candidate in t+ 1,
conditional on all parties’ candidates in t+ 1 being new, using the revised
RD in which elections in t are open-seat and include both incumbent and
non-incumbent parties.
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C.5. Replication Procedure of Klasnja and Titiunik
(2017)
In order to corroborate our theoretical argument presented above, we replicated the
electoral data used by KT from Brazil’s government website.1 We had to replicate the
data from the original source, because KT’s replication files did unfortunately not yet
contain the candidate-level data, which we needed to identify re-runners, runner-ups as
well as incumbents. Our sample size is smaller than KT’s with 11,186 observations in
the pooled election sample of incumbent parties, 2,156 observations in the Incumbent
Sample and 9,020 observations in the Open Seat Sample. KT report a total sample of
around 27’455 observations. However, around the cut-off, we have comparable numbers
of observations and we receive similar optimal bandwidths as KT using the rdrobust
package by Calonico et al. (2015) in R.
A reason why our sample is smaller than KT’s might be due to incomplete data on
Brazil’s government website, which shows currently the following statement:
“Candidate data and election results from 1994 to 2002 are incomplete. A review is
being made of the data sources and, as the work is completed, the files will be replaced.”
Table C.5.1 below lists the number of candidate observations from all parties (and not
just incumbent parties) per state and year in Brazil’s mayoral elections between 1996
and 2012 in our replicated sample. What seems obvious is that observations in 1996
are not complete. 1996 is used as year t − 1 to identify incumbent parties in 2000 (i.e.
t). Hence, if 1996 is incomplete, it reduces the number of incumbent parties we can
1National repository for electoral data: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/
repositorio-de-dados-eleitorais-1/repositorio-de-dados-eleitorais
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identify in our sample. It is likely that KT have additional information which parties
have won elections in 1996 (e.g. a dummy variable for incumbency status of parties) and
that they can therefore identify all incumbent parties that could run for re-elections in
2000. Having less observations of incumbent parties reduces the power of our sample,
but does not undermine our theoretical argument as long as it is still representative of
the whole sample. This means that the share of runner-up candidates who re-run after
close elections is (1) not significantly higher in our sample compared to the complete
sample. And (2), runner-up candidates in our sample do not perform significantly better
in our sample compared to the complete sample.
State 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Total:
AC 19 53 62 66 73 351
AL 8 291 296 299 305 1’501
AM 8 213 189 214 225 1’099
AP 5 64 49 67 75 333
BA 9 1’119 1’254 1’264 1’129 5’984
CE 10 456 501 507 508 2’486
ES 9 230 235 218 235 1’201
GO 12 653 686 642 664 3’344
MA 8 596 665 659 663 3’250
MG 7 2’228 2’353 2’229 2’251 11’480
MS 5 223 207 183 210 1’055
MT - 355 381 384 369 1’873
PA 8 454 470 437 481 2’389
PB 8 502 552 574 551 2’735
PE 8 486 506 484 513 2’562
PI 212 521 583 579 541 2’984
PR - 1’000 1’092 1’035 1’024 5’250
RJ - 324 341 309 366 1’763
RN 6 409 417 408 426 2’103
RO - 175 158 165 147 799
RR 5 37 57 45 47 267
RS 12 1’329 1’252 1’154 1’186 6’192
SC - 742 752 727 689 3’656
SE 10 200 193 204 217 1’052
SP 12 1’950 2’069 1’914 2’036 10’171
TO 16 342 333 363 371 1’814
Total: 397 14’952 15’653 15’130 15’298 15’695
Table C.5.1.: Number of candidate observations in all parties and mayoral elections per
state and per year in the replicated sample.
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C.6. Formal Statement of the Model
The players of the model are Party A, Party B, and a representative voter V . Party
A must nominate a candidate cA ∈ {a, n}, where a is the old candidate A nominated
in the previous election, and n is a new candidate randomly drawn from the candidate
pool. Party B must nominate a candidate cB ∈ {b, n}, where b is the old candidate and
n is a new candidate randomly drawn from the same candidate pool. To simplify the
exposition, we also denote an old candidate either a or b as o.
The parties are office-seekers, and the winning party will enjoy an office rent normal-
ized to 1. The voter needs to elect either cA or cB. The voter’s utility is represented as a
mean-variance utility function, formally UV (θi) = −e−λθi , where the utility is increasing
in θi, i ∈ {o, n}. λ is the degree of risk aversion. This implies that the voter, who is
risk averse, cares about both the quality of the elected candidate and the uncertainty
of the new candidate’s quality. The voter dislikes uncertainty more when λ is larger.
We also suppose the voter will elect an old candidate over a new one when indifferent
in an election between a new and an old candidate, and randomize when indifferent in
elections with other candidate compositions.
Regarding quality of the candidates. As assumed in the canonical RD strategy, we
suppose that the candidates ran in a close election, the quality of the old candidates
are the same, i.e., θo = θa = θb, and this quality is a common knowledge to all players
in the game. New candidates on the other hand are drawn from a candidate pool. Ex
ante, the quality of a new candidate is θn ∼ N(µn, σ2n). After a new candidate is drawn,
a party needs to decide whether to nominate the new candidate n or the old one o. The
voter does not know n’s quality if she is nominated. Instead, the voter observes the n’s
performance during the campaign, i.e., receiving a signal xn to learn about θn. Formally,
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xn = θn + n, where n ∼ N(0, σ2 ).
The strategy profile of the voter and the parties constitute a Perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium if:
1. The voter updates her belief about the competence of the new candidate n following
the Bayes’ rules. Observing xn, from the conjugate prior of normal distribution, we
know that n’s expected mean quality is E(θn|xn) = µnσ2+xnσ2nσ2+σ2n , and its variance is
V ar(θn|xn) = σ2σ2nσ2+σ2n . Following the property of the mean-variance utility function,
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2. Given the voter’s strategy, parties use a cutoff strategy to maximize its winning
probability: A party will replace the old candidate when it finds a new candidate’s


















θo, we know that a party will replace the old candidate (in other words, a new
















The Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is thus:
















> θo (note that we suppose the voter will
elect an old candidate over a new one when indifferent in an election between a
new and an old candidate, and randomize when indifferent in elections with other
candidate compositions).
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2. A party replaces the old candidate when µn > µ
∗
n.
C.7. Comparative Statics with Respect to Uncertainty
of Candidate’s Quality and the Degree of Risk
Aversion
What happens if we increase the uncertainty in the quality of new candidates σn, and




























we know that increasing the uncertainty makes the party’s threshold of replacing the old
candidate µ∗n to be higher. This indicates that, with higher uncertainty in the quality of
a candidate randomly-drawn from the candidate pool, a party will be more conservative








we know that µ∗n is increasing in the voter’s degree of risk aversion. This indicates that,




C.8.1. Quality-based Incumbency Effects
Reference Summary
Eggers (2017) Why current RD estimates may suffer from candidate quality-based bias.
Ashworth and de Mesquita (2008) Close elections between an incumbent and a runner-up
select on average high-quality candidates into next election.
Carson et al. (2007) Unpack how the interaction between party strength and candidate quality mattered
for the development of incumbency effects in the US.
Table C.8.1.: Summarised literature on quality-based incumbency effects.
The idea of quality-based incumbency effects is not new. Eggers (2017) derives in a sim-
ple theoretical model why RD estimates from this literature may suffer from candidate
quality-based bias. Most importantly, he refers to differential candidate replacement
rates, which produce quality-based incumbency effects if the candidates who re-run are
stronger or weaker than the replacement candidates. According to Eggers, this can occur
for 3 reasons: Selection into re-running, changes in the candidate pool over time and
selection into marginality.
The first and the third reason are important for the argument we make in this paper.
First, marginal losers from close elections tend to re-run, because their chances to win
against the marginal winner proved to be good. Second, the average quality of marginal
candidates is stronger than the parties’ average candidate. On p. 6, Eggers states: “If
one candidate is drawn from the candidate pool and the other is stronger than the candi-
date pool (e.g., because she is an incumbent), then close elections will disproportionately
feature candidates who are stronger than the candidate pool.” Therefore, we predict that
re-runners from narrow elections are on average stronger than new candidates.
Eggers relates his theory to an earlier model by Ashworth and de Mesquita (2008).
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Their model predicts that close elections between an incumbent and a runner-up select
on average high-quality candidates into the next election. This selection into the follow-
up election can of course only occur if candidates are not prevented from re-running due
to term limits.
In an impressive empirical contribution, Carson et al. (2007) unpack how the inter-
action between party strength and candidate quality mattered for the development of
incumbency effects in the US. Using a new historical data-set on US congressional can-
didates in the 19th century, they show that highly competitive elections and the strong
party system at the time led to the nomination of more equally qualified candidates both
on the incumbent and contender side of an election. This caused a small quality gap
between candidates and hence a much smaller incumbency advantage than we observe
today in US Congress elections.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is to point out a specific quality-based
bias in the way partisan incumbency effects are estimated today. Further, we propose
an empirical strategy to overcome this problem, which has not been suggested so far.
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C.8.2. The Partisan Incumbency Effect
Reference Summary
Lee (2008) Using RD to estimate incumbency effects.
Erikson and Titiunik (2015) The personal incumbency effect using RD.
Hall and Snyder (2015) Identifying the “scare-off” effect of incumbents.
Magalhaes (2015) Why we should estimate incumbency effects unconditional on a party actually re-running.
Klasnja and Titiunik (2017) Partisan incumbency disadvantage in Brazilian mayoral elections 1996-2012
Klasnja (2015a) Partisan incumbency disadvantage in Romanian mayoral elections 2008-2012.
Klasnja (2015b) Model on partisan incumbency disadvantage and corruption.
Fowler and Hall (2014) Partisan incumbency effect in US state legislature elections 1998-2008.
Table C.8.2.: Summarised literature on the partisan incumbency effect.
At its beginning, the incumbency effect literature using RD made no attempt to dis-
entangle the personal from the party incumbency advantage (Lee, 2008). Estimated
coefficients included both, the advantage that an individual candidate had from re-
running for office, and the advantage the party had from re-running with the same or a
new candidate.
Since it is of substantive interest which of the two benefits (or suffers) from holding
office, a more recent literature developed empirical strategies to identify only one or the
other. Each of these strategies uses a specific variation of the RD by Lee (2008). For
the personal incumbency effect, Erikson and Titiunik (2015) propose to apply an RD
to open-seat elections with high re-running rates of incumbent candidates in the next
election. The identified effect further includes what is known in the literature as the
“scare-off” effect (e.g., Hall and Snyder (2015)), which implies that marginally losing
parties in a close election anticipate an advantaged incumbent candidate in the next
election and therefore tend to run with a lower quality (or no) candidate. This means
that all estimates of incumbency effects working both above and below the RD cut-off
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need to be divided by two in order to avoid a double count.2
Magalhaes (2015) provides both theory and evidence why we should estimate incum-
bency effects on the probability of winning, unconditional on a party actually re-running
in the next elction. Especially outside of the US where re-running rates of parties can
vary significantly, conditioning on the party actually running can introduce severe selec-
tion bias, e.g. if only strong marginal losers decide to re-run in the next election.
For the study of partisan incumbency effects, several recent articles use an almost
identical empirical strategy. All exploit term limits of candidates who win a close elec-
tion and hence have to be replaced by the incumbent party in the next election.
Klasnja and Titiunik (2017) find a large partisan incumbency disadvantage in Brazil-
ian mayoral elections 1996-2012, which supports their theory that voters punish weak
parties for their failure to discipline lame-duck incumbents. Klasnja (2015a) identifies
a similarly large incumbency disadvantage in Romanian mayoral elections 2008-2012,
which increases in mayors’ opportunity costs of corruption. This confirms his theory
that voters frequently replace mayors with new candidates who may have the same po-
tential but yet lower know-how for corruptive activities than the experienced incumbent
(Klasnja, 2015b).
In a far more established democractic context, Fowler and Hall (2014) find a nega-
tive but not significant partisan incumbency effect in US state legislature elections from
1998-2008. They suggest that voters may want to balance over time between the Re-
2This may not apply for all incumbency effects. For example, Klasnja and Titiunik (2017) theorise
that their estimated partisan incumbency disadvantage only occurs after an incumbent candidate
has reached her term limit. Hence, below their RD cut-off where a marginal loser runs against an
incumbent candidate, the disadvantage for the incumbent party should not be at work.
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publican and Democratic party.
The key point in all of their empirical strategies is that the replacement of the narrowly
winning party’s candidate is exogenous due to term limits, while the selection of all other
candidates is endogenous. Hence, both above and below the RD cut-off, all other parties
can strategically choose a candidate with whom they enter the next election. It is this
endogeneity in candidate quality, which causes the risk of a quality-based downward bias
in the estimation they use. The fact that they all estimate a negative RD coefficient in
substantively different contexts and for different underlying theories is indicative. We
explore the source for this potential bias followed by a theoretical model below.
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